Hodeida.

An op-ed posted by defence analyst Udi Etzion in the Jerusalem Post on July 21 brought back old memories. “Almost 30 years ago, the Israel Air Force carried out Operation ‘Wooden Leg’ to attack the PLO headquarters in Tunis, a distance of 2,200 kilometres from Israel, the most extended attack it had carried out until then. The attack was carried out by eight F-15 fighter jets aided by two aerial refuelling planes to enable the F-15s to cover the distance. Defence analysts were impressed by Israel’s ability to attack with fighter jets at ranges commonly used by bombers.

The attack on the Houthi targets in Yemen is reminiscent of that operation, with an almost identical range but with different aircraft. In 2024, the Israeli air force operates a squadron of F-15I Ra’am aircraft, which is more advanced and better suited for long-range attack missions than the F-15s used in the Tunis attack.

According to reports, this time, the air force used the newer F-35 stealth multi-role combat aircraft, known as Adir, which led the attack. The 100 F-16I Sufa aircraft operated by the air force are far more advanced than the Ra’am, which arrived here 26 years ago. Likely, the Ra’am and Sufa aircraft were also integrated into the operation, even if only for refuelling protection.

Unlike the F-15 and F-16, the F-35 is a single-engine aircraft with a single pilot rather than a pilot and navigator who can assist in operating advanced attack munitions. However, it has several significant advantages in long-range attacks.

The first of these advantages is stealth; radars find it very difficult to detect the F-35 due to its structure and the materials it is coated with, which absorb most of the electromagnetic waves. An attacking F-35 will be detected much later than an F-15 or F-16, usually too late to respond and intercept the attack. This is also important concerning the attack on Yemen, as the Houthis have already demonstrated that they possess anti-aircraft missile systems, and they have already shot down American UAVs.”

At this juncture I want add a comment. Following most large-scale operations the IDF spokesman issues a brief statement. He definitely does not provide a detailed account regarding the aircraft employed in the attack, often designated as classified information.

Understandably, lacking these details Udi Etzion resorts to educated guesswork

“According to reports,” “Likely, the Ra’am and Sufa aircraft were also integrated into the operation,”

Back to the main text.

The aircraft (F-35 Adir) also has electronic warfare systems, including Israeli systems, which the air force insisted on integrating into the purchased aircraft. These systems are designed to protect the plane when it carries under its wings weapons and fuel tanks that reduce its stealth attributes.

The second advantage is the aircraft’s array of sensors. Israel has already purchased 50 Lockheed Martin aircraft and is currently acquiring a third squadron. The list includes advanced radar, optical, and thermal sensors; with the ability to intercept radar transmissions; and especially the capacity to collate this information and to cross-reference it.

This allows it to locate targets, identify the safest flight path with minimal chances of detection and interception, and share its information with other aircraft and rear command centres. The F-35 is not just an attack aircraft; it has capabilities that, until recently, required the support of a series of surveillance and intelligence-gathering aircraft.

Michael Knights, a research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy favours a different approach to the Houthi threat.

“On July 20, Israel responded to a deadly Houthi drone attack in Tel Aviv with heavy airstrikes on the Yemeni port of Hodeida, destroying most of the site’s oil storage tanks. On the one hand, this targeting choice reflects crucial gaps in the international community’s policy toward the group: namely, the failure to implement UN sanctions on the Houthis or enforce U.S. sanctions aimed at keeping Iran from providing oil products as a valuable form of terrorist financing. On the other hand, Hodeida is also a crucial entry point for humanitarian aid, so targeting its infrastructure has negative repercussions for the Yemeni people.

To address this dilemma, Israel must be convinced not to respond to ongoing attacks by destroying additional infrastructure at Hodeida port, which the 2018 Stockholm Agreement left in the Houthis’ hands based on the expectation that they would demilitarise it. Yet this in turn will require the international community to do a better job of ensuring that humanitarian infrastructure is not being used for the benefit of a designated terrorist group. Indeed, the United States must remind global partners at the UN Security Council and elsewhere that Houthi diversion of aid, corruption, and kidnapping of aid workers is now the principal driver of humanitarian risk in Yemen.

Despite more than 220 Houthi attacks on Israel since the Gaza war erupted last October, the Hodeida operation was the first acknowledged Israeli counterstrike in Yemen. Clearly it wasn’t improvised without adequate preparation. The attack plan was in place, ready to be activated when an opportunity presented itself.

 Around twenty-eight oil tanks were located in the targeted area; satellite imagery showed as many as eighteen of them visibly destroyed, though other damaged tanks may have been obscured by smoke.

Israel no doubt chose these targets because imported hydrocarbon products have become Iran’s primary means of financing its Houthi partners, similar to how it has illicitly funded other bad actors like the Syrian regime and Lebanese Hezbollah. Tehran’s hand is visible in the movements and ownership of many of the tankers that bring such products to the Houthi-held ports of Hodeida, al-Salif, and Ras Issa. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen has been highlighting this problem since 2019, when it estimated that Iran was providing $30 million per month to sustain the Houthi war effort.

The group has also facilitated the sale of sanctioned Iranian oil products outside Yemen. In 2021, the U.S. government began sanctioning the network of Iran-based Houthi financier Said al-Jamal for smuggling “Iranian fuel, petroleum products, and other commodities to customers throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.” According to the Treasury Department, “A significant portion of the revenue generated from these sales is directed through a complex international network of intermediaries and exchange houses to the Houthis.”

Based on imagery from Israel’s attack, one can conclude that only eight of the Hodeida oil tanks were full at the time (eight were shown burning; although more exploded, they may have been full of combustible vapor rather than oil products). If so, the Houthis might have lost as much as $60 million worth of products.

Notably, none of the vessels in this sample period were flagged for inspection by the Djibouti-based UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which effectively lapsed this spring due to personnel shortages (including the diversion of some inspectors to the Gaza humanitarian effort). On March 14—around the same time UNVIM ceased its public reporting—British deputy permanent representative to the UN James Kariuki told the Security Council about “extremely concerning” reports of “Iranian ships circumventing [UNVIM] inspections” and docking in Houthi-held ports. In May, British permanent representative Barbara Woodward warned of a “notable surge” in Iranian bypassing of UNVIM, with an estimated 500 truckloads of non-inspected material entering Hodeida since October. And on July 9, U.S. ambassador Stephanie Sullivan called for strengthening UNVIM’s capacity to inspect a broader range of vessels bound for Yemen.   

The attack on Hodeida has been interpreted as a warning to Iran that its petroleum storage facility on Kharg Island is also vulnerable to attack.

Kharg Island (better known as Khark Island)  provides a sea port for the export of oil and extends Iranian territorial sea claims into the Persian Gulf oil fields.

Somehow, I doubt if Israel will be impressed by Michael Knights' arguments.

Take care.

Beni,

25th of July, 2024