Quite
a while ago, I can’t pinpoint exactly when, I noted that Israel generates a
disproportionate amount of news. In other words, it’s a small country where too
much is happening. Consequently, the
international news media is disproportionately represented here. Furthermore,
whenever our neighbours threaten us, or feel threatened by us, the foreign news
media bureaus call in reinforcements to handle the reporting of the impending
campaign/war. However, even during periods of relative quiet this hyperactive
country manages to produce plenty to write home about.
Lately, international news outlets have been reporting on the various stages of the Israel-Hamas War. In particular about the IDF’s efforts to destroy the cross-border tunnels along the Philadelphi corridor (The Philadelphi Corridor, also called the Philadelphi Route, is the Israeli code name for a narrow strip of land, 14 km in length, situated along the entirety of the border between Gaza Strip and Egypt).
A number reporters working for Israeli news outlets- Ynet, the Jerusalem Post, Haaretz and others have accompanied IDF troops during operations in Rafah. An analysis published in the Jerusalem Post this week attempted to unravel the Hamas-Egyptian cross-border tunnel mystery. –
“While
visiting the Philadelphi corridor in Rafah, The Jerusalem Post’s reporter
was told that the IDF needs at least six months to eradicate cross-border Hamas
tunnels completely, if not longer.
Almost
seven weeks into the IDF invasion of Rafah, and with major operations there due
to be concluded any day now, the IDF still is far from certain that it has or
will find all of the cross-border tunnels between Gaza and Egypt.
In
fact, the estimate for finding and completely destroying all of the
cross-border tunnels is likely to take up to six months, but could easily be
longer than that.
So
far, multiple IDF sources have estimated that there are at least 25
cross-border tunnels, but these are just initial estimates.
Of
all of the tunnel battles the IDF has taken on in Gaza, this is the most
important by far because the Philadelphi Corridor is Hamas’s main supply line
for receiving arms from the outside world, especially from Iran.”
“How
can it be”, the author asked,” that the IDF's progress, while very significant
and impressive, could fall to prevent Hamas from returning to rule in Gaza?
Doesn’t
the IDF, after years of expanding the tunnel special forces unit, ‘Yahalom’,
and investing billions of dollars in robots, specially trained dogs, customised
drones, and a variety of other cutting-edge technologies, have the capabilities
to terminate this mega-threat?
This
is without even getting into the complex geopolitical question, which involves
Egypt, the US, the UN, and others, of whether the IDF can prevent Hamas’s
return if it withdraws completely from the Philadelphi Corridor.
Even
before one gets to that question, if the IDF, currently with full control,
cannot root out all of the tunnels, it is hard to see what will stop Hamas from
rearming.
If
finding cross-border tunnels starts deeper in Rafah, and not just on the
thinner and shorter Philadelphi Corridor, then the search for them is much more
extensive and more complex.
The
cross-border tunnel dilemma would be a bit easier if the Egyptians were as
dedicated to eliminating 100% of cross-border tunnels as the IDF is, but IDF
sources indicate that they are not.
In
fairness to the Egyptians, like Israel, they may have underestimated Hamas’s
capacity to rebuild.
If
the IDF, which sees Hamas as a serious threat, underestimated the terror group
and did not get anywhere near destroying all the tunnels even after wars with
Hamas in 2008-9, 2012, 2014, and 2021, then why expect better and perfect
results from Egypt?
All
of this is a generous explanation regarding Egypt.
The
less generous explanation is that politics shifted in Egypt between 2015/2019
and 2023/2024.
2015
and even 2019 were closer in time to when Hamas helped the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood against the Egyptian military, and Cairo’s main thought about Hamas
was probably still to smash it and any assets, including tunnels, which it had
in Egypt.
But
at some later point, the politics may have changed.
Most
of the world started to see Hamas as a fait accompli that would rule Gaza for a
long time to come and therefore couldn’t be ignored.
Maybe
at some point, Egypt’s military regime reached an understanding with Hamas that
as long as Cairo preserved certain interests and influence over Gaza’s rulers,
the military would look the other way over certain cross-border underground
smuggling issues that only negatively impacted Israel.
There
is no question that the amount of criminal smuggling increased in recent years,
and Egypt was doing little to assist Israel in breaking the trend.
If
that is true, then Egypt was probably also doing less to crack down on terror
smuggling by Hamas.
IDF
sources told the Jerusalem Post that the Egyptians were
embarrassed when confronted with the large number of cross-border tunnels that
the IDF had shown them, which Cairo had said no longer existed.
But
was it embarrassment in the sense of shock that Hamas had outwitted them? Or
was it embarrassment that they understood that the IDF understood that Cairo
had decided to look the other way?
Either
way, defence sources have indicated that it is not at all clear that Egypt is
even eliminating all of the extensions of tunnels that are on its side of the
border.
This
means that even if Israel eliminates many kilometres of tunnels extending from
Rafah-Gaza up to the Egyptian border, the continuation of those tunnels may
remain neither destroyed nor even neutralised (partially collapsed).
That
would make it that much easier for Hamas to reconstruct those tunnels if (more
likely when) the IDF gives up complete or partial control of the Gaza side of
the Philadelphi Corridor or even once the IDF starts to reduce its standing
troop presence in Rafah.
Now
that this has been clarified, there is actually very little mystery to the
Egypt-Gaza cross-border problem. What we lack are several months, if not years,
to continue to destroy the tunnels, more cooperation from Egypt, and some way
to permanently prevent Hamas from reconstructing everything that is destroyed,
there is no reason to expect that Hamas’s rearmament life-line will be cut off
– it will not.
It
remains to be seen how long it will take Hamas to reconstruct/repair the
tunnels sufficiently to start smuggling significant amounts of weapons. and
will the IDF or whichever third party starts handling aspects of Gaza security
try to seize or destroy smuggled weapons at some point within Gaza, or will
Hamas renew its tunnel labyrinth unchallenged.
A
number of respected military affairs analysts have posited that had
Netanyahu not insisted on achieving ‘total victory’’ we could have reached an
interim agreement to facilitate the release of some of the Israeli hostages, if
not a final deal with Hamas.
I
was about to sign off when a news flash brought me to believe there is still room
for cautious optimism.
“Recent
proposals by CIA Director William Burns have injected new momentum into the
hostage release negotiations, Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar reported
Thursday. The US-crafted proposal was reportedly developed in coordination with
Egyptian and Qatari mediators, with possible Turkish involvement.
According
to the report, the American suggestion includes clear, unambiguous language in
the agreement. This would ensure that negotiations between phases one and two
would proceed under a guaranteed ceasefire or establish prolonged calm
throughout the talks following phase one. The report noted that these proposals
closely align with Hamas' central demand for a complete ceasefire.
Al-Akhbar
also mentioned another American idea involving Israel's evacuation of the Rafah
crossing as part of an agreement with Egypt on its management, without
obligating Israel to fully withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor.
Hamas
has since relayed its response to the Mossad, which has begun reviewing it.
Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas' political bureau, engaged in discussions with
mediators in Qatar and Egypt about ideas aimed at reaching an agreement.
Haniyeh also conferred with senior Turkish officials about recent developments.
Reporting on CIA Director Burns’ proposal CNN
commented, “Israel and Hamas appear to be on the brink of a framework
agreement for a ceasefire and hostage release deal, an Israeli source familiar
with the negotiations said.
Israeli
officials believe Hamas’ latest response will enable the two parties to enter
detailed negotiations to reach an agreement, the source said.
A
deal, however, is still not finalised nor is it assured. Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu must first green-light entering into that next phase of
negotiations; and it will likely take several weeks of difficult discussions to
negotiate the details of a potential agreement, including the identities of
Palestinian prisoners to be released in exchange for Israeli hostages held by
Hamas and the sequencing of releases.
Israeli
negotiators are set to meet with Israel’s political leadership, including
Netanyahu, over the coming days to decide whether to enter this phase of
detailed negotiations.
Hamas
has confirmed that it passed a response on an Israeli proposal to mediators in
Qatar and Egypt, repeating its demand for a complete ceasefire.
“We
have put forward some demands that achieve securing access to a complete
ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces,” Basem Naim, a member of Hamas’
political bureau, told CNN on Wednesday.
Hamas
added in a later statement that it has dealt with the Israeli proposal
“positively.”
This
development comes as the Hostage and Missing Families Forum warned in a
statement that millions of Israelis would take to the streets if the government
fails to secure a deal to release the hostages.
“The
people of Israel show time and time again in every poll that they are in favour
of a complete deal for the return of all hostages. We will not allow the
government’s ministers to torpedo the deal again,” the statement said.
“The
government is at the highest moral test of its tenure: the continuation of
abandonment or a determined action for rescue and restoration,” the statement
added. “It’s either the complete return of the hostages or all Israeli citizens
will be taking to the roads and intersections.”
Reviewing
this lengthy missive, depressing as it is, there is nevertheless a glimmer of
hope for a positive outcome.
Beni,
4th
of July, 2024
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