The worm has turned.

While supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice party celebrated the results of the first round of Egyptian parliamentary elections, Israeli observers amended their damage assessments. There's no doubt that the Islamic parties did better than expected. Admittedly, these results are from the first round of the Egyptian parliamentary elections only, but incomplete as they are, they do nevertheless, indicate a trend.

At this stage it's not clear whether the combined Islamist parties will try to form a coalition government, or if the Freedom and Justice party will seek a partner from among the liberal parties to counter the more radical Salafist Nour Party.

Since the parliament's final party makeup won't be known till January we can safely leave the Egyptians simmering on a back burner. As a last minute safety precaution a Yediot Ahronot staff journalist called Mounir Mahmoud, an Egyptian counterpart to ask his expert opinion. "Israel has no cause for concern – the peace treaty won't be revoked," said Mahmoud.

Calmed and reassured we can now switch to "Iran Mode."

Politicians love platforms and rarely miss an opportunity to exploit public and private occasions to make a statement with an open or imbedded message.

Prime Minister Netanyahu is no exception to that rule of thumb. Speaking at the annual Ben Gurion memorial ceremony held at Sde Boker he made a veiled reference to the Iranian threat. Invoking David Ben Gurion's leadership attributes Netanyahu drew a parallel to the present need, "to take tough, fateful decisions in the face of long odds and conventional wisdom."
Minister of Defence Ehud Barak repeats a similar message. However, not everyone in the cabinet favours the preemptive attack option. Ministers Benny Begin and Dan Meridor strongly oppose it. Former directors of the Mossad and military intelligence have also ruled out attacking Iranian installations. Ex-Mossad director Meir Dagan has repeatedly warned against the consequences of embarking on a reckless attack.

In an article published in The New Republic William Galston wrote about the annual forum of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy held recently. He said, “There is a gulf between Israel and the United States that could have momentous consequences in 2012. When American officials declare that all options are on the table, most Israelis do not believe them. They have concluded, rather, that when the crunch comes (and everyone thinks it will), the United States will shy away from military force and reconfigure its policy to live with a nuclear-armed Iran. This is an outcome that no Israeli government can tolerate. For Israel, the Palestinian issue is an identity question: What kind of country will Israel be and what kind of life will Israelis lead? But the Iranian issue is an existential question: Will Israel and Israelis survive?”

In a similar vein Professor Zaki Shalom, research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies and the Ben-Gurion Research Institute at Ben-Gurion University, made some interesting observations about Israeli-American strategic coordination regarding an Israeli operation against Iran.

“It seems increasingly clear that the American administration has no real intention of using an overt military option to eliminate the Iranian nuclear program. The practical meaning is that the US prefers to accept a nuclear Iran rather than risk military action against it,” claims Professor Shalom.

I don’t know if he attended the Saban Forum. Anyway his remarks appear to be a response to Leon Panetta's speech.

“This reality may present Israel with a dilemma in the coming months, whether to accept the possibility of Iran attaining nuclear capability or try to foil this possibility by means of its own independent military action. should Israel try to clarify either explicitly or implicitly the possibility of receiving any sort of green light from the US for a military operation against Iran, it is almost certain that the answer will be an absolute "no," undertaking an operation with far-reaching strategic implications contrary to the explicit position of Israel’s main, perhaps only, ally. Under present circumstances it is hard to see how Israel could benefit from this. Israel may assume that should its military action against Iran fail and it finds itself caught up in a widespread regional conflict and facing a massive Iranian response that could severely threaten Israel, the administration would not abandon it as a punitive measure for having dared to act against American wishes for the following key reasons: a) the special relationship that over the years has been formed between the two nations; b) unequivocal declarations by very senior administration officials about the US commitment to Israel’s security; c) the fear on the part of the US that the lack of American support would force Israel to make use of “the strategic deterrent force” that Israel, so America assumes, possesses; d) the awareness that public opinion and Congress would apply massive pressure on the administration not to abandon Israel in its most difficult hour; e) the concern that many voters, including Jews and supporters of Israel, would turn their back on the President in the upcoming election.

The Israeli government must assume that in any case, the American administration would issue statements against any Israeli military operation in Iran. The real nature of the American response, however, would to a large extent be affected by the measure of the Israeli operation’s success. Should it be a “clean” strike, i.e., manage to disrupt the Iranian nuclear project severely, not entail heavy losses to either side, and not elicit an exceptional Iranian counter-action, then the US would likely pay lip service to the need to condemn Israel for having embarked on a military action before all political moves against Iran had been tried and found wanting. In practice, the United States would almost certainly be pleased that its job had been done by others. However, should the operation fail, Israel would suffer not only American and international condemnation, but also conceivably punitive steps.”

Veteran publicist- journalist and politician Uri Avneri expressed scepticism concerning the likelihood of an Israel strike against Iran. Not surprisingly Avneri chose the Saudi Arab News to comment on the Iran dilemma. “It is an old Israeli tactic to act as if we are going crazy. We shall not listen to the U.S. any more. We shall just bomb and bomb and bomb. Well, let’s be serious for a moment, Israel will not attack Iran. Period"

The Mishkoltz Rebbe, Shalom Berger says we can rest assured there is no need to attack Iran. He’s sure we can rely on Divine Intervention. “God will get rid of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.” That’s nice to know, however it won’t harm to have a backup plan.

Journalist Ilana Dayan's television interview with retired Mossad director Meir Dagan revealed how deeply concerned he is about the consequences of the preemptive attack option. However, when he was asked to comment on the series of "mishaps" that have occurred to personnel and installations at Iran’s nuclear and missile sites, Dagan refused to comment. When the interviewer persisted with the same question, rephrasing it and asking if all these incidents were sabotage or force majeure, Dagan smiled and mumbled something about attributing them to Divine Intervention.

Cyber warfare was obliquely included in Ilana Dayan’s list of mishaps.

For more than a year now there have been a number of reports about the damage caused by the Stuxnet worm. This particular malware and a precursor called the Conficker worm which first appeared in 2008 have caused damage and delays to Iran’s nuclear programme. John Bumgarner, chief technology officer for the US Cyber Consequences Unit, a non-profit group that studies the impact of cyber threat, claims, "Conficker was a door kicker. It built out an elaborate smoke screen around the whole world to mask the real operation, which was to deliver Stuxnet."

The Stuxnet worm appears to have been responsible for the malfunctioning of the centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility. Yossi Melman, who covers intelligence topics for Haaretz suspects an Israeli involvement in the development of the Stuxnet worm . Meir Dagan and other people in the intelligence community estimate that Iran won’t have a nuclear weapon before 2015—at least three years later than earlier estimates. “The worm has turned.”

Consequently it’s difficult to understand why Netanyahu and Barak appear to be rushing ahead with preparations for a preemptive attack on Iranian nuclear and missile facilities.

Have a good weekend

Beni 8^th of December, 2011.