SUMMING UP
The numerous analyses of the recently concluded Israel – Palestinian
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) military action have been conducted mostly by various
Israeli think-tanks, both affiliated and others ostensibly not aligned.
The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy is a pro-Israel American think tank based in
Washington, D.C., focused on the foreign policy of the United States in the
Near East.
I am quoting here, selected texts from an analysis written by David Makovsky. He is the Institute’s director of a programme that analyses Arab-Israel Relations.
Viewing the operational aspects of this latest exchange of fire,
Makovsky said,” As
an Iranian proxy, PIJ lacks Hamas’s broad public support in Gaza, and its
rockets lack the lethality or range of those held by Hamas. Despite its
military limitations, between May 9 and May 13, PIJ successfully fired 1,469
rockets at Israeli civilian areas, although roughly one-fifth landed in Gaza.
PIJ also managed to fire a few rockets that reached the southern Tel Aviv
suburbs and a West Bank settlement near Jerusalem.
Israel’s Iron
Dome air defence system intercepted 95.6 percent of the rockets on course to hit Israeli civilian targets. One Israeli was killed in a Rehovot apartment
building and a Gazan labourer was killed while working in Israel. Reports suggest Israel twice delayed the
start of the operation amid concerns that innocent bystanders could be killed.
In all,
the operation killed thirty-three Palestinians in Gaza, including ten uninvolved civilians in the opening airstrikes, according to the IDF. Most casualties were militants, but some occurred as a result of PIJ misfires.
The IDF registered tactical successes by killing three PIJ operational leaders in the initial May 9 strikes, as well as three other high-level militants thereafter. In a positive step for Israel’s layered missile defence, the IDF field-tested the medium-range David’s Sling system for the first time, shooting down a rocket headed for Tel Aviv.
As for the broader context, Israel
was responding to PIJ rocket attacks on Israeli cities launched after PIJ activist Khader Adnan died on May 2 while on a hunger
strike in Israeli custody. Israeli defence officials were also concerned about PIJ’s burgeoning rocket production
capability in the West Bank city of Jenin.
As in August
2022, Hamas resisted reported urging by Iran to enter the fighting, and in this round it reportedly even refused to
shelter PIJ operatives by pairing them with Hamas fighters as shields. Rather,
Hamas continued its policy of keeping Gaza quiet in order to consolidate its
control and make economic gains (i.e., maintaining access for a minority of
Palestinians to higher-paying jobs in Israel), while focusing on its West Bank
operations against Israel.
Hamas would
have struggled to stay on the sidelines had the fighting lasted longer,
especially given the symbolic resonance of Jerusalem Day, May 19, which marks
Israel’s victory in the 1967 war. An annual Israeli flag parade set to pass through the Muslim Quarter of
Jerusalem’s Old City has invariably posed a security challenge, but Israel has resisted
the Biden administration’s requests to alter the route. This year, despite the plans
and provocations threatened by Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir, who leads
the extremist Otzma Yehudit party, there were relatively
few incidents.
On May 14,
polls conducted by three Israeli television networks showed that nearly 60
percent of Israelis were satisfied with the security actions against PIJ. At
the same time, they did not see the campaign as a turning point. A Channel 13
poll revealed that 53 percent of respondents believed it was a matter of
'months' before another Gaza confrontation would occur, whereas only 17 percent thought more than a
year would pass. Military analysts interviewed on TV panels and even relatively upbeat analyses in other news media, generally failed to offer reassurance of a
long-term solution to the Gaza tensions.
Given general
public support for short, focused military operations, the mild popularity surge experienced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is unsurprising. Yet the Israeli leader
needed any help he could get following the uproar over his government’s proposed
controversial judicial overhaul. Support for the coalition was basically in
free fall by late March amid public anger over the sudden dismissal of Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, who called for a
pause in the reform plans. Hundreds of thousands of Israelis took to the
streets in protest, and the Histadrut general trade union called for widespread
strikes. In response, Netanyahu was forced to backtrack, publicly voicing
support for compromise talks facilitated by President Isaac Herzog.
Netanyahu’s aides
have conveyed to reporters in background statements that the prime minister does not want to
advance any controversial unilateral legislation during the spring-summer
Knesset session, given that it could derail passage of the two-year budget
before the month’s end. (By law, Israel’s government dissolves if it does not
pass a budget by May 29.) Undoubtedly, though, the far-right elements of
Netanyahu’s bloc will see the budget deadline as an opportunity for
brinkmanship on various issues. Friction could centre, first, on large proposed
shifts in funding for the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community, including increased
assistance for educational institutions that exclude core subjects such as math
and English. The anti-overhaul movement will see this as part and parcel of its
opposition to the sweeping changes the government is trying to implement, and
the sharp increase in subsidies is sure to rekindle resentment.
The judicial
overhaul proponents like Knesset Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee chair
Simcha Rothman will threaten to advance the legislation during the budget
debate if the Herzog talks bog down.
The May 14
surveys conducted
by Israeli TV channels 12, and 13 would appear to offer a political path for
Netanyahu. By late April, polls showed that the prime minister’s Likud Party
would plummet to twenty seats if elections were held right then, down from its
existing thirty-two-seat position. But by mid-May, Netanyahu’s party appeared to have gained back seven or eight of the
lost seats. An election today could still see a bloc led by de facto National
Unity head Benny Gantz triumph by anywhere from three to seven seats. Gantz’s
strength has impressed analysts, who had presumed—after five elections in
three-plus years—that the political fight would come down to a narrow slice of
soft-right voters. But at Netanyahu’s April low point, Gantz appeared to have a
much higher ceiling. Moreover, despite falling short in previous national
elections, Gantz has gained public respect as a unifying figure intent on
avoiding a culture war over the judicial overhaul.
Netanyahu
understands that the judicial issue is a political lightning rod that he cannot
touch now, and that his association with extremist political figures like
Ben-Gvir, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, and Justice Minister Yariv
Levin—who lately are perceived as being able to overpower him—is weakening him
in the eyes of the broader public. A military conflict, by comparison, links
the prime minister to more pragmatic, straightforward military chiefs and would
appear to boost his political prospects.”
Summing up, David
Makovsky said, “Netanyahu
must now walk a political tightrope. On the one hand, he will try to avoid
angering the coalition’s ideological base, an act that will involve hinting
that the overhaul has merely been postponed—not scuttled—or that Herzog can
facilitate a compromise palatable to the right. Yet anti-overhaul protesters do
not trust Netanyahu and believe that the issue is only temporarily on the
backburner and can return at any time. Thus, protests will continue. On the
other hand, the prime minister will seek to signal to the Biden administration
his desire to jointly counter Iran while building stronger ties with Saudi
Arabia, both of which require prior consultation between the leaders in the
Oval Office. Investors, meanwhile, are awaiting a clear signal from the prime
minister either that judicial overhaul is dead or that a reasonable compromise
has been reached, but Netanyahu may seek to maintain ambiguity in the hope that
the issue will either fade or lose its political potency.
As usual I like to conclude on a pleasant, hopeful note. What could be
better than a flower parade.
“The
Tag Meir coexistence organization conducted its ninth annual Flower March
through the Old City of Jerusalem Thursday morning as a counterpoint to the
nationalist Flag March later in the day.
The left-wing organisation said several hundred participants had taken part in the march, distributing flowers to residents of the Muslim, Christian and Armenian Quarters in order to spread a message of “love, inclusion [and] solidarity” ahead of what the organisers described as the “racism and incitement” of the Flag March.
A Tag Meir coexistence activist gives a Muslim woman a flower during the organization's ninth annual Flower March through the Old City of Jerusalem designed to spread a message of "love, inclusion and solidarity" ahead of the nationalist Jerusalem Day Flag March, May 18, 2023
“We need to remember that this day is not a happy day for the Palestinians and Muslims in Jerusalem. They are 40 percent of Jerusalem’s population. That is why we think the Flag March should go through a different route, and not force them to close their stores,” Tag Meir director Gadi Gvaryahu told The Times of Israel.
Perhaps the concept of
the flower parade is a tad naïve, but nice.
Take care,
Beni, 19th of May,
2023.
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