Options

Prime Minister Netanyahu has been busy again mopping up after his ministers. This time it was an inadvertent remark made by Minister of Defence Ehud Barak and a sabre-rattling follow-up contributed by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman. Judging by Lieberman's bellicose remarks we are about to go to war. His outburst provoked an equally belligerent response on the Syrian side. The exchange of threats started on Monday last week when Minister of Defence Ehud Barak warned in a briefing to senior IDF officers, that “the absence of a peace settlement with Syria, was liable to lead to a confrontation and could spark off an all-out, regional war.” Israelis understood Barak’s remark as a plea for the Israeli government to start new peace negotiations with Syria, but the Syrians apparently interpreted it as warmongering. Syria's Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem was quick to respond - "Israel should not test Syria's determination. Israel knows that war will move to the Israeli cities." Lieberman looking more like a bar bouncer than a senior cabinet minister (actually he was a bar bouncer in his youth) replied without consulting the prime minister or the minister of defence. He threatened to depose Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and put an end to the Assad dynasty if the wily Syrian should contemplate attacking Israel directly or by proxy.
By midweek both Barak and Netanyahu were anxious to reassure the Syrians that Israel is not mobilising for war. Barak called on Assad to "return to the negotiating table, instead of trading harsh words." Lieberman and Netanyahu issued a reassuring joint statement stating,
"We pursue peace and negotiations with Syria, without preconditions, while Israel will continue to act with force and determination against any threats."
In retrospect it appears that Walid al-Moallem chose to misunderstand Barak's badly worded statement. The Syrian minister and his advisors are familiar with the inner machinations of Israel's coalition government. They are also well aware that the exchange of threats is simply empty rhetoric. Avigdor Lieberman certainly knew that a firm well worded reply to Moallem would have been in keeping with diplomatic protocol and would have placated both sides. Instead he chose to ratchet up the exchange of verbal volleys obviously currying favour with Israelis who appreciate a strong plain-talking leader. I doubt if many people were impressed by Lieberman’s intimidating antics and by the end of the week the topic was old news. War wasn't imminent and peace was as elusive and distant as ever.
Journalist Akiva Eldar advises against the "illusion of the 'Syria first' option. Namely, the Israeli tendency to negotiate a peace settlement one track at a time. In an article he wrote for Haaretz Eldar reminds us that, "Three prime ministers - Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak - encouraged Bill Clinton to bypass Yasser Arafat and try his luck with Hafez Assad. Netanyahu, too, tried his luck." "Switching tracks" claims Eldar is counterproductive instead he advocates negotiating with the Palestinians and the Syrians separately on parallel tracks.
Arab Affairs analyst Dr. Guy Bechor recommends a "back to the drawing board" approach.
In an article he wrote for Yediot Ahronot Bechor says, "The time has come to bring Jordan too into the equation, just like Egypt has been brought into the Gaza equation." Bechor reminds his readers that after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza the Egyptians were left with the responsibility for the Gaza-Egyptian border and the Rafah border crossing. However, as long as Israel controls the Allenby bridge border crossing and the border between the West Bank and Jordan the Jordanians are simply interested onlookers. "Israel did Jordan a favour in 1967 when it detached it from the Palestinian problem, just like it did the Egyptians a favour by detaching them from Gaza. " Claims Bechor and warns,” A tiny Palestinian state will not be viable, unless it has a direct and clear link to Jordan, which is home to a solid Palestinian majority and where the heir to the throne himself is half-Palestinian. "
Bechor's Jordanian linkage concept certainly arouses a feeling of déjà vu. A few weeks ago Giora Eiland, former head of Israel’s National Security Council, presented a more comprehensive outline of a similar idea, namely, the latest reincarnation of the “Jordanian Option.” The origins of the Jordanian Option can be traced to the contacts between the Jewish Agency (the official link between the Jews in Palestine and the British mandatory authority) and King Abdullah I of Transjordan. In 1947 these contacts culminated in a secret agreement to partition Palestine between the Jewish state and Transjordan (later Jordan). After the War of Independence Israeli leaders regarded the survival of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan as essential to Israel’s security. After Israel captured the West Bank in the Six Day War Labour Party leaders opposed the creation of a Palestinian state and strove, unsuccessfully, for a territorial compromise with Jordan. The Jordanian Option ceased to be Israel's official policy following the rise to power of the Likud Party in 1977. Later, whether in opposition or as the Likud's coalition partner, the Labour Party continued to advocate the Jordanian Option. By cutting the links between Jordan and the West Bank in July 1988, Jordan's King Hussein announced, in effect, that a Jordanian Option no longer exists.
Giora Eiland’s concept was presented in a monograph called "Regional Alternatives to the Two-State Solution," released last month by Bar-Ilan University's Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies The embryo of the present concept appeared in an article he wrote for MESH (Middle East Strategy at Harvard) in April 2008 entitled “Back to the Jordanian Option,” Eiland argued that an Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement is “unfeasible in the foreseeable future.” He suggested reshuffling the cards and try to think about other solutions as well.
“One of them is a return to the Jordanian Option. The Jordanians won’t admit this publicly, yet a Palestinian state in the West Bank is the worst solution for them. They too know that within a short period of time such a state will be ruled by Hamas. The moment Jordan—which has a Palestinian majority as well as powerful Muslim Brotherhood opposition—shares a border with a Hamas state, the Hashemite regime will face immediate danger.” In his regional alternatives outlined in the Bar-Ilan pamphlet Giora Eiland explains, ”What is needed is a completely new way of looking at possible solutions, widening the lens to come up with fresh ideas beyond the idea of a two-state solution. The first option is what could be called the US of Jordan, a variation on the old Palestinian-Jordanian federation theme. The second option envisions a Palestinian state, but one with territory that would be enhanced by 720 km2. given by Egypt, which would in turn be compensated by a similar amount of land taken from the Negev.” Referring to the two-state solution he says, "It is hard to believe that the diplomatic effort that failed in 2000 will succeed in 2010, when most of the elements in the equation have changed for the worse.” According to Eiland US administrations have consistently claimed that: The Palestinians aspire to attain independence based on the 1967 borders. The gap between the sides' positions is small and bridgeable. ·Moderate Arab states are interested in ending the conflict and therefore will assist in its solution. The end of the conflict will bring about stability. Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is vital to obtaining Arab assistance in combating the Iranian threat. There is currently an opportunity to resolve the conflict and it must not be squandered. There is only one solution to the conflict, and that is the solution of two states with the 1967 border between them. As an alternative to becoming locked into the two-state mindset, Eiland proposes a Jordanian-Palestinian federation whereby Gaza and the West Bank would be states in a Jordanian kingdom, much like Pennsylvania and New York are American states. "They will have full independence on domestic issues as well as a budget, governmental institutions, laws, a police force, and symbols of independence, but similar to Pennsylvania or New Jersey they will not have responsibility for two issues: foreign policy and military forces. Those two areas, exactly as in the United States, will remain the responsibility of the 'federal' government in Amman." Eiland says the benefits of this proposal to the Palestinians are enormous. First and foremost it would ensure that an independent Palestinian state would not be ruled by Hamas. In addition, he writes, "the Palestinians also understand that under a two-state alternative, they will become citizens of a tiny state. Such a small state is not viable and will have security limitations (for example, conceding sovereignty over its airspace). It is preferable to be equal citizens in a large, respected country where the Palestinians will form the demographic majority." Jordan would benefit, he continues, because the way to prevent instability in Jordan, which would be fuelled by a future Hamas regime in the West Bank, is through Jordanian military control over this territory. And Israel would gain, he says, because it is more likely to get the security it desires if the territories are incorporated into a greater Jordanian state, rather than if a new - and most likely failed - mini-state is created on its doorstep. Eiland's other model, based on territorial exchange, calls for Egypt to transfer some 720 km2. of land - including 24 km. along the Mediterranean coast toward El-Arish - to the Palestinians, in order to allow them to build a million-plus city and a sustainable port and airport. Egypt would be compensated by an equal amount of land taken from the Negev, and a tunnel at Israel's southern tip from Egypt to Jordan, which would connect Egypt with the Arab countries to the east. The 720 km2. are equal to 12 percent of the West Bank, which would be the percentage of West Bank territory to remain in Israel's hands. The enlargement of Gaza is necessary if it is to be a viable entity, Eiland argues Egypt would benefit primarily from the 10 km. tunnel to Jordan, which would give it important physical and economic access to the main eastern part of the Middle East, and Jordan would get - via the tunnel - an important passage to the Mediterranean. So far Giora Eiland’s proposal has evoked only a ripple of comment. Maybe it is premature and needs to wait till the two-state solution becomes irrelevant. At the moment Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas is too busy to concern himself with Eiland’s proposals. Earlier this week Israeli TV Channel 10 aired a graphic video showing a Rafik al-Husseini Abbas's chief of staff caught on a hidden camera soliciting sex from a job applicant. The exposé was revealed to Channel 10 by Fahmi Shabaneh formerly in charge of the anti-corruption unit in the Palestinian General Intelligence Service. Shabaneh also disclosed dozens of cases of financial and administrative corruption in Mahmud Abbas’s inner government circle. In an interview with The Jerusalem Post two weeks ago, Shabaneh accused Abbas of failing to act against senior PA and Fatah officials allegedly involved in the theft of public funds and in sex scandals. Shabaneh said that he decided to talk to Channel 10 and The Jerusalem Post after Palestinian, Arab and foreign media organisations refused to interview him out of fear of being “punished” by the PA. Hamas news media did mention the scandal and the Channel 10 late night exposé programme boasted record viewer ratings among Palestinians.

Have a good weekend

Beni 11th of February, 2010. .