The Iran Dilemma

A Talmudic precept instructs, "When facing an enemy determined to kill you, rise early and kill him first." Maybe the sages who phrased this injunction had existential threat situations in mind, however I doubt if they could have envisaged the dilemma Israel is facing today.

A number of think-tanks, strategic analysts and Middle East observers have been discussing how best to prevent Iran reaching nuclear capability.

The fact that Iran is rapidly approaching that threshold and has adopted a belligerent attitude to Israel, more pointedly expressed in Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's threats to wipe Israel off the face of the map, has added an aspect of urgency to these deliberations.

Among the options discussed, the possibility of precluding an Iranian nuclear capability by means of a preemptive attack has been well assessed.

Other options, namely; adopting more stringent sanctions, the proposed "engagement" and even acquiescing and simply learning to live with the reality of a nuclear armed Iran, have been considered too.

Before examining these options let's consider the last no-action alternative.

A few weeks ago political scientist John Mueller published an article in Foreign Policy Magazine entitled "The Rise of Nuclear Alarmism."

Mueller who has a reputation for downplaying military threats asserts that the atomic bomb's impact on substantive historical developments has been minimal. "Things would likely have turned out much the same if it had never been developed. The only real effect of nuclear weapons is humanity's unhealthy obsession with them, a preoccupation that has inspired some seriously bad policy decisions."

Mueller points out that since the end of WW2 the possessors of nuclear weapons haven't found use for them in actual armed conflicts. "They were of no help to the United States in Korea, Vietnam, or Iraq; to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan; to France in Algeria; to Britain in the Falklands; to Israel in Lebanon and Gaza; or to China in dealing with its once-impudent neighbor Vietnam."

"There is even more hysteria about Iran, which has repeatedly insisted that it has no intention of developing the weapons. If that regime changes its mind or is

lying, it is likely to find that, except for stoking the national ego for a while, the bombs are substantially valueless, a very considerable waste of money and effort." Well that is certainly reassuring. However before we "beat our swords into ploughshares," I prefer to consider other options and not rely on Iranian magnanimity.

Alastair Crooke, a co-director of the London-based Conflicts Forum, like many other people, senses that time is running out. ."Beware the winds of December" he advised recently in a piece he wrote for - Asia Times

"The US administration knows that any sanctions on Iran over its nuclear programme ultimately will fail. They will fail not only because Russia and China will not play ball but precisely because the much touted 'moderate alliance of pro-Western Arab states' is looking increasingly to be a paper tiger: the 'moderates' are not seriously going to confront Iran and its allies."

Crooke argues that if sanctions on Iran are widely acknowledged - at least in private within the US administration - as destined to fail, this must be provoking some interesting self-questioning within the White House: The US is in the process now of withdrawal from Iraq, it is looking for the exit in Afghanistan and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is getting messier. None of these events seems likely to become particularly glorious episodes for the administration.
"It is not hard to imagine White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel and White House senior adviser David Axelrod asking themselves, ‘why the president should want to risk another perceived failure’ - as sanctions on Iran surely will be.” "Why", they may ask, "impose sanctions and open ourselves to persistent Republican jeering at their inevitable failure and then ultimately force us to have to ask ... well, what do we do next, Mr. President"?

The "engagement" proposal has been rejected, so what do we have left?

Before we go in with all guns blazing let's consider a few opinions regarding this option.

Earlier this year Louis Rene Beres professor of international law at Purdue University considered the "anticipatory self-defence." option in a different light.

In an article published in Ha’aretz he mentioned how U.S. Vice President Joe Biden boldly asserted that Israel, "as a sovereign nation," has the right to protect itself against a nuclear threat. As we remember a White House spokesperson rushed to qualify that Biden's comments shouldn't be misconstrued as a "green light" for any preemptive action.

Nevertheless, Beres considers the preemptive option a possible "big stick."

"Here is the key issue: As long as Israel can reasonably assume that any expected Iranian leadership will remain rational, Prime Minister Netanyahu could focus on 'living with a nuclear Iran.' Such a 'coexistence' policy would represent a regrettable, but largely unavoidable, position, one that would need to be backed up with a selectively partial end to Israel's ‘nuclear ambiguity’ (the so-called ‘bomb in the basement’), and with genuinely credible threats of Israeli nuclear reprisals for nuclear aggressions. More precisely, these deterrent threats would have to include aptly explicit references to Israel's nuclear targeting doctrine (‘counter-city’ or ‘counter-value,’ never ‘counter-force’), as well as compelling evidence of both the survivability and penetration capability of Israel's deterrent nuclear forces."

So far there is every indication that our government isn't placing much trust in
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's rational behaviour.

Some journalists have hinted that the temporary "construction freeze" is somehow related to a preemptive attack against Iran.

The not so reliable DEBKA files website reported "In a showdown with settlement leaders on Thursday, Dec. 2, Netanyahu assured them that the building suspension across the Green Line (not applied in Jerusalem) was essential in the broad light of Israel's overall interests."

DEBKA files continues "The vague impression he and defence minister Ehud Barak generate that Israel is about to launch an attack on Iran remains to be borne out. But no one honestly believes that a halt in the construction of 100 extra rooms in Alon Moreh or a dozen apartments for newly-weds in Maale Adummim will make any difference to decisions in Washington, Tehran or even Jerusalem."

"The fact is," claims DEBKA files," that the Obama administration like its predecessor is flat against an Israeli military initiative - even if it means letting Iran go ahead and develop a bomb - for fear that Iran will send its retaliatory missiles flying against Israel and American interests in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East and drag the US inexorably into the conflict. "

Micah Zenko, a fellow of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations asserts that if diplomacy fails, the world should be prepared for an Israeli attack on Iran's suspected nuclear weapons facilities

Although he made this assessment three months ago it is still relevant.

"Israel Has Iran in its Sights," he claims. Zenko further develops this scenario,

"If Israel attempts such a high-risk and destabilizing strike against Iran, President Obama will probably learn of the operation from CNN rather than the CIA. History shows that although Washington seeks influence over Israel's military operations, Israel would rather explain later than ask for approval in advance of launching preventive or preemptive attacks."

Zenko cites a number of precedents; In 1956 at the time of the "Suez Campaign," during the Six-Day War in 1967, and in 1981 when Israeli fighter-bombers destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osiraq shortly before it was to be fuelled to develop the capacity to make nuclear weapons-grade plutonium.

On all these occasions Washington was not informed in advance.
President Reagan condemned the Osiraq attack and "thought that there were other options that might have been considered."
A few days later, Prime Minister Menachem Begin told CBS News: "This attack will be a precedent for every future government in Israel. ... Every future Israeli prime minister will act, in similar circumstances, in the same way."
A few weeks ago I quoted from Micah Zenko's article with reference to an Israeli attack on a Syrian nuclear facility.
"Begin's prediction proved true on Sept. 6, 2007, when Israeli aircraft destroyed what was believed to be a North Korean-supplied plutonium reactor in Al Kibar, Syria. Four months earlier, Israeli intelligence officials had provided damning evidence to the Bush administration about the reactor, and the Pentagon drew up plans to attack it. Ironically, according to New York Times reporter David Sanger, President Bush ultimately decided the U.S. could not bomb another country for allegedly possessing weapons of mass destruction. An administration official noted that Israel's attack went forward "without a green light from us. None was asked for, none was given."
Zenko concludes,
"These episodes demonstrate that if Israel decides that Iranian nuclear weapons are an existential threat, it will be deaf to entreaties from U.S. officials to refrain from using military force. Soon after the operation, Washington will express concern to Tel Aviv publicly and privately. The long-standing U.S.-Israeli relationship will remain as strong as ever with continued close diplomatic, economic, intelligence and military cooperation."

Nevertheless the dilemma remains and was aptly phrased by The Economist last week

"An Iranian nuclear bomb, or the bombing of Iran?"

It is a US dilemma as well. The Economist quotes from a bipartisan American report drawn up by two ex-senators and a former air-force general, which recommends the United States plan overtly for military action, if only to strengthen diplomacy. General Charles Wald, (retired) says, "The Iranians frankly don’t believe that we would do anything against them”… The Economist concludes, "America is trying to woo the Muslim world, draw down in Iraq and build up in Afghanistan. As Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of America’s joint chiefs of staff, said on November 4th: 'The last thing in the world that I need right now is a third conflict—as we’re trying to work our way through these other two.'

Israel’s threats of military action might be more credible than America’s"

Let's not panic intimates The Economist, "Iran may yet choose to stop 'one turn of the screwdriver' short of a bomb." In the meantime it proceeds with caution ever mindful of the possibility of an Israeli preemptive attack. "Iran has learned from Israel’s previous actions. It has dispersed and buried its nuclear facilities to make them harder to strike. In contrast with the 'Two Minutes over Baghdad' of Israel’s raid on Osiraq, there is no easy shot. If anything, it has become harder to hobble Iran as time has passed."

A report last month by the Council on Foreign Relations, a New York think-tank, suggests that Israel could limit itself to three targets: Isfahan, Arak and Natanz. But to strike the centrifuges at Natanz, buried under 23 metres of soil and cement, it would have to use several bunker-busting bombs in “burrowing” mode: dropping bombs repeatedly on the same crater to dig down to the protected centrifuges. The report estimates that three bombs per “aim point” would give a 70% chance of success.

The Economist warns, "Still, the repeated sorties and loitering time needed to achieve this would probably require suppressing Iran’s air defences, which would require more sorties, perhaps hundreds. Israel would be operating at the limit of its range, even with air-to-air refuelling, and would probably have to cross the air space of other countries. It might not be able to sustain such an operation."

Arriving at the real dilemma the paper asks, " Would attacking a few sites really crimp Iran’s nuclear programme, or merely drive it entirely out of sight?"

Quoting again from the US feasibility report, The Economist continues "General Wald, for one, suggests that Israeli action may be little more than a 'pinprick'. This may be galling for Israelis, but few would contest that the American air force, with planes deployed closer to Iran and the ability to bring in aircraft carriers, could do a much more thorough job. America is unlikely to escape blame for Israeli military action, so it might as well join in, say some. A bigger American operation could go after more nuclear sites and take out some of Iran’s means of retaliation: missile sites and naval bases. It might even want to strike a blow against the Revolutionary Guards. This scenario starts to look like a major air war; closer to two months over Iran than two minutes. "

Maybe Iran could retaliate and cause a lot of damage.

"Many Muslims would regard a military strike on Iran as another war against Islam. Iran could stoke anti-American insurgencies across its borders in Iraq and Afghanistan. It could also prod its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Hamas movement to resume their missile war against Israel."

Weighing up all the options The Economist sums up, "So which will it be: a war with Iran, or a nuclear-armed Iran? Short of a revolution that sweeps away the Iranian regime—ushering in one that agrees, like post-apartheid South Africa, to give up its nuclear technology—sanctions may offer the only hope of avoiding the awful choice. "

The very bleak attack scenario outlined in The Economist article is definitely not the last word. I'm inclined to think other alternatives exist.

The New York think-tank scenario quoted in The Economist assumes that Israel will attack with fighter bombers. It ignores Israel’s indigenous Jericho II and the improved Jericho III missiles capable of carrying conventional and nuclear warheads to any place in Iran

The Israeli navy has five Dolphin-class submarines . Various reports indicate that these submarines are equipped with cruise missiles with a range of (1500-2400 km) that can deliver conventional or nuclear warheads with extremely high accuracy.

In the event of a conflict with Iran these Dolphin-class submarines could serve as either a first or a second-strike platform. In order to bring them within striking range the quickest route would be to send them through the Suez Canal.

A few months ago two submarines made a much-publicised test cruise through the canal.

The very presence of even a small number Israeli Dolphin-class submarines within striking range of Iran is a not-to-be ignored deterrent.

Of course an Israeli preemptive attack requires good military intelligence. Since on the ground information is hard to come by, it seems our "eyes in the sky", the four Israeli satellites in orbit weren’t sent there to photograph for Google Earth.

With the season’s greetings.

Beni 17^th of December, 2009.