I’ve decided not to comment on the results of the U.S presidential elections. In my humble opinion they have no immediate impact on whether or not Iran will retaliate for Israel’s October 26 retaliatory attack targeting military sites and air defence systems tied to the country’s energy and
petrochemical industries.
In an op-ed he wrote for the National Post Andrew Richter said “The world waits as Iran decides what to do next. So far, cooler heads have prevailed on both sides
With the attack, the ball is now back in Iran’s court. Tehran has to decide whether to respond (again) and begin a new wave of escalatory strikes, or to let the current crisis pass.
The signs so far have been mixed. On the positive side, official Iranian state media was quick to downplay the strikes, even going so far as to claim they were limited and caused ‘little damage.’ But since then, the regime’s language has grown steadily more threatening, first, claiming Iran had a ‘duty’ to respond, and most recently suggesting that there will be ‘bitter, unimaginable consequences’ for Israel. These seemingly contradictory responses to the severity of Israel’s attack may suggest a divided government, pulled in opposing directions by competing factions.
For its part, Israel clearly thought long and hard about the targets it hit, and almost certainly adjusted them after its initial plans were leaked to an Iranian web site. It made sure not to directly strike oil or nuclear facilities, as both constitute ‘red lines’ which Iran would have felt obligated to respond to. Rather, the targets were carefully selected in order not to force Tehran’s hand.
Other factors will, no doubt, influence Iran’s decision. Perhaps most critically, the Iranian economy is in terrible shape, and can ill afford a full-scale war with a richer, more technologically-advanced foe. And Iranian military officials are certainly aware that Israel’s military is the most powerful in the region.
Furthermore, Iranian officials also know that outside of their ballistic missiles — which thus far have been largely unable to get past Israel’s defence systems — Tehran has no weapons that can hurt Israel. Its Air Force, as but one example, is barely functional, and would prove no match for the Israelis. Thus, it would enter any larger conflict with Jerusalem from a position of weakness.
However, at the same time, Israel must consider some factors that should give it pause as well. Most obviously, its military is no doubt fatigued after operating at a high tempo for over a year in Gaza and for the past several months in Lebanon. Israel’s army has had to be reinforced by civilian reservists, and these men are likely tired of the endless fighting and are looking forward to returning to their normal lives.
And while Israel does not comment on its weapons supplies and stockpiles, many analysts have started to ask difficult questions about whether its running low on munitions, including the anti-missile systems upon which the Iron Dome depends. While Israel produces some of its weapons domestically, it relies on Washington for the vast bulk of its arsenal, and many have even wondered about weapons supplies in the U.S. So, Israel has its own reasons for wanting to avoid a full-scale war.
All that said, I expect Iran will retaliate, and, once again, the odds of a larger war will be heavily reliant on chance.”
Local politics have gained considerable mention more recently.
Verbal clashes between Netanyahu and Gallant are not new.
Admittedly, the relationship between both men was rarely cordial and often caustic. There was little love lost between them – over the state of negotiations with Hamas, Israel’s military strategy and Netanyahu’s bid to bring in a sweeping overhaul of the judiciary in 2023.
Netanyahu and Gallant have often disagreed over the war in Gaza. In August, Gallant told a closed-door Knesset committee that Netanyahu’s goal of “absolute victory” in Gaza was “nonsense,” according to Israeli news media. Netanyahu then took the extraordinary step of releasing a press statement accusing Gallant of adopting an “anti-Israel narrative.”
Gallant was also highly critical of Netanyahu’s emphasis on controlling the Philadelphi Corridor. He said that prioritising its control over a ceasefire and hostage deal was a “moral disgrace.” In the cabinet, he voted against continued occupation there. “If we want the hostages alive, we don’t have time,” he said.
But it may be domestic politics that ultimately played the biggest role.
Netanyahu on Tuesday was forced to withdraw draft legislation that would have allowed ultra-Orthodox Israelis (Haredim) to get government subsidies for daycare even if the father of the children does not serve in the IDF, as all other Jewish Israelis are obligated to do. Netanyahu relies on ultra-Orthodox parties to govern, and they have threatened to upend his coalition if they are forced to serve in the military en masse.
Gallant had been outspoken against the idea that ultra-Orthodox Israelis be exempt from service, saying that “the security system under my leadership will not submit it to legislation.”
Gideon Sa’ar, whom Netanyahu has tapped for foreign minister, is thought to be an influential interlocutor to the ultra-Orthodox parties. Netanyahu, in his statement, said that Sa’ar’s appointment “will enhance the stability of the coalition and the stability of the government, and these are very important at any time, but especially in wartime.”
Safe and sound in my locale I can’t claim to know how people in other places (apart from my own family, of course) feel.
Take care.
Beni,
7th of November, 2024
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