Thursday, 22 July 2010

A dome and a dilemma


With the passage of time, or to phrase it more brutally, with advancing old age, I find predictability comforting. It's good to know that the sun will rise tomorrow even when it's obscured by clouds. However, some things are predictably annoying. This week we marked Tisha B'av and predictably the usual provocative arguments regarding its commemoration appeared in the news media. By contrast the report on IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi's visit to Rome was very noteworthy. The visit made for the purpose of furthering cooperation between the Italian and Israeli armies also included a visit to the Roman Forum and of course the Arch of Titus.

Despite the infamous significance of the triumphal arch for Jews everywhere it also bears an intrinsic positive value. It provides the only contemporary depiction of the sacred articles looted from the Temple in Jerusalem . Ironically the menorah sculpted on the Arch served as the model for the menorah used on the emblem of the State of Israel. It became one of the most poignant symbols of the Diaspora.

In the sixteenth century Pope Paul IV , herded the Jews of Rome into a Ghetto and forced them to swear an annualoath of submission before the Arch of Titus. The arch bore such significance for Roman Jews, that they refused to walk under it. An exception occurred in 1948 with the founding of the State of Israel, when members of the local Jewish community passed through it in a solemn procession, in the opposite direction to that taken by the triumphant Roman legions.

On Tisha B'av , Lt. Gen. Ashkenazi's visit to the arch accompanied by his colleague the Italian Chief of Staff, General Vincenzo Camporini marked the closing of a cycle of history. I know other Israeli leaders have visited Rome and have stood before the Arch of Titus. However, as far as I know this was the first formal occasion when two generals, one the commander of the army of Italy, the reformation of ancient Rome, and the other the commander in chief of the armed forces of modern Israel, a nation forged from the descendents of the people exiled in the wake of the actions of Titus and his successors, stood together at that site. Maybe on that historic occasion the eternal repose of Titus and Paul IV was disturbed.

Another predictable response came from the Lebanese news media group Al-Manar, widely considered to be ideologically aligned with Hezbollah.

In a lead article bearing the title “Iron Dome Ready for Duty by November. Purchase Could Choke Israeli Budget.” The author described the impressive results of the final tests conducted on anti-rocket system this week. Quoting from an Israeli radio interview conducted with Yossi Drucker, the director of Rafael's Iron Dome project, Al-Manar says he claimed that the Iron Dome defence system provides a complete solution to all rocket threats to the Zionist entity

( Al-Manar’s term) from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.
“ Drucker said that Iron Dome had exceeded the defence establishment's original expectations for the anti-missile system. He also specifically stated that Iron Dome could be used to protect Sderot from incoming Palestinian rocket attacks.” Obviously the article wasn’t meant to simply relay information to the Lebanese public on the success of the Iron Dome system.

The message was concise and to the point. “It won’t work and even if it works it will cost too much.” Al-Manar found support for its claim from two articles published in Haaretz. Now I know why I cancelled my subscription to Haaretz.

In the earlier article published in January this year the paper claimed,
“The public relations campaign accompanying the test ( the early set of tests) is full of deceptions and half-truths. It has ignored the flaws in the systems and has created illusions. This is because Iron Dome will not protect the communities directly surrounding Gaza nor, apparently, locales even further away from the Strip.”
In likely scenarios of rocket fire on the home front, the stock of Iron Dome missiles is liable to run out way before the rocket barrages end. And in any case, because of the high cost of using Iron Dome for defence, the Palestinians in the south and Hezbollah in the north can defeat us at the bank, without even launching a single rocket,”

An editorial published this week in Haaretz further augments the earlier report it published. “In developing Iron Dome and the system that is supposed to function one aerial floor above it, ‘Magic Wand,’ Israeli governments acknowledged that they had been mistaken in setting priorities and earmarking resources for the defence establishment. But this was only a grudging admission. Despite the completion of development and the announcement that the system is operational, there is still no intention to deploy the first two batteries, which will be ready in the fall, to protect Sderot and other communities in the south.”

…." The launchers, rockets, radar and command vehicles of Iron Dome will evidently be for show, not for use.”

“This decision is baffling. It broadcasts doubt within both the government and the IDF that Iron Dome can actually move from television to the gritty reality of clashes with Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. It upsets residents of the south and could also puzzle Washington, which contributed more than $200 million to the programme.

It is unclear whether the Katyusha and Qassam launchers who watched the test footage believed what they saw. But it is now fairly clear that those who are supposed to equip themselves with Iron Dome and deploy it still do not believe in it.”

Of course this is just one opinion expressed in a newspaper whose editors have an axe to grind.

In a review which appeared six months ago on the “Riskline” (Political and Security Analysis) website Ian Siperco provided an interim outline of Israel’s anti-rocket and anti-missile programme. Under the title “Pursuit of the Shield: The Case for Israeli National Missile Defence” the author presented a far more balanced perspective, “Israeli efforts to develop an ambitious active missile defense (AMD) programme are at last reaching the first stages of operational maturity. With five overlapping weapons systems scheduled to come online by 2012-13, the programme carries the very real potential to change the nature of strategic decision-making in the region. But even if the missile shield is efficient in its reliability of interception, Israel must carefully consider whether it can rely entirely upon a combination of deterrence and active defence, or whether it must also stand ready to implement a decades-old policy of preemption. “ I’m sure the defence establishment has considered the more comprehensive approach.

Siperco continues, “Because rocket flight times to Israel range from nine seconds for the typical Gaza Qassam to roughly one to two minutes for Hezbollah's military-grade Katyushas, authorities required a weapon positioned for effective coverage with an exceptionally quick detect-to-launch cycle. Rafael's Iron Dome system was designed with these requirements in mind, optimized to protect city-sized areas against rockets fired from a range of 4 to 40 kilometres without being constrained by altitude, characteristics, or concentration of incoming salvos. “ He also mentions the system’s critics,

“Critics of the decision to opt for a doctrinal shift to AMD are divided between two camps: those who fear that the programme cannot provide a solution to nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and those who warn that large barrages of missiles may be used to overwhelm the system or force Israel into a costly arms race.
The first group makes the argument that no aerial shield can be made hermetic. Because even an extremely low rate of leakage would be intolerable if the incoming missiles carried nuclear and/or biological warheads, programme detractors warn against abandoning Israel's preemption option. For the moment, these arguments remain speculative. Under ideal conditions, Tehran might be able to carry out a first bomb test by 2010, but, at least under current conditions, the possible test devices would be the size of shipping containers and thus not deployable as weapons. While Iranian scientists are thought to be experimenting with technology for a "two-point implosion" device that could reduce the diameter of a warhead to a size that one of their Shahab rockets could carry, Israeli intelligence assumes the Iranians won't succeed before 2014.

There is also concern that countries like Iran or Syria could try to overwhelm the system by firing large barrages of ballistic missiles. This argument likewise does not stand up to scrutiny. The fire-control centres of Arrow batteries deployed near the cities of Rishon LeZion and Ein Shemer are capable of operating up to 14 interceptors at the same time and will each soon be equipped with 100 rockets, more than enough to respond to any medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile threat (as a point of reference, Iraq fired a total of 39 Scud missiles at Israel in 18 separate air raids for the whole of the 1991 Gulf War).

Of more pressing and practical concern are the implications of employing a costly rocket-based interceptor system to interdict up to 50,000 short-range missiles buffeting Israel on three fronts. It's true that Iron Dome is designed to provide ample protective overlap with the lower-tiered Centurion C-RAM (for use against steep-trajectory rockets and mortar shells that fall too quickly for Iron Dome to react). But, whereas the Centurion is a relatively cheap acquisition and inexpensive to operate (the system relies on fire bursts of between 3,000 and 4,500 20mm rounds per minute), an Iron Dome battery requires an initial outlay of $215 million with each Tamir interceptor missile running between $40,000 and $50,000

Ben Hartman writing in the Jerusalem Post this week raises doubts about the affordability of the Iron Dome system, nevertheless I keep in mind Ian Siperco’s cost analysis,

“Detractors have seized upon the relatively high sticker price of these interceptors to argue that reliance on Iron Dome may lead to a costly arms race, with militant groups forcing Israel to spend tens of thousands of dollars a shot to target comparatively cheap, homemade Qassams (produced in the Gaza Strip for an estimated cost of $200). These critics are either disingenuous or ill-informed. Iron Dome was designed to provide both robust and selective defence, keeping unit costs low by differentiating between weapons headed toward populated areas and those that will fall into the sea and open fields.

Development of Iron Dome has cost over $200 million, and the programme has come under repeated criticism because of its high cost. The system operates by identifying an incoming threat and then firing a missile to intercept it in mid-air. The missiles cost tens of thousands of dollars each, while the crudely-made rockets they’re meant to take down cost very little.”
Ben Hartman quotes an article on the CBN News Web site claiming that Iron Dome project director, Yossi Drucker, says each Tamir missile would cost $100,000.
Military analyst Reuven Pedatzur is less than thrilled about the system, which he has referred to as “a scam.” Pedatzur has consistently criticised the Iron Dome and its sister systems from their very inception. He hinges on the higher price ticket for the Tamir interceptor and gives a bargain price for the Qassam rockets.
“If each missile we fire costs $100,000, and each Qassam costs $10, $20, then all they’ll need to do is shoot as many rockets as they possibly can until we go broke. Hezbollah alone is believed to have over 150,000 long-range rockets. We can’t afford this.”
Pedatzur summed up his response to the claims that the Iron Dome system provides an answer to short to medium range threats as “nonsense and delusional,”

In the meantime India, Singapore and other unnamed prospective customers have show interest in acquiring the Iron Dome system. Obviously exports will help reduce the production costs of the system and the interceptors.

The dilemma regarding where to deploy the first two batteries coming off the assembly line in November is real. Instinctively we should opt to place the batteries along the Gaza Strip periphery, however concern for vital military air bases may take precedence over civilian centres.

The debate and the dilemma has yet to be resolved.

Have a good weekend.

Beni 22nd of July, 2010.



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