A few weeks ago while perusing the end of the year sales in a local bookstore I noticed four Arab women thumbing through books stacked on another stand. Their conservative apparel identified them as Muslims, probably from one of the villages nearby. The fact that all the books on the stand were in Hebrew didn't surprise me. Many Israeli Arabs begin the day in Arabic and spend their working hours alternating between Hebrew and Arabic. Israeli Arabs, both men and women have become increasingly fluent in Hebrew. This fluency can be traced back to the profound changes that took place in the "Arab Sector" during the mid-1960s. Between 1949 and 1966 the Arab minority in Israel was controlled by martial law. Once the martial law restrictions were lifted more Arabs were able to seek work outside the main Arab population centres. Working in the majority Jewish sector necessitated a working knowledge of Hebrew. Furthermore, the compulsory study of Hebrew as a second language in Arab schools and the exposure to Hebrew in the mass media contributed to an increasing fluency in Hebrew among Israeli Arabs. This linguistic integration has helped to advance the general wellbeing of Israeli Arabs; however they still remain one of the poorest sectors in the country.
Nevertheless, there are signs of some improvement. According to a study commissioned by the Israeli National Insurance Institute, there has been a significant rise in the employment rate in the Arab sector in recent years, mainly among women.
A few days after the bookstore encounter we travelled to Ramat Hasharon to attend a family gathering.
Driving south from Galilee along Route 6, also known as the Yitzhak Rabin highway, you pass very close to the imaginary "Green Line." At these places a very tangible wall and fence demarcate between Palestinians and Israelis. The stretches of concrete wall, fence and patrol roads with their sophisticated monitoring devices ward off would be terrorists, car thieves and other villains. Considering the awful consequences of a no-barrier situation I'm convinced it was well worth the cost (one million dollars a kilometre). However our much improved security and the subsequent sense of wellbeing have a downside.
Reaching a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians has become less urgent, we have walled them out. However, by walling them out we are also walling ourselves in. This siege situation, albeit self-imposed, afflicts both the besieged and the besieger. Admittedly driving along route 6 I feel neither remorse nor claustrophobia, nevertheless, I'm sure people in the Gaza periphery communities running for cover during a barrage of Qassam rockets and mortar fire are very much under siege. Likewise, on the other side of the divide Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, hemmed in on all sides are definitely besieged.
Maybe building walls, erecting fences and developing sophisticated defence systems are part and parcel of our siege mentality, but it's a mentality that developed as a response to continuous threats and attacks made by our neighbours. Some observers link our obsession with existential threats to the Holocaust. As far back as 1976 author Amos Elon wrote of the national psyche and the Holocaust in his book- 'The Israelis- Founders and Sons.' "The Holocaust remains a basic trauma of Israeli society. It is impossible to exaggerate its effect on the process of nation-building. There is a latent hysteria in Israeli life that stems directly from this source...The trauma of the Holocaust leaves an indelible mark on the national psychology, the tenor and content of public life, the conduct of foreign affairs, on politics, education, literature and the arts.".
Carlo Strenger a Swiss-Israeli psychologist, philosopher, existential psychoanalyst and journalist, prefers the term "bunker mentality." He says, "Israel has real enemies like Iran and Hezbollah. Human psychology is such that fear often leads to freezing and hanging on to the same course of action, even if it proves disastrous time and again. As a result Israel doesn’t listen to criticism - either from inside or from outside. This inability to listen is reinforced by self-righteousness: Israel is stuck in the belief that it is right, and everybody else is wrong and hence incapable of admitting that Israeli policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians has been disastrous; that Israel should have engaged with the Arab League peace initiative years ago, and that a U turn needs to be made. Admitting that one has been wrong is always difficult; but Israel’s need for self-righteousness makes it even more difficult."
The Arab Peace Initiative Strenger refers to was first proposed in 2002. Sometimes called the Saudi Initiative or the Abdullah Initiative, it has some major advantages. However these advantages exact a high price. It attempts to end the Arab-Israeli Conflict, which means normalising relations between the entire Arab region and Israel, in exchange for a complete withdrawal from the occupied territories (including East Jerusalem ) and a "just settlement" of the Palestinian refugee crisis based on UN resolution 194. Carlo Strenger and others believe that not responding to the plan was a mistake. However, the Palestinian refugees' "right of return" is regarded by many Israelis as a "Trojan horse." It has been a major stumbling block in all the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The two key points of the initiative, namely the complete withdrawal from the occupied territories and the "right of return" clause caused many Israelis to reject it.
Abdullah’s initiative followed an earlier plan proposed by President Clinton. The “Clinton Parameters” were more palatable to many Israelis. The parameters included recognition of “facts on the ground” and the principle of exchange of territories. The latter two points were incorporated in later negotiations with the Palestinians. The facts on the ground are the large Israeli settlements blocs in the West Bank.
In 2007, when Benyamin Netanyahu was leader of the opposition he rejected the Saudi initiative outright. In 2009, President Shimon Peres noted with satisfaction the "u-turn" in the attitudes of Arab states toward peace with Israel as reflected in the Saudi Initiative. However he disagreed with its wording and preferred to consider it a basis for negotiations.
The Palestinian Authority strongly supports the plan and Mahmoud Abbas officially asked U.S. President Barack Obama to adopt it as part of his Middle East policy. Hamas rejected the plan.
Since then Israel and the Palestinian Authority have been at loggerheads regarding the resumption of negotiations, each side making its participation in the renewed talks conditional to certain demands. The PA demands freezing all construction in Israeli settlements in the Judea and Samaria and Israel insists that the PA should recognise Israel as a Jewish state.
Ronald R. Krebs, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota also chose to label Israel's weltanschauung "bunker mentality." In the November/December 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs he describes "How the Occupation Is Destroying the Nation." Krebs says, "For the Israeli right and its allies around the world, the greatest danger to Israel's future is the unwillingness of Palestinians to make peace. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict does threaten Israel, but not, as the right would have it, because militant and even seemingly moderate Palestinians harbor plans to drive the Jews into the sea. Rather, the conflict threatens Israel because of the havoc it wreaks on the country's internal politics. Since 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, its presence in those territories has played a central role in structuring Israeli politics, transforming a country once brimming with optimism into an increasingly cynical, despondent, and illiberal place." Krebs goes on to describe how the bunker mentality has bred an aggressive ethnic nationalism. He claims it has strengthened ultra-Orthodox political parties, which have exploited divisions between the right and the left to become kingmakers. In exchange for their parliamentary support, they have demanded economic subsidies for their constituents, who often devote years and in some cases their entire lives to studying in Jewish seminaries rather than participating in the work force. Ronald Krebs balances his depressing description by placing a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel. Unfortunately he bases his assumption on a political forecast. Political outcomes in Israel are rarely predictable. He places his trust in the emergence of a centrist governing coalition. Despite a lot of procrastination and bungling Netanyahu's ratings in the opinion polls remain unchanged, but there are indications that change is in the wind. Last year's social welfare protests are beginning to translate into political action. The resurrection of the all but clinically dead Labour party as well as other changes, might just create new alliances that could challenge the hegemony of Netanyahu’s Likud party.
I want to return to the four Arab women in the bookstore and speculate regarding their attitude to Israel as a Jewish state in the context of the two-state solution to the Arab-Palestinian Conflict. This is particularly relevant now in view of the talks held in Amman on Tuesday between Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erakat and Israeli envoy Yitzhak Molcho. The talks are sponsored by Jordan and the Quartet. The Quartet as we know is comprised of the United States, United Nations, European Union and Russia. The sponsors hope to kick-start talks which ground to a halt shortly after they began in September 2010.
If Israel and the Palestinian Authority succeed in reconvening negotiations they will probably try to renew the understandings that were almost concluded in September 2010. Then the document of reference was not the Saudi Initiative but the Clinton Parameters. Both sides had accepted the two state solution format. Prior to the meeting in Amman the PA opted to garner support for a unilaterally declared Palestinian state. It has also threatened to ditch the two state solution in favour of a one state solution
Some observers claim that a one-state solution is generally endorsed by Israeli Arabs. Many Israeli Arabs fear that densely populated Arab communities close to the Green Line might be included in the land swaps tentatively accepted as part of a two-state solution.
Michael A. Cohen a senior research fellow at the American Security Project related to the two state solution in a column he published in the September 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs.
“Everyone knows an independent Palestine, side by side with Israel, is unworkable right now. But it's even more hopeless than they think. Some Palestinians and Israelis talk about a binational confederation in which each group has the same political rights. But this is highly unlikely to occur because it would almost certainly mean the end of Zionism and the dream of a Jewish state. On the other side of the spectrum, Israel could simply annex large swaths of the West Bank and leave the Palestinian Authority in a stateless limbo -- but at risk of significant international opprobrium. Then there is the most likely option: the maintenance of the status quo and a Zionist, Jewish state in which Israeli soldiers continue a military occupation of millions of Arabs with no political rights, but perhaps certain economic and social rights. “ He concluded, “As the two-state option slowly fades into oblivion, both sides will have to seriously contemplate an Israeli-Palestinian arrangement that looks very similar to this. Indeed, as Daniel Levy, a senior research fellow at the New America Foundation noted, emphasizing this uncomfortable reality might be the most useful role the United States can play right now -- namely, beginning a conversation with Israelis that makes clear that unless there is significant movement toward a Palestinian state and, soon, a one-state military occupation, an increasing international isolation is Israel's long-term future. Any other scenario, unfortunately, is increasingly difficult to envisage.”
Michael Cohen probably knows the old adage about making predictions. It is especially relevant to the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. “Never make predictions, especially about the future.”
Have a good weekend
Beni 6th of January, 2012.
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