The view from Tel Saki

The Friday trip to the Golan Heights was definitely not one of those run-of-the-mill sightseeing tours. Our tour guide Aviram Barkai, a veteran of the Yom Kippur war had carefully chosen the vantage points in his itinerary. Each one was a chapter in his book "Stemming the breach," the untold story of the heroic stand made by the  188^th armoured brigade, blocking the advance of the Syrian army in  the battles waged  on the Golan Heights in October 1973.

We stood by the bunker at Tel Saki where  in 1973 a hopelessly outnumbered and out- gunned group of parachutists and armoured corps crews fought desperately, almost to the point of annihilation, determined to halt the Syrian advance. Not far below us a lone Syrian flag was flying at a border post.

It occurred to me that while we were reliving old battles, new battles were raging not far from where we stood. We are better able to understand what is happening in Syria, than most casual observers outside our region. Still, for most of us Syria is a place we hear about on news bulletins, but in the daily routine it seems to be more distant than a fading star.   Having said that, I hasten to add that we are not insensitive to the atrocities committed by Syrians against Syrians.

One of the best descriptions of what is happening in Syria was published in Foreign Policy Magazine. The author,  Aaron David, Miller assured us that “Everything was going according to plan,” then hastened to add “It just depends on whose plan you are talking about.”    “The key actors -- America, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the Arabs -- know precisely what they're about (or at least what they want to avoid) and are acting quite willfully to attend to their own interests.”  

“In short, we have a coalition not of the willing but of the disabled, the unwilling, and the opposed. And each has a clear agenda. The tragedy for Syria is that it's just not a common agenda.”

While we were walking back to our bus below Tel Saki I looked back towards the Syrian border, past the flag as far as the horizon. There was nothing in that landscape that could indicate what was really happening in Syria. I’m sure a host of foreign intelligence agencies equipped with the best spy-ware money can buy are trying to see a lot more than I could at Tel Saki.

Spy-satellites, drones and the old fashioned on the ground informer add body to sparse information leaked out from Syria. In Israel journalists, analysts and Middle East researchers whose special sphere of interest is Syria, all of them fluent in Arabic, rely on other sources as well. They have cultivated “associates” inside Syria who they contact frequently for the purpose of gleaning reliable  information. They describe a divided opposition force that has failed so far to unite under a common flag.

Bashar al-Assad’s power basis, a legacy from his father, is held together by fear. Assad is an Alawi and he relies on the support of the minority Alawi community. The Alawis make up 12 percent of Syria’s population, many of them fear persecution or worse at the hands of Sunni Muslim majority if the regime falls. This also explains why key units of the Syrian army have not deserted. About 80% of the well-equipped, well-trained 4^th armoured division are Alawis. For them, the struggle to crush the opposition is potentially an existential one. So far there is no sign that Assad’s regime is about to collapse.

Aaron David, Miller explains why  Obama  is reluctant to intervene in Syria. “Sure, the president is outraged by Assad's brutality, and yes he'd like to do more. But bad options and electoral politics provide little incentive or leeway for heroics on Syria. The president is more focused on the perpetuation of the House of Obama than on the fall of the House of Assad. And rightly so. Americans are tired of costly military interventions, and the election is going to turn not on foreign policy but on the economy. And the Republicans can't find a way to make political hay from an Obama foreign policy that on balance has been smart and competent.

The only issues Americans care about abroad these days are terrorism and high gas prices. The president may pay for the latter but has been very tough on the former. Foreign policy will not help him in November, but a costly stumble abroad could hurt him. And the Syrian crisis offers plenty of opportunities for that. If the president acts, it will be cautiously and in the company of others. “

 Journalist Nicholas D. Kristof is less sympathetic to the president’s hesitancy .In  a piece he called “Dithering while people die,” posted in the  Pittsburgh Post-Gazette . Kristof wrote  on assignment in the Nuba Mountains, Sudan

“When a government devours its own people, as in Syria or Sudan, there are never easy solutions. That helps explain President Barack Obama's dithering, for there are more problems in international relations than solutions, and well-meaning interventions can make a crisis worse.    Yet the president is taking prudence to the point of paralysis. I'm generally an admirer of Mr. Obama's foreign policy but his policies toward both Syria and Sudan increasingly seem lame, ineffective and contrary to U.S. interests and values”. ….. “Likewise, in Syria, the United States has not only refused to arm the opposition but has, I believe, discouraged other countries from doing so. Yes, there's an underlying logic: The Syrian opposition includes extreme elements, and the violence is embedded in a regional sectarian conflict. Nonetheless, the failure to arm the opposition allows the conflict to drag on and the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, to massacre more people. The upshot is that the violence spills over into Lebanon, and sectarian poisons make Syria less and less governable.”

Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. examined Turkey’s relations  with the U.S  with regard to the Syrian dilemma. “Will Turkey Force Obama's Hand on Syria?” he asks. “Ankara and Washington both abhor the Syrian regime's brutal crackdown on demonstrators. But according to some reports, Ankara is hosting the Syrian opposition and possibly even helping arm it.

In contrast, Obama's cautious policy on Syria appears to be driven by a desire to avoid three things: the political unknown after Bashar al-Assad, war in an election year, and a new military campaign in a Muslim country.

Erdogan might find it increasingly difficult to tolerate Obama's "wait-and-see" strategy. For the Turks, slaughter in Syria is not an overseas affair, but rather a tragedy close to home that they cannot ignore.

Turkey's border with Syria spans 510 miles, crisscrossing ethnic groups and families. Some Turks have loved ones in Syria who are in harm's way. These constituents demand that Erdogan do his utmost to stop the al-Assad regime from perpetrating its crimes.”

A few months ago Erdogan used war-like rhetoric, threatening Assad’s regime. Turkey has a strong army, nevertheless, it wouldn’t attack Syria alone.   An alliance with Arab states and active US support  would better  serve its purpose. Cagaptay mentions an additional reason to overthrow Assad

“There is one more reason why Ankara cannot live with the al-Assad regime, even if Washington can. Recent news reports suggest the Syrian regime is allowing the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a Kurdish terrorist group that targets Turkey, to operate inside Syrian territory.

Turkey views the PKK as an existential threat, and it considers anyone who hosts the group to be an enemy. So even if Washington were to reach a modus vivendi with Damascus, it is hard for Ankara to ever become friends with al-Assad.

The longer Washington delays action against al-Assad, the more nervous Ankara will become about the PKK's growing strength inside Syria. Eventually, Erdogan will ask Obama to help him oust al-Assad and prevent the PKK from becoming a fighting machine next door. This divergence will test the limits of the Obama-Erdogan relationship.

For the time being, Erdogan might accept U.S. inaction, knowing that Obama's re-election chances depend on his ability to keep America out of an overseas conflict. But what happens after the U.S. elections in November?

Regardless of the winner, Erdogan will demand help from Washington to end the Syrian regime's patronage of the PKK. This is because Erdogan, like Obama, has election fever. The Turkish leader wants to become the country's first popularly elected president in polls to be held in 2013 or 2014. (Until a recent constitutional amendment, Turkish presidents were elected by the country's parliament.)

Should al-Assad continue to reign despite Erdogan's outspoken support for regime change, this will tarnish the Turkish leader's image as the tough guy who gets things done, the very image that has earned him respect and helped him win three successive elections since 2002.

He would also be weakened with the PKK thriving in Syria and using its territory as a springboard to launch attacks against Turkey. Then he would most certainly ask Obama to prove whether he is truly the friend that the Turkish leader thinks he is.”

The view from Tel Saki across the calm arid landscape was deceptive.

Just the same at the present time  we prefer  to maintain our observer status.

Beni                                        15^th of June, 2012.