The Land of the Cedars

In the coming months a number of unprecedented changes are about to take place in the high command posts of Israel's defence and security branches. Reports of these impending changes have usually related to each one individually without evaluating their accumulative effect. The fact that within a few months the IDF's chief of general staff, the commander of Israel's navy and the heads of the intelligence branches will all be pensioned off is definitely cause for concern.

Jane's Defence Weekly's correspondent Yaakov Katz examined this unique situation in a special analysis he compiled recently. Quoting an anonymous senior IDF source Katz said the negative effect of so many personnel changes could have been avoided if their end of tenure dates had been more staggered. Just the same there is a positive side to the reshuffling process that comes in the wake of command post changes. Retiring the top brass tends to infuse new ideas and fresh thinking especially in agencies like the Mossad whose director Meir Dagan has just completed eight years service. .

In addition to Dagan the IDF chief of general staff Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi, Vice-Admiral Marom, the director of Military Intelligence Major General Amos Yadlin and the head of the General Security Services (also referred to as the Shin Bet), Yuval Diskin will be concluding their respective tenures..

All will leave with well earned recommendations and will have no difficulty in finding gainful employment. I'll hazard a guess and say that some of them will spend their declining years writing their memoirs.

Despite the infamous Goldstone Committee Report Gabi Ashkenazi will leave his post with many achievements to his credit. In fact an added feather in his cap is the strong relationship he forged with the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen. Some military observers claim that his relationship with Minister of Defence Barak could have been better. However, the decision not to extend Ashenazi's tenure was mainly a principle consideration. In the past only one chief of general staff served more than the mandatory four year tenure.

The intelligence branches don't always see eye to eye. This is not peculiar to Israel. Some of the differences of opinion have been attributed to professional rivalry especially at the top echelon of some of the branches. A case in point is the difference of opinion between the Mossad and MI (the military intelligence branch). Mossad director Meir Dagan opposes promoting peace talks with Syria whereas the director of military intelligence Amos Yadlin, who is also the government's intelligence advisor, has publicly supported the concept of opening the Syrian track, mainly for the purpose of weakening the Damascus – Teheran axis.

The IDF team, headed by Major-General (res.) Giora Eiland that investigated the boarding of the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara, published its report recently. For some reason official investigations, boards of inquiry, special committees and other probing bodies are expected to deliver clear conclusions and sever a few heads. Well the Eiland Report didn't single out even a "sentry on guard at the gate" for censure. "The Sentry Syndrome", now a firmly established Hebrew colloquialism was coined after the ignominious "Night of the hang gliders." Following an attack on an IDF camp in Upper Galilee carried out in November 1987 by Ahmed Jibril's (PFLP-GC), an IDF board of inquiry blamed the sentry on duty at the time of the attack. He was charged and sentenced to six months in prison. Only following public pressure did Chief of Staff Dan Shomron decide to take further proceedings and transfer the brigade operations officer from his position. Hence the phrase "The sentry syndrome" (Tismonet HaShin-Gimel), meaning that a system is trying to shake off responsibility for a failure by putting all the blame on the lowest possible rank.

In the case of the Eiland Committee its mandate didn't include conclusions involving personnel it was entrusted with the task of examining the overall functioning of the units involved in the operation

It did however point to mishaps in the various intelligence channels involved in planning and executing the raid, and a failure to integrate Navy intelligence information, research, and other intelligence sources.

Eiland said he found no evidence of negligence in the planning and implementation of the operation.

He also made it clear that there was a difference between “operational failures

” and “operational mistakes” and that he had only found mistakes, not failures.

“There were mistakes, also at the high command level, but happily, they were not the result of negligence,” Eiland said.
Amos Harel, military correspondent and defence analyst for Haaretz commented on the report as follows "Eiland's decision not to make recommendations about individuals may be right. Does every probe have to end with rolling heads? In any case, the head of the navy, Maj. Gen. Eliezer Marom, is ending his term soon. An impressive career should not be stained by a single incident."

Heads will be rolling in Lebanon soon. These are troubled times in the Land of the Cedars. The Alfa espionage scandal continues to shock the country.

The Lebanese government plans to file an official complaint against Israel with the United Nations Security Council over the extensive spy ring it claims to have uncovered in the last year.

Lebanon began a wave of arrests in April 2009 as part of an investigation in which dozens of people have been arrested on suspicion of spying for Israel. A retired brigadier general of the General Security Directorate was among the detainees. More than twenty people have been formally charged.

The Lebanese complaint to the United Nation's Security Council will centre on Israel's alleged covert ties in the country's state-owned mobile telecom company Alfa.

Some of the people accused are said to have planted monitoring devices allowing Israeli tracking stations to tap directly into the Alfa network, one of the two major cell phone companies operating in Lebanon,

Yet despite all efforts by the Lebanese security services to dismantle the Israeli spy networks the uncovering of additional networks indicates that what has been discovered so far could be no more than the tip of the iceberg.

Reports of the espionage network in the Israeli news media have based their comments on Lebanese and Arab sources.

Lebanese commentators claim that the uncovering of the espionage network is one of Israel's worst ever intelligence setbacks.

So far no Israeli politician or spokesperson has bothered to confirm or deny the allegations.

My personal unqualified opinion, based on a few newspaper articles and an unreliable gut-feeling, is that the Lebanese have good cause to be angry.

None of the suspects have been tried but the political leadership has already sealed their fate.

Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah has called for the death sentence for the alleged spies and , praised President Michel Sleiman who expressed readiness to sign any death sentence verdict. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt also jumped on the bandwagon. So it’s reasonable to expect that a few heads will roll (necks will be stretched or whatever).

The Financial Times had a look at another cause for anxiety in Lebanon.

In an article dealing with the Rafik al-Hariri Tribunal findings the author forecasted a bleak outcome. “Lebanon Closer to Crisis Over Tribunal” declared the paper, “Lebanon is braced for another political crisis as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon appears to be heading towards indicting Hezbollah.
The alleged involvement of undisciplined Hezbollah members in ex-Premier Rafik Hariri's assassination is a perilous outcome for the country: the movement is now part of the coalition government led by Saad Hariri, the prime minister and son of the dead leader," the newspaper said.

"The tribunal apparently reached a conclusion that is the worse-case scenario, so at a minimum this is likely to cause a major government crisis," says Paul Salem, director of the Carnegie Middle East Centre in Beirut. "The government would be cooperating with an institution which others (Hezbollah) say is an Israeli agency."

The Financial Times quoted analysts as saying that Hezbollah, whose military organization is more powerful than the Lebanese army, will not hand over any suspects. Nor will the government be in a position to arrest anyone.

Many Arab affaires commentators in Israel devoted particular attention to the as yet unpublished findings of the Rafik al-Hariri Tribunal . I’ve singled one comment that appeared in Haaretz. “The findings of the international tribunal's prosecutor could mark the end of the coalition between Premier Saad Hariri and Hezbollah and would make it difficult for the Shiite party to maintain its close alliance with Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement.”

Haaretz believes the tribunal findings which would reportedly be released in September are liable to threaten Lebanon with a grave political crisis.

"But these are not Hezbollah’s only troubles. Recently, there has been increasing internal Lebanese criticism of the Shiite organization's growing influence in the country and its military activities south of the Litani River, which not only violate U.N. Resolution 1701 but also threaten to embroil Lebanon in another war with Israel."

Some analysts argue that even in the worst case scenario materialises and Hezbollah is directly implicated in the Hariri assassination its coalition partners, Saad Hariri among them will prefer to forgo the due process of law, possibly defer it indefinitely.

The Land of the Cedars is truly troubled.

Have a good weekend.

Beni 29^th of July, 2010.

A dome and a dilemma

With the passage of time, or to phrase it more brutally, with advancing old age, I find predictability comforting. It's good to know that the sun will rise tomorrow even when it's obscured by clouds. However, some things are predictably annoying. This week we marked Tisha B'av and predictably the usual provocative arguments regarding its commemoration appeared in the news media. By contrast the report on IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi's visit to Rome was very noteworthy. The visit made for the purpose of furthering cooperation between the Italian and Israeli armies also included a visit to the Roman Forum and of course the Arch of Titus.

Despite the infamous significance of the triumphal arch for Jews everywhere it also bears an intrinsic positive value. It provides the only contemporary depiction of the sacred articles looted from the Temple in Jerusalem . Ironically the menorah sculpted on the Arch served as the model for the menorah used on the emblem of the State of Israel. It became one of the most poignant symbols of the Diaspora.

In the sixteenth century Pope Paul IV , herded the Jews of Rome into a Ghetto and forced them to swear an annualoath of submission before the Arch of Titus. The arch bore such significance for Roman Jews, that they refused to walk under it. An exception occurred in 1948 with the founding of the State of Israel, when members of the local Jewish community passed through it in a solemn procession, in the opposite direction to that taken by the triumphant Roman legions.

On Tisha B'av , Lt. Gen. Ashkenazi's visit to the arch accompanied by his colleague the Italian Chief of Staff, General Vincenzo Camporini marked the closing of a cycle of history. I know other Israeli leaders have visited Rome and have stood before the Arch of Titus. However, as far as I know this was the first formal occasion when two generals, one the commander of the army of Italy, the reformation of ancient Rome, and the other the commander in chief of the armed forces of modern Israel, a nation forged from the descendents of the people exiled in the wake of the actions of Titus and his successors, stood together at that site. Maybe on that historic occasion the eternal repose of Titus and Paul IV was disturbed.

Another predictable response came from the Lebanese news media group Al-Manar, widely considered to be ideologically aligned with Hezbollah.

In a lead article bearing the title “Iron Dome Ready for Duty by November. Purchase Could Choke Israeli Budget.” The author described the impressive results of the final tests conducted on anti-rocket system this week. Quoting from an Israeli radio interview conducted with Yossi Drucker, the director of Rafael's Iron Dome project, Al-Manar says he claimed that the Iron Dome defence system provides a complete solution to all rocket threats to the Zionist entity

( Al-Manar’s term) from Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.
“ Drucker said that Iron Dome had exceeded the defence establishment's original expectations for the anti-missile system. He also specifically stated that Iron Dome could be used to protect Sderot from incoming Palestinian rocket attacks.” Obviously the article wasn’t meant to simply relay information to the Lebanese public on the success of the Iron Dome system.

The message was concise and to the point. “It won’t work and even if it works it will cost too much.” Al-Manar found support for its claim from two articles published in Haaretz. Now I know why I cancelled my subscription to Haaretz.

In the earlier article published in January this year the paper claimed,
“The public relations campaign accompanying the test ( the early set of tests) is full of deceptions and half-truths. It has ignored the flaws in the systems and has created illusions. This is because Iron Dome will not protect the communities directly surrounding Gaza nor, apparently, locales even further away from the Strip.”
“In likely scenarios of rocket fire on the home front, the stock of Iron Dome missiles is liable to run out way before the rocket barrages end. And in any case, because of the high cost of using Iron Dome for defence, the Palestinians in the south and Hezbollah in the north can defeat us at the bank, without even launching a single rocket,”

An editorial published this week in Haaretz further augments the earlier report it published. “In developing Iron Dome and the system that is supposed to function one aerial floor above it, ‘Magic Wand,’ Israeli governments acknowledged that they had been mistaken in setting priorities and earmarking resources for the defence establishment. But this was only a grudging admission. Despite the completion of development and the announcement that the system is operational, there is still no intention to deploy the first two batteries, which will be ready in the fall, to protect Sderot and other communities in the south.”

…." The launchers, rockets, radar and command vehicles of Iron Dome will evidently be for show, not for use.”

“This decision is baffling. It broadcasts doubt within both the government and the IDF that Iron Dome can actually move from television to the gritty reality of clashes with Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. It upsets residents of the south and could also puzzle Washington, which contributed more than $200 million to the programme.

It is unclear whether the Katyusha and Qassam launchers who watched the test footage believed what they saw. But it is now fairly clear that those who are supposed to equip themselves with Iron Dome and deploy it still do not believe in it.”

Of course this is just one opinion expressed in a newspaper whose editors have an axe to grind.

In a review which appeared six months ago on the “Riskline” (Political and Security Analysis) website Ian Siperco provided an interim outline of Israel’s anti-rocket and anti-missile programme. Under the title “Pursuit of the Shield: The Case for Israeli National Missile Defence” the author presented a far more balanced perspective, “Israeli efforts to develop an ambitious active missile defense (AMD) programme are at last reaching the first stages of operational maturity. With five overlapping weapons systems scheduled to come online by 2012-13, the programme carries the very real potential to change the nature of strategic decision-making in the region. But even if the missile shield is efficient in its reliability of interception, Israel must carefully consider whether it can rely entirely upon a combination of deterrence and active defence, or whether it must also stand ready to implement a decades-old policy of preemption. “ I’m sure the defence establishment has considered the more comprehensive approach.

Siperco continues, “Because rocket flight times to Israel range from nine seconds for the typical Gaza Qassam to roughly one to two minutes for Hezbollah's military-grade Katyushas, authorities required a weapon positioned for effective coverage with an exceptionally quick detect-to-launch cycle. Rafael's Iron Dome system was designed with these requirements in mind, optimized to protect city-sized areas against rockets fired from a range of 4 to 40 kilometres without being constrained by altitude, characteristics, or concentration of incoming salvos. “ He also mentions the system’s critics,

“Critics of the decision to opt for a doctrinal shift to AMD are divided between two camps: those who fear that the programme cannot provide a solution to nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and those who warn that large barrages of missiles may be used to overwhelm the system or force Israel into a costly arms race.
The first group makes the argument that no aerial shield can be made hermetic. Because even an extremely low rate of leakage would be intolerable if the incoming missiles carried nuclear and/or biological warheads, programme detractors warn against abandoning Israel's preemption option. For the moment, these arguments remain speculative. Under ideal conditions, Tehran might be able to carry out a first bomb test by 2010, but, at least under current conditions, the possible test devices would be the size of shipping containers and thus not deployable as weapons. While Iranian scientists are thought to be experimenting with technology for a "two-point implosion" device that could reduce the diameter of a warhead to a size that one of their Shahab rockets could carry, Israeli intelligence assumes the Iranians won't succeed before 2014.

There is also concern that countries like Iran or Syria could try to overwhelm the system by firing large barrages of ballistic missiles. This argument likewise does not stand up to scrutiny. The fire-control centres of Arrow batteries deployed near the cities of Rishon LeZion and Ein Shemer are capable of operating up to 14 interceptors at the same time and will each soon be equipped with 100 rockets, more than enough to respond to any medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile threat (as a point of reference, Iraq fired a total of 39 Scud missiles at Israel in 18 separate air raids for the whole of the 1991 Gulf War).

Of more pressing and practical concern are the implications of employing a costly rocket-based interceptor system to interdict up to 50,000 short-range missiles buffeting Israel on three fronts. It's true that Iron Dome is designed to provide ample protective overlap with the lower-tiered Centurion C-RAM (for use against steep-trajectory rockets and mortar shells that fall too quickly for Iron Dome to react). But, whereas the Centurion is a relatively cheap acquisition and inexpensive to operate (the system relies on fire bursts of between 3,000 and 4,500 20mm rounds per minute), an Iron Dome battery requires an initial outlay of $215 million with each Tamir interceptor missile running between $40,000 and $50,000

Ben Hartman writing in the Jerusalem Post this week raises doubts about the affordability of the Iron Dome system, nevertheless I keep in mind Ian Siperco’s cost analysis,

“Detractors have seized upon the relatively high sticker price of these interceptors to argue that reliance on Iron Dome may lead to a costly arms race, with militant groups forcing Israel to spend tens of thousands of dollars a shot to target comparatively cheap, homemade Qassams (produced in the Gaza Strip for an estimated cost of $200). These critics are either disingenuous or ill-informed. Iron Dome was designed to provide both robust and selective defence, keeping unit costs low by differentiating between weapons headed toward populated areas and those that will fall into the sea and open fields.

Development of Iron Dome has cost over $200 million, and the programme has come under repeated criticism because of its high cost. The system operates by identifying an incoming threat and then firing a missile to intercept it in mid-air. The missiles cost tens of thousands of dollars each, while the crudely-made rockets they’re meant to take down cost very little.”
Ben Hartman quotes an article on the CBN News Web site claiming that Iron Dome project director, Yossi Drucker, says each Tamir missile would cost $100,000.
Military analyst Reuven Pedatzur is less than thrilled about the system, which he has referred to as “a scam.” Pedatzur has consistently criticised the Iron Dome and its sister systems from their very inception. He hinges on the higher price ticket for the Tamir interceptor and gives a bargain price for the Qassam rockets.
“If each missile we fire costs $100,000, and each Qassam costs $10, $20, then all they’ll need to do is shoot as many rockets as they possibly can until we go broke. Hezbollah alone is believed to have over 150,000 long-range rockets. We can’t afford this.”
Pedatzur summed up his response to the claims that the Iron Dome system provides an answer to short to medium range threats as “nonsense and delusional,”

In the meantime India, Singapore and other unnamed prospective customers have show interest in acquiring the Iron Dome system. Obviously exports will help reduce the production costs of the system and the interceptors.

The dilemma regarding where to deploy the first two batteries coming off the assembly line in November is real. Instinctively we should opt to place the batteries along the Gaza Strip periphery, however concern for vital military air bases may take precedence over civilian centres.

The debate and the dilemma has yet to be resolved.

Have a good weekend.

Beni 22^nd of July, 2010.

Security and shaving gel

By paraphrasing the adage “You can’t have too much insurance” with “You can’t have too much security,” I’m sure to arouse a comment or two. Exaggerated caution can be more of a burden than a boon. Even in the Middle East repetitive checks and screenings can be annoying. On the other hand I’m equally annoyed when security is lax. A case in point occurred this morning when I went to the open-air market in Afula (our throbbing local metropolis).

A few years ago the market was relocated to a more spacious and securer site on the perimeter of the town. At the entrance to the market a bored security guard waved me through without checking the contents of my bag. When I volunteered to open it he declined my offer but nevertheless asked me if I was carrying a weapon.

On the way out in the parking lot I met Mustafa an old friend and neighbour. Mustafa Zoabi, hails from Neura, an Arab village close to Ein Harod. I wondered if Mustafa and his wife had also been waved through by the security guard.

By contrast the very professional screening we encountered at Ben Gurion air terminal two weeks ago when we flew to Oslo was thorough and swift.

A few years ago Bob Simon praised the security at Ben Gurion air terminal in a counter terrorism programme he presented for the CBS television news magazine “60 Minutes.”

As I recall Simon focused on the combination of well trained security personnel, sophisticated scanners and intelligent profiling employed at the Tel Aviv airport.

While we were away I was twice the victim of too much security. Instead of packing my toiletry bag in our large suitcase I carried it with me in an overnight bag. The scanner identified a shaving gel canister as a potential security threat, my bag was opened and the canister was confiscated. I blamed myself for the oversight and bought another canister in Lillehammer. On the return journey I was careful to pack the toiletries bag in the large suitcase, however due to an unknown luggage limitation imposed by the airline we had to repack to avoid paying an excess fine. In the repacking process which involved some ingenuity and a lot of brute force applied to the single suitcase the toiletry bag was inadvertently placed in the overnight shoulder bag. Well the Norwegian scanner homed in on my new shaving gel canister and a gleeful Norwegian security officer removed it and consoled me with a brief apology. Maybe I should grow a beard.

A few weeks ago at the height of the Gaza flotilla drama I read a public opinion survey conducted in Norway. According to the survey 40% of the respondents interviewed said they would not buy Israeli goods. Since I don’t place much trust in P.O. surveys I wasn’t concerned about meeting the 40% selective purchasers.

It’s possible that we met the apathetic, disinterested or even sympathetic 60% of the Norwegians who were helpful and accommodating. Whenever I spoke to rank and file Norwegians I intentionally identified myself as an Israeli. Not once did my identity provoke any critical response. On one occasion we were greeted enthusiastically by a very nice Norwegian woman who was proud to use her five-word Hebrew vocabulary. In spite of the 40% conscientious shoppers Norwegians are nice!

In Molde we met up with three expatriates – Herzl and Eshel from Ein Harod and Herzl’s wife Hildagunn . Hildagunn of course is Norwegian but her fluent Hebrew helps qualify her as an expatriate.

The conversation over coffee and Norwegian waffles at Eshel’s home focused on security ( at that time my one forfeited canister of shaving gel) and drifted to a local incident. It seems that an Israeli expert on counter-terrorism, mainly methods of countering roadside bombs had been invited to deliver a paper on his particular field of expertise at a Norwegian conference on counter-terrorism. A last minute intervention by a local anti-Israel political group caused the conference organisers to cancel the invitation. Ironically four Norwegian soldiers were killed by a roadside bomb about the time the conference was being convened. Our host Eshel Tzur wrote a letter of protest to a local newspaper complaining about the stupidity of narrow political interests overriding real security concerns.

Norway is beautiful! The mountains, lakes, rivers waterfalls and fjords are overwhelming. I photographed more than I can possibly condense into a travelogue of our visit and now I am having a hard job editing the material.

Back home we discovered little had changed. There’s another government crisis over the defence budget. An amicable compromise will be found and our impossible coalition government will somehow manage to survive.

The Gilad Shalit protest march seems to have ended with a whimper. The Libyan “Free Gaza” relief ship docked at El Arish and won’t be going to Gaza after all.

I found the current issue of Jane’s Defence Weekly in my mail box at work.

It featured a lead interview Yedidya Ya’ari, chief executive officer of Rafael advanced defence systems. Rafael is the developer and manufacturer of the “Iron Dome” counter rocket system. By the end of August this year the Israel Defence Force is scheduled to achieve initial operational capability with its first two Iron Dome systems. When that happens Israel will be the first country in the world with an operational short-range rocket defence system. “David’s Sling,” another system being developed by Rafael is expected to become operational in 2013. David’s Sling is designed to meet strategic threats posed by medium range missiles.

These particular systems as well as others being developed are primarily intended to meet our own defence and security needs. Israel’s relatively large defence budget has its limits. It can’t possible be the sole market for new armaments under development Moreover, the minister of finance is determined to shave off some of the surplus from the defence budget. Israel’s military industries are well aware of possible cuts in defence expenditure, so bearing this in mind and cognizant of lucrative foreign demands for Israeli weapons and defence systems, they are increasing their efforts to export battle-tested products as well as new systems like the Iron Dome. Of course all military exports have to be approved by the ministry of defence.

In another issue of Jane’s Defence Weekly the magazine’s local correspondent Yaakov Katz reported of a change of mind regarding exports of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia. Katz wrote about an agreement reached between Russia and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) to purchase 12 reconnaissance UAVs scheduled for delivery in September this year.

During the 2008 conflict with Georgia over South Ossetia, Georgia operated another type of UAV- Elbit Systems Hermes 450. The Russians learnt the value of UAVs from that conflict and since then have tried to acquire UAVs from IAI.

The negotiations which began earlier this year have stopped “pending a reassessment.” UAVs sold to Russia in the past are older models and pose no threat to Israel if Russia resells them to a non- friendly third party. However newer versions are another matter. Israel’s decision to freeze the sales negotiations stems from concern about Russia’s ties with Syria and Iran.

In sensitive matters of this nature you can’t be too careful.

Have a good weekend.

Beni 15^th of July, 2010.