Thursday 26 January 2012

Waters of contention







Jacob and Rachel by the well.

The ancient water cisterns on the hill above Ein Harod have always served the people who lived here. However our founding fathers were an exception, they chose a better more modern and reliable water supply system. From Byzantine times, perhaps earlier, the people who made their homes here cut into the ground rock to build cisterns for storing runoff surface water. For hundreds of years flocks were watered from these cisterns and in good years the people on the hill had enough water to irrigate a few crops. However water for domestic purposes was brought from the Harod stream in the valley. Hauling water was a toilsome, time consuming task that hadn’t changed since this hill was first inhabited. In fact the whole water economy was very much like it was in biblical times. Just the same, meeting by a well or watering hole, a recurring biblical theme, conjures up visions of pastoral bliss, even romantic encounters and has inspired artists through the ages. Reality is less romantic. Although we were promised a land flowing with milk and honey, it seems the Almighty wasn't so generous with water.

Descriptions of the Holy Land in the Bible, post biblical texts, journals recorded by mediaeval pilgrims and even nineteenth century travellers, depict arid inhospitable landscapes. "The valleys are unsightly deserts fringed with a feeble vegetation that has an expression about it of being sorrowful and despondent." Mark Twain – Innocents Abroad. Our main watercourse the River Jordan flows 251 km from Lebanon to the Dead Sea. For most of its course the Jordan’s river bed is below sea level, limiting its use for irrigation. Most of the southern length of the river is too saline for use in agriculture. At the point where it enters the Dead Sea it is seventeen times more salty than sea water. In the past the Jordan River, a few tributaries, a lake we call a sea, and a number of artesian wells made up most of our water sources. Hardly the stuff to reclaim the homeland with.

Increasing Jewish immigration during the British Mandate period with a parallel increase in the Arab population, both the indigenous and migrants from neighbouring states, strained water resources necessitating a better system of water management.

In the late 1930s and mid-1940s, Transjordan and the World Zionist Organisation commissioned mutually exclusive competing water resource studies. The Transjordanian study, performed by Michael G. Ionides, concluded that the available water resources are not sufficient to sustain a Jewish state which would be the destination for Jewish immigration. The Zionist study, by the American engineer Walter Clay Lowdermilk, concluded that by diverting water from the Jordan basin to support agriculture and residential development in the Negev, a Jewish state supporting 4 million new immigrants would be sustainable. A few years after his survey Lowdermilk published a book called Palestine, Land of Promise. Regarding the Jewish settlements he wrote, “Defying great hardships and applying the principles of cooperation and soil conservation they have demonstrated the finest reclamation of old lands that I have seen in three continents. They have done this by the application of science, industry and devotion to the problems of reclaiming lands, draining swamps, improving agriculture and livestock and creating new industries. All this was done against great odds and with sacrificial devotion to the ideal of redeeming the Promised Land.” At the end of the 1948 Arab Israeli War with the signing of the General Armistice Agreements in 1949, both Israel and Jordan embarked on implementing their competing initiatives to utilise the water resources in the areas under their control.

The first "Master Plan for Irrigation in Israel" was drafted in 1950 and approved by a board of consultants in 1956. The main component of the Master Plan was the construction of the Israeli National Water Carrier (NWC). In 1953, Israel began construction of a water carrier to take water from the Sea of Galilee to the country's populated centre as well as the south of the country, while Jordan concluded an agreement with Syria, known as the Bunger plan, to dam the Yarmouk river and utilise its waters to irrigate Jordanian territory. However before the plan could be implemented a clash between Israeli and Syrian forces caused severe damage to the Syrian engineering infrastructure and brought the project to a halt. President Eisenhower dispatched Ambassador Johnston to the region to work out a plan that would regulate water usage. Thirty years later an analysis conducted by the CIA placed the Middle East on the list of possible conflict zones related to disagreement over sharing water resources. The report drawn up by the Agency stated that more than a fifth of the region’s population lacks access to adequate potable water and more than a third of the population lacks appropriate sanitation.

Last Thursday my wife and I spent the day with our daughter Irit by the Sea of Galilee. While sipping coffee at Beit Gavriel on the shores of the lake I contemplated our frightening dependence on its waters.

About 40 percent of the water we use is pumped from the Kinneret (Sea of Galilee). Another 30 percent comes from the western and northeastern aquifers of the mountain aquifer system. The western and northeastern aquifers straddle the Green Line that separates Israel from the West Bank, but most of the stored water is under pre-1967 Israel, making it mostly accessible only to Israel. Being a country that has been at constant war with the Palestinians, water rights are a serious impediment affecting an amicable agreement. The remaining 30 percent comes from a combination of natural springs, desalination plants and man made reservoirs used mainly for replenishing the aquifers.

Before the Oslo agreements of 1993, water rights belonged solely to Israel. With the responsibility for millions of people, Israelis and Palestinians, Israel promised safe drinking water to all the people of the region. After 1993, with the signing of the Oslo agreements, Palestinians were allowed to have a share of the water that is under and flows through Israel. There were still problems building the infrastructure that was to carry the water. The Palestine Authority motivated by political reasons did not want an Israeli water infrastructure. To obviate this problem the Oslo II agreement allocated two-thirds of the infrastructure development to the Palestinians and one-third to Israel.

After Oslo II was signed, Israel moved very quickly to carry out its part of the agreement, however the Palestinian Authority worked slowly and neglected its obligations. In many places, little or nothing was done to create a Palestinian water infrastructure The PA has many Israeli built wells but has been slow to pipe water to the people under its jurisdiction. There is also significant water loss due to corrosion in the older inefficient water systems.

I realise that I have written about this in the past. Nevertheless, I repeat it here because the French parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee has just published an unprecedented report accusing Israel of implementing “apartheid” in its allocation of water in Judea and Samaria.

Italian journalist Giulio Meotti called the accusations slanderous. He said, "The report, authored by Socialist Party MP Jean Glavany, is a powerful blood libel against the Jews, because it establishes the false comparison between Palestinians and South Africa’s blacks, who were obliged to use separate and neglected water sources." Meotti reminded his readers that when Jordan occupied the West Bank between1948 and 1967, some 80% of the Arab population was not connected to a water network. Since 1967 Israel has linked almost all Arab communities in Judea and Samaria with local water grids, so that now 90% of homes there have indoor plumbing. The total water supply to that region has doubled from 64 million cubic metres a year to 120 million as a result of improved water access.

In 2004, while addressing an international conference on water conservation a representative of the Israeli Water Commission proposed allocating 50 million m³/year from the desalination plant in Hadera for the exclusive supply of up to one million Palestinians in the northern West Bank. Funding for the project was obtained, but the Palestinian Authority rejected the proposal. Some experts argue that water supplies in the region could simply be used more efficiently. Jordan, for instance, could use its Yarmuk supply first for drinking water rather than for irrigation, and then recycle urban waste water to keep the crops growing, as Israel does.

Israeli representatives assert meanwhile that the debate over water has been skewed by the Arabs' emphasis on disparities in consumption.

Agronomist Avraham Katz-Oz, formerly Israeli Minister of Agriculture, has negotiated with the Palestinian Authority regarding water sharing. He illustrated how the debate has been distorted." A person living in a high-rise apartment building in Tel Aviv with a sink, dishwasher, washing machine, shower and toilet is likely to use a lot more water than someone in a Palestinian refugee camp where such amenities are minimal. I'm not saying that's good, but that disparity is a socioeconomic problem -- it's not a water problem." Environmental groups, such as the Israel Union for Environmental Defence, have called for a moratorium on new desalination plants, beyond the ones already in the advanced bidding stages. "We believe that even in 2020, we can make do with 315 million cubic metres of desalinated annually ", they say. Their report calls for water conservation, the treatment of wastewater and the recycling of grey water (domestic waste water other than toilet effluent), as well as using construction techniques that allow rainwater to permeate the surface to reach the aquifers. The authors of the report claim that this would reduce the need for massive desalination of seawater.

There have always been adherers to a conservative approach concerning our water economy. These diehards claim that there is a cyclic pattern of droughts and years blessed with more than average precipitation. The corollary of that opinion is to conserve water both during droughts and rainy years. Replenish the aquifers, build sewerage filtration plants, but avoid building desalination plants. Forcing people to stop watering their lawns and persuading farmers to cut back on irrigated crops has never been popular. The opposition to desalination plants stems from cost and environmental factors. However, newer improved technology has made desalination affordable and damage caused to the environment minimal.

At present Israel leads the world in water conservation technology, research and development of innovative applications, desalination and recycling sewerage. Our agronomists are pioneering innovative irrigation techniques, notably drip irrigation. This technology has developed into a lucrative export branch. An Israeli consortium unveiled the world's largest reverse osmosis desalination plant near Hadera recently. It is the third in a series of five desalination plants being built over the next few years that will eventually supply Israel with about 750 million cubic metres of water.

Water need not be a contentious issue. Just the same a biblical reference to Moses’ sin at the “waters of contention” (Numbers 20:2-13) is a potentially explosive matter. I can understand the Palestinian reluctance to be linked to an Israeli desalination plant. A few years ago a proposal to import water from Turkey was a viable option. Then we enjoyed good relations with Turkey and the cost of imported water was not prohibitive. However, some Israelis feared dependency on water from an outside source. At that time we had a rainy winter so the proposal was shelved. In addition to selling water to the Palestinians we will have enough water to supply the Jordanians as well. The continuous flow of water to these potential customers can be guaranteed by the “Quartet” or another international body. Haggling over rain in the Judean hills on the west side of the watershed that ends up in the aquifer on our side of the Green Line is futile. The Palestinians could easily obtain foreign grants for sewerage reclamation and improvement of their water economy. However, like it or not they will always be dependent on water from an external source.

The weather forecast for the weekend predicts intermittent showers.

Rain or shine, have a good weekend.

Beni 26th of January, 2012.



Thursday 19 January 2012

The Iran Dilemma 2012

On your next trip to Iran be sure to include the Alamut fortress in your itinerary. According to an Iranian ministry of tourism spokesman reconstruction work at the Alamut fortress in the country's southern Caspian province will make the site more accessible to tourists. This mountain fortress was conquered and destroyed by the Mongols in the thirteenth century. The Mongols took Alamut from the Ismaili Shia warriors ending the rule of these infamous Muslim The Alamut fortress

assassins. Apparently the word assassin is derived from the Farsi word Hashshashin, which shares its etymological roots with the word hashish. Founded by the Persian Hassan-i Sabbah, the Hashshashin were active in the fortress for about four hundred years. The group killed members of the Muslim Abbasis, Seljuk and Christian Crusader élite for political and religious reasons. Although it is commonly believed that the assassins were under the influence of hashish during their "missions," historians doubt if this is true. Ironically, modern Iran, the heir to mediaeval Persia, is currently plagued by a number of targeted killings. Iranian government spokesmen have accused the CIA, MI5 and the Mossad of assassinating a number of Iranian nuclear scientists. The latest victim was Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, deputy director at Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility. Eye witnesses reported that two men on a motorcycle affixed a magnetic bomb to Roshan's car while he was driving to work last week. So far the Iranian authorities haven't managed to exhibit a "smoking gun." Lack of tangible evidence hasn't bothered the commentators who were quick to assume the Mossad was responsible for the assassinations. To support their insinuations they quote remarks made separately by IDF chief of staff Lt-Gen Benny Gantz and Minister of Defence Ehud Barak, about the "unnatural" things happening in Iran. Just the same it's interesting to speculate why Mr. Barak's parents chose to name him Ehud. Presumably he was named after the biblical Ehud Ben Gera, the father of all assassins who slew Eglon King of Moab - Judges 3:20

In his Atlantic Magazine column Jeffrey Goldberg asks - “Does Israel, or whoever is assassinating Iranian scientists, believe that these killings will actually slow-down Iranian nuclear development? In other words, do the people behind the assassinations believe that Iranian nuclear knowledge is so concentrated in the minds of a few scientists that a limited series of assassinations can cripple the program?" Unwittingly, Yediot Ahronot military affairs analyst Ron Ben Yishai provided an answer to Goldberg’s question. “The most important aspect of the assassinations is the killing of people who constitute ‘knowledge bases.’ It is clear that any military strike on Iran would only thwart the nuclear and missile projects by a few years, but the elimination of key figures may extend the programs’ recovery period, if and when they’re attacked.” Ben Yishai too poses a question regarding the assassins’ identity – Mossad fingerprints? And follows by intimating, “All indications show that a state organ is behind the assassinations.” The US and Britain have flatly denied responsibility for the killings, whereas Israel has neither denied nor confirmed involvement in them. In an interview with Radio Free Europe, defence and security analyst Shashank Joshi said, “After the West -- the Western countries, the P5 countries [i.e. the five permanent members of the UN Security Council], and Germany -- have worked so hard to build this international coalition of sanctions against Iran, would they jeopardize that or would they provoke Iran even further at a time when they are trying to work very hard to get Iran back to the negotiating table? The suggestion, therefore, is that either this was a group not involved with those sanctions or a state that was impatient with those sanctions and didn't think they would work anyway." The interviewer also asked Joshi about the Mossad activity in the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq. Perhaps this offers a clue regarding the identity of the assassins. Joshi believes the Kurdistan link is a red-herring. "However, in the murky world of assassinations and covert actions you can't rule out that possibility," he said.

Josh Mitnick Christian Science Monitor correspondent in Israel, also related to the efficacy of selective assassinations. “Few believe that the strikes will ultimately deny Iran of its goal of nuclear capability, but observers credit the covert campaign with slowing down Iran’s nuclear progress over years, giving more time for diplomats and pushing back the possibility of a military strike.” He goes on to quote Meir Elram, a senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (TAU), "If anyone has a strategy to slow down the process, it’s a wise strategy,’’ Elram considers assassinations a legitimate tool in the fight against Iran. "If you weigh it against the risks, compared to an all-out assault on Iranian installations, it’s a much more measured and perhaps constructive tactic in the long run." Jeffrey Goldberg on the other hand points to the inherent danger of the assassination policy and argues that it doubles Iran’s determination to cross the nuclear threshold as fast as possible. “Once Ahmadinejad does that he is North Korea, or Pakistan: An untouchable country.”

Professor Avner Cohen author of “Israel and the Bomb” and "The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb," takes the moral high ground and asks, "Is it right to create a situation in which scientists (first nuclear scientists and then perhaps scientists in general and senior officials ) become pawns in a war of assassinations and counter-assassinations?" Shibley Telhami and Steven Kull wrote in the New York Times suggesting a way of "Preventing a Nuclear Iran, Peacefully." Relying on the findings of a public opinion poll conducted by the Israeli Dahaf Institute, they believe creating a nuclear free zone in the Middle East is the best way to defuse the present explosive situation. The findings were gleaned from a randomly selected group of 510 Israeli Jews canvassed by the Dahaf Institute. Not surprisingly the Dahaf poll barely raised a ripple of interest in Israel.

At this juncture it’s pertinent to add a comment on Israel’s nuclear ambiguity policy. In an article published in the Huffington Post, Daniel Wagner, managing director of Country Risk Solutions, a political risk consulting firm based in Connecticut,, provided an interesting analysis of our predicament . Given the political upheaval in the region this year, it is only natural to wonder whether Israel's decades-old policy of nuclear ambiguity is likely to benefit Israel in the longer-term. From the perspective of prolonging the balance of power that still exists, maintaining the ambiguity will probably serve Israel well. As long as Israel's neighbors and enemies presume Israel has a substantial nuclear capability, Israel should remain secure from existential attack, but only until other regional powers themselves go nuclear. Then the calculus may change, and become more an issue of demonstrating that Israel's nuclear arsenal is larger than that of any other regional power. At that time, Israel will presumably have no choice but to formally declare its capability.” Wagner concludes, “Israel has been a net beneficiary of its policy of nuclear ambiguity, but whether Israel will be able to maintain a balance between its security and foreign policy objectives, and the ideals of transparency in a democratic society and a globalized world, remains to be seen. One thing is for certain - Israel cannot afford, and has no intention, of either admitting its capability or changing its geostrategic posture until and unless lasting peace is reached with the Palestinians and all of its neighbors. For that reason, it must be expected that Israel, and the world, will be waiting quite some time for Israel to either clarify its status or adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT.)”

According to the usually reliable Jane's Defence Weekly in 2010 Israel had between 100 and 300 nuclear warheads. Jane’s estimated that most of them are probably being kept in unassembled mode but can become fully functional in a matter of days.

Ron Ben Yishai explained the relatively restrained Iranian reaction to the attacks on its nuclear scientists. “Apparently the reason is Iran’s fear of Western retaliation. Any terror attack against Israel or another Western target – whether it is carried out directly by Iran or by Hezbollah – may prompt a Western response. Under such circumstances, Israel or a Western coalition (or both) will have an excellent pretext to strike and destroy Iran’s nuclear and missile sites. Moreover, Tehran fears that Israel will take advantage of an Iranian attack in order to strike the immense missile and rocket arsenals funded or built by Iran in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza. The main aim of these arsenals is to serve as Iranian deterrence against a military strike. Hence, it is no wonder that Iran does not wish to jeopardize these strategic assets only to satisfy its hunger for revenge and restore the regime’s prestige. This is also the reason why the Iranians made sure in recent years that Hezbollah would not fire rockets at Israel, carry out attacks in Israeli territory, or avenge the assassination of the group’s military commander, Imad Mugniyah.”

Josh Mitnick quoted Haaretz columnist Yossi Melman, regarding the deterrent effect of the assassinations “The attacks are meant to strike fear among Iranian nuclear workers that they are risking their lives by working in the program – and deter potential recruits – while landing a blow to the prestige of the Iranian leadership. “ Mitnick himself said, “Many believe the repeated strikes against Iran are likely to ratchet up pressure on Iran to retaliate. Former Mossad director Danny Yatom told Israel Radio on Wednesday that Iranian reports of the assassination lays the groundwork to justify retaliation. Indeed, the chief editor of Iran's hard-line Kayhan newspaper, Hossein Shariatmadari, wrote a column pressing for just such a response. "Assassinations of Israeli military and officials are easily possible," he wrote.

“But because Israel refuses to confirm or deny the attacks,” says Mitnick,” Iran lacks an obvious smoking gun with which to justify escalating the conflict through an open strike on Israel. Instead, Iran is likely to look for a covert means of retaliation, which is more difficult to carry out.”

"The Iranian position is problematic; they threaten but don't act," Danny Yatom said. "They will have to do something if they want people to take them seriously and therefore I believe we are on an inevitable collision course."

Yaakov Katz, Jane’s Defence Weekly correspondent in Tel Aviv reported that the IDF and the Israeli Ministry of Defence are planning to establish a new aggregate corps that will specialise in carrying out long range military operations.

In other words preparing for the contingency of the “inevitable collision course,” Danny Yatom referred to.

Israel’s elite special forces are currently attached to various branches of the armed forces; “Shaldag” a target designation unit, is part of the Israel Air Force, Flotilla 13, the IDF equivalent to the US Navy SEALs, is part of the Israel Navy, and Sayeret Matkal, the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit, is part is part of the Military Intelligence Directorate. The new “Depth Corps” will oversee the operational activation of the three special forces, while the training and particular branch military doctrine will remain the responsibility of each parent military branch. Katz said, “Potentially, the Depth Corps could be involved in any Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, although such an operation would probably be conducted by the Israel Air Force unless ground troops were involved.”

Have a good weekend.

Beni 19th of January, 2012.



Thursday 12 January 2012

The Palombo Gates


Measured by almost every yardstick the Museum of Art, Ein Harod is an anomaly. Admittedly, kibbutz art museums are not unusual. Indeed, many kibbutz communities have built galleries and museums dedicated to art. Most of them are part of public buildings, often the dining room complex where they occupy a space or hall adjacent to the community library and memorial room. A few, like Ein Harod's art museum are 'stand-alone' structures. Our museum which began in the 1930s as a one-man project, the initiative of a local artist, was housed at first in a wooden hut. In 1948 the corner stone of the museum's first wing was laid at a new site and today it's the third largest art museum in Israel. People visiting the museum for the first time often remark that it's strange to find a museum so large in a rural area. Together with a second museum, a now defunct open-air theatre and two cultural halls, the museum of art formed an intrinsic part of Ein Harod's pioneer philosophy. It was a statement cut in stone rejecting the concept of cultural centralisation.

With the passage of time our Museum of Art has become a "trend setter" and today art in the provinces is as relevant as in the galleries and museums of the main urban centres.

This lengthy preamble serves merely to mention the museum's gates. These impressive wrought-iron gates are immediately recognisable as the work of the late David Palombo; the artist who fashioned the gates to the Knesset courtyard, the portal to our parliament

Writing about the Knesset and its elected members is always difficult, so by way of a digression ahead of the topic I chose to pause by the Palombo Gates before examining what is happening in the halls of government.

By comparison with most other democracies, political parties in Israel are both numerous and fluid. In the last General Election in February 2009, no fewer than 33 parties vied for the 120 seats in the Knesset . Parties are constantly changing name, uniting, splitting and forming alliances. In the last election, 12 political parties secured representation in the Knesset, but only five parties won more than 10 seats

Simultaneously and almost with equal measure, Israeli democracy is a source of both pride and frustration. A few months ago a lead article in The Economist tried to explain our electoral system. "Israelis are rightly proud that their country is the only genuine and functioning democracy in the Middle East, until recently a region dominated by repressive and dictatorial regimes. It is a democracy that has survived repeated wars and that, with a conscript army and formidable military apparatus, remains on a war-like footing. It is a democracy in which the rule of law is so strong that even a president (Moshe Katsav) or a prime minister (Ehud Olmert) can be indicted (for rape and fraud respectively.) On the other hand, Israeli's strange electoral system and fractious political parties virtually guarantee that the government will be a coalition of very different political parties with a strong likelihood that at least one will be a nationalist or ultra-religious one with disproportionate influence in the government. This makes ruling and legislating – even more negotiating with the Palestinians – very difficult, so that on average Israeli governments last only half their permitted term (two years instead of four).

The state was born in war, it has repeatedly engaged in further wars, it has regularly been the subject of suicide bombers and rocket attacks, and it is in a permanent state of war-readiness. It has a large, conscript army and a formidable security service (Mossad). Every family has some connection with the army and many of the leading political figures have had senior experience in the military or intelligence. To an extent unequalled in any other functioning democracy, it is security - and not ideology or economics - that is at the heart of political discourse and policymaking. As in so many states, therefore, democracy here is essentially a work in progress."

The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) describes itself as an independent, non-partisan "Think-and-Do Tank" that devises ways to strengthen the moral and structural foundations of Israeli democracy. While Israel's policymakers are consumed by crisis management, the IDI attempts to deal with the long-term challenges facing the State in realms such as Political Reform, National Security, Religion and State, and Constitutional Law. Since its establishment in 1991, IDI has supported and advised Israel's elected officials, civil servants, and opinion leaders. Its description of our system of government is slightly more sympathetic. "Israeli policymakers groan under the burden of an overloaded national agenda that ranks among the most complex in the world. Forged in the crucible of war a little more than sixty years ago, Israel’s institutions of government have adapted slowly to the challenges posed by a growing society of extraordinary diversity, living in a near-constant state of emergency. The Israeli Knesset, for example, despite its tremendous array of responsibilities, remains the smallest and most under-staffed House of Representatives in the world; the State of Israel, forced to withstand the relentless pressure on democratic values produced by a state of siege, still lacks a bill of rights that would safeguard individual liberties; and the Israeli political system, faced with momentous challenges that require a strong capacity for decision, is often plagued by instability and paralysis. Lurching from crisis to crisis, Israel’s leaders have little time and few resources to devote to strategic planning and brainstorming."

French political scientist and writer Dominique Moisi is more critical. He asks, "What is wrong with Israel? In the last few years, the Jewish state seems to have done more than all of its combined enemies to delegitimise itself in the eyes of the world. Its leaders’ apparent inability to think in strategic terms, and their indifference to the tribunal of global public opinion, is resulting in growing frustration among its citizens and, what may be more dangerous, deepening international isolation." He fears our leaders, "May have lost the ability to act collectively in a “raison d’état” manner." Moisi the son of a Holocaust survivor raises another possibility, "Or perhaps the weight of Holocaust remembrance has blinded Israel’s leaders and distorted their thinking – in ways that, at the time the State of Israel was created, the Holocaust itself almost miraculously did not." Professor Moisi claims the failure of the peace process in the 1990’s, followed by the coming of the second Intifada, appears to have encouraged the radicalisation of Israel’s extremes while discouraging moderates. The revival of religious parties – in a country created by avowed secularists – opened the way for a more politically powerful but also more nationalistic and intolerant setting. Immigrants from the former Soviet Union have made valuable contributions to Israeli society enriching our culture and the sciences. However, Dominique Moisi breaks a taboo singling out a negative attribute of the Russian immigration. "One could also ask whether the arrival of one million 'Russians,' regardless of their actual ties to Judaism, had a negative effect on Israeli society, by encouraging ideological rigidity and a disdain for democracy that did not prevail before." Finally he arrives at the obvious conclusion, "Or is the explanation for Israel’s current predicament to be found on the more prosaic terrain of the country’s dysfunctional democracy? In reality, all these explanations are largely complementary; none is in contradiction with the others. But the most important cause, the one that should be addressed before all others because it is eroding Israel’s very viability, is the near paralysis of the political system.” Moisi reasons that though Italy can survive bad government and corruption because it is surrounded by the placid environment of the European Union. This is not true of Israel. Here he refers to the "bunker mentality" I mentioned last week. "Protected by a 'security wall' on one side and the sea on the other, Israeli citizens may enjoy the feeling of living on an artificial island from which they can connect directly to the areas of modernity and prosperity in Asia and the West. Yet they are surrounded by a sea of angry and frustrated people, and cannot escape the logic of the region they inhabit." I'm not sure I understand what the "logic of the region" is. However, I do agree with the conclusion Dominique Moisi arrives at. "Israel’s political system, through its complex mechanisms of rigged party selection and absolute proportionality, condemns the country to weak coalition governments and escalating corruption. It must be reformed urgently. Government leaders in Israel cannot afford to spend 90% of their time thinking about how to survive politically at a time when the state’s right to exist is being challenged….." Reform of the country’s political system has simply become a matter of life and death."

Dominique Moisi's analysis of Israel's political system isn't exactly a revelation. Laymen and legislators alike advocate change but know that no ruling party is strong enough to bring about that change. The smaller partners in the ruling coalition government are loath to vote themselves into oblivion.

Prime Minister Netanyahu appears to be unbeatable. General elections are not scheduled to take place till next year. "As it stands, Netanyahu's domestic allies still view the prime minister as the man who cannot lose. An ironclad ruling coalition, an opposition which can barely keep its chairs warm, a White House useful when acquiescent and useful when carping. Re-election is assured. Life is good." Observed columnist Bradley Burston in Haaretz. However, Burston knows that Israeli politics are notoriously unpredictable and wonders if Netanyahu is," The man who cannot lose - or can he? "…..

"Netanyahu's government rests on keeping his friends close and Avigdor Lieberman closer. But the foreign minister's crucial 15-strong faction - on a good day a diplomatic albatross of racism and the Zionism of Nastiness - could implode entirely if Lieberman is indicted for fraud and a range of other allegations." January 13th will be the day of the albatross.

Burston speculates that, "Shorn of Lieberman's lockstep votes, Netanyahu would command a paltry 51 of the Knesset's 120 seats. Early elections would likely ensue, but if Lieberman were out of the picture, the large Russian vote would be expected to split among a number of parties, with a sizeable percentage sitting out the election altogether."

Even if Lieberman avoids indictment, a number of potentially explosive issues lie alongside Netanyahu's path to re-election. They include how he will react to the High Court ruling instructing him to dismantle illegal outposts and the "unknown entity factor." If former Shas party leader Aryeh Deri decides to head a new religious party list in the coming elections political analysts predict he will win five seats. That's hardly enough to make him a "kingmaker," or is it? His five seats could decide the election between a right bloc at 58 seats and a centre-left at 57. Aryeh Deri is still vacillating, so for the time being Netanyahu is safe and sound. Popular TV anchorman Yair Lapid announced his intention to head a new list in next year's elections. Another Haaretz columnist, Gideon Levy commented on Lapid's decision to join the political fray, "A new political species has arrived in Israel, the celebrity-politician, and this is bad news. It doesn't say much about them but it says a lot about us, the Israelis." Known for his cutting-edge cynicism Levy annoys a lot of people. " Yair Lapid, Noam Shalit and Karnit Goldwasser will certainly liven up the dull political map with bright new colours." Noam Shalit of course is the father of Gilad Shalit. He has announced his intention to win a place in the Labour party's list. Karnit Goldwasser is a war widow and she is expected to join Lapid's list. Major-General Shlomo Yanai (reserves) who recently retired as CEO of Teva Pharmaceutical Industries is another name on the list of aspiring politicians. Currently old soldiers are out of vogue, but news media people are definitely the old-new breed seeking to pass the Palombo Gates. Reviewing the new guys on the block Levy said,“The attitude toward each of them was emotional - and nothing more. Lapid created a pleasant atmosphere and amused us, Shalit and Goldwasser touched our hearts, and all three roused in us a bit of identification. In a country where almost everything is emotional, they were the heroes of the hour, the heroes of the time. We laughed with them and cried with them. We followed them and identified with them; they took us into their lives and the lives of their families in good times and bad, but - oops - we really didn't know them at all.

What we know is the image built around them, and that's enough to make them celebrities. But we don't have the slightest idea about their positions, and that's not enough to make them politicians. No one in this country but their family and friends knows anything about their opinions. Maybe they have opinions and maybe they don't. (My suspicion is they don't.)”

Have a good weekend.

Beni 12th of January, 2012.

Thursday 5 January 2012

The Bunker Mentality

A few weeks ago while perusing the end of the year sales in a local bookstore I noticed four Arab women thumbing through books stacked on another stand. Their conservative apparel identified them as Muslims, probably from one of the villages nearby. The fact that all the books on the stand were in Hebrew didn't surprise me. Many Israeli Arabs begin the day in Arabic and spend their working hours alternating between Hebrew and Arabic. Israeli Arabs, both men and women have become increasingly fluent in Hebrew. This fluency can be traced back to the profound changes that took place in the "Arab Sector" during the mid-1960s. Between 1949 and 1966 the Arab minority in Israel was controlled by martial law. Once the martial law restrictions were lifted more Arabs were able to seek work outside the main Arab population centres. Working in the majority Jewish sector necessitated a working knowledge of Hebrew. Furthermore, the compulsory study of Hebrew as a second language in Arab schools and the exposure to Hebrew in the mass media contributed to an increasing fluency in Hebrew among Israeli Arabs. This linguistic integration has helped to advance the general wellbeing of Israeli Arabs; however they still remain one of the poorest sectors in the country.


Nevertheless, there are signs of some improvement. According to a study commissioned by the Israeli National Insurance Institute, there has been a significant rise in the employment rate in the Arab sector in recent years, mainly among women.

A few days after the bookstore encounter we travelled to Ramat Hasharon to attend a family gathering.

Driving south from Galilee along Route 6, also known as the Yitzhak Rabin highway, you pass very close to the imaginary "Green Line." At these places a very tangible wall and fence demarcate between Palestinians and Israelis. The stretches of concrete wall, fence and patrol roads with their sophisticated monitoring devices ward off would be terrorists, car thieves and other villains. Considering the awful consequences of a no-barrier situation I'm convinced it was well worth the cost (one million dollars a kilometre). However our much improved security and the subsequent sense of wellbeing have a downside.

Reaching a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians has become less urgent, we have walled them out. However, by walling them out we are also walling ourselves in. This siege situation, albeit self-imposed, afflicts both the besieged and the besieger. Admittedly driving along route 6 I feel neither remorse nor claustrophobia, nevertheless, I'm sure people in the Gaza periphery communities running for cover during a barrage of Qassam rockets and mortar fire are very much under siege. Likewise, on the other side of the divide Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, hemmed in on all sides are definitely besieged.

Maybe building walls, erecting fences and developing sophisticated defence systems are part and parcel of our siege mentality, but it's a mentality that developed as a response to continuous threats and attacks made by our neighbours. Some observers link our obsession with existential threats to the Holocaust. As far back as 1976 author Amos Elon wrote of the national psyche and the Holocaust in his book- 'The Israelis- Founders and Sons.' "The Holocaust remains a basic trauma of Israeli society. It is impossible to exaggerate its effect on the process of nation-building. There is a latent hysteria in Israeli life that stems directly from this source...The trauma of the Holocaust leaves an indelible mark on the national psychology, the tenor and content of public life, the conduct of foreign affairs, on politics, education, literature and the arts.".

Carlo Strenger a Swiss-Israeli psychologist, philosopher, existential psychoanalyst and journalist, prefers the term "bunker mentality." He says, "Israel has real enemies like Iran and Hezbollah. Human psychology is such that fear often leads to freezing and hanging on to the same course of action, even if it proves disastrous time and again. As a result Israel doesn’t listen to criticism - either from inside or from outside. This inability to listen is reinforced by self-righteousness: Israel is stuck in the belief that it is right, and everybody else is wrong and hence incapable of admitting that Israeli policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians has been disastrous; that Israel should have engaged with the Arab League peace initiative years ago, and that a U turn needs to be made. Admitting that one has been wrong is always difficult; but Israel’s need for self-righteousness makes it even more difficult."

The Arab Peace Initiative Strenger refers to was first proposed in 2002. Sometimes called the Saudi Initiative or the Abdullah Initiative, it has some major advantages. However these advantages exact a high price. It attempts to end the Arab-Israeli Conflict, which means normalising relations between the entire Arab region and Israel, in exchange for a complete withdrawal from the occupied territories (including East Jerusalem ) and a "just settlement" of the Palestinian refugee crisis based on UN resolution 194. Carlo Strenger and others believe that not responding to the plan was a mistake. However, the Palestinian refugees' "right of return" is regarded by many Israelis as a "Trojan horse." It has been a major stumbling block in all the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The two key points of the initiative, namely the complete withdrawal from the occupied territories and the "right of return" clause caused many Israelis to reject it.


Abdullah’s initiative followed an earlier plan proposed by President Clinton. The “Clinton Parameters” were more palatable to many Israelis. The parameters included recognition of “facts on the ground” and the principle of exchange of territories. The latter two points were incorporated in later negotiations with the Palestinians. The facts on the ground are the large Israeli settlements blocs in the West Bank.

In 2007, when Benyamin Netanyahu was leader of the opposition he rejected the Saudi initiative outright. In 2009, President Shimon Peres noted with satisfaction the "u-turn" in the attitudes of Arab states toward peace with Israel as reflected in the Saudi Initiative. However he disagreed with its wording and preferred to consider it a basis for negotiations.

The Palestinian Authority strongly supports the plan and Mahmoud Abbas officially asked U.S. President Barack Obama to adopt it as part of his Middle East policy. Hamas rejected the plan.

Since then Israel and the Palestinian Authority have been at loggerheads regarding the resumption of negotiations, each side making its participation in the renewed talks conditional to certain demands. The PA demands freezing all construction in Israeli settlements in the Judea and Samaria and Israel insists that the PA should recognise Israel as a Jewish state.

Ronald R. Krebs, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota also chose to label Israel's weltanschauung "bunker mentality." In the November/December 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs he describes "How the Occupation Is Destroying the Nation." Krebs says, "For the Israeli right and its allies around the world, the greatest danger to Israel's future is the unwillingness of Palestinians to make peace. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict does threaten Israel, but not, as the right would have it, because militant and even seemingly moderate Palestinians harbor plans to drive the Jews into the sea. Rather, the conflict threatens Israel because of the havoc it wreaks on the country's internal politics. Since 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, its presence in those territories has played a central role in structuring Israeli politics, transforming a country once brimming with optimism into an increasingly cynical, despondent, and illiberal place." Krebs goes on to describe how the bunker mentality has bred an aggressive ethnic nationalism. He claims it has strengthened ultra-Orthodox political parties, which have exploited divisions between the right and the left to become kingmakers. In exchange for their parliamentary support, they have demanded economic subsidies for their constituents, who often devote years and in some cases their entire lives to studying in Jewish seminaries rather than participating in the work force. Ronald Krebs balances his depressing description by placing a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel. Unfortunately he bases his assumption on a political forecast. Political outcomes in Israel are rarely predictable. He places his trust in the emergence of a centrist governing coalition. Despite a lot of procrastination and bungling Netanyahu's ratings in the opinion polls remain unchanged, but there are indications that change is in the wind. Last year's social welfare protests are beginning to translate into political action. The resurrection of the all but clinically dead Labour party as well as other changes, might just create new alliances that could challenge the hegemony of Netanyahu’s Likud party.

I want to return to the four Arab women in the bookstore and speculate regarding their attitude to Israel as a Jewish state in the context of the two-state solution to the Arab-Palestinian Conflict. This is particularly relevant now in view of the talks held in Amman on Tuesday between Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erakat and Israeli envoy Yitzhak Molcho. The talks are sponsored by Jordan and the Quartet. The Quartet as we know is comprised of the United States, United Nations, European Union and Russia. The sponsors hope to kick-start talks which ground to a halt shortly after they began in September 2010.

If Israel and the Palestinian Authority succeed in reconvening negotiations they will probably try to renew the understandings that were almost concluded in September 2010. Then the document of reference was not the Saudi Initiative but the Clinton Parameters. Both sides had accepted the two state solution format. Prior to the meeting in Amman the PA opted to garner support for a unilaterally declared Palestinian state. It has also threatened to ditch the two state solution in favour of a one state solution

Some observers claim that a one-state solution is generally endorsed by Israeli Arabs. Many Israeli Arabs fear that densely populated Arab communities close to the Green Line might be included in the land swaps tentatively accepted as part of a two-state solution.

Michael A. Cohen a senior research fellow at the American Security Project related to the two state solution in a column he published in the September 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs.

“Everyone knows an independent Palestine, side by side with Israel, is unworkable right now. But it's even more hopeless than they think. Some Palestinians and Israelis talk about a binational confederation in which each group has the same political rights. But this is highly unlikely to occur because it would almost certainly mean the end of Zionism and the dream of a Jewish state. On the other side of the spectrum, Israel could simply annex large swaths of the West Bank and leave the Palestinian Authority in a stateless limbo -- but at risk of significant international opprobrium. Then there is the most likely option: the maintenance of the status quo and a Zionist, Jewish state in which Israeli soldiers continue a military occupation of millions of Arabs with no political rights, but perhaps certain economic and social rights. “ He concluded, “As the two-state option slowly fades into oblivion, both sides will have to seriously contemplate an Israeli-Palestinian arrangement that looks very similar to this. Indeed, as Daniel Levy, a senior research fellow at the New America Foundation noted, emphasizing this uncomfortable reality might be the most useful role the United States can play right now -- namely, beginning a conversation with Israelis that makes clear that unless there is significant movement toward a Palestinian state and, soon, a one-state military occupation, an increasing international isolation is Israel's long-term future. Any other scenario, unfortunately, is increasingly difficult to envisage.”

Michael Cohen probably knows the old adage about making predictions. It is especially relevant to the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. “Never make predictions, especially about the future.”

Have a good weekend

Beni 6th of January, 2012.