Thursday 21 June 2012

Fencing them out



Israel’s State Comptroller has been likened to the legendary bogeyman, held in awe by everyone in public office. His principal function is to check on the legality, regularity, efficiency, economy, and ethical conduct of public institutions. The checks are performed by continuous and spot inspections of the financial accounts and activities of all ministries, the armed forces and security services, local government bodies, and any corporations, enterprises, or organsations subsidised or managed by the state in any form.                                               The State Comptroller in Israel also functions as Ombudsman to whom members of the public may address complaints about actions by governmental bodies.
Outgoing Ombudsman / Comptroller Micha  Lindenstrauss is known to be extremely diligent. His critics accuse him of loving the limelight too much.           His reports often seem well-coordinated with the media. Notably, his report regarding alleged corruption involving Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yoav Galant.   The document   was crucial in preventing Galant from being appointed IDF Chief of Staff. His admirers, on the other hand claim his use of the news media is not for self-aggrandisement, but as an auxiliary  to enhance the impact of his reports. Like his predecessors, Micha Lindenstrauss is painstakingly thorough.
Last week Comptroller Lindenstrauss presented his report on the handling of the  Mavi Marmara incident . As expected he criticised Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for poor decision-making in the lead-up to the boarding  of the Mavi Marmara two years ago
“Netanyahu,” the state comptroller wrote in a long-awaited report, “failed to heed multiple warnings, including alerts from the IDF chief of staff, that an Israeli military effort to enforce its blockade by intercepting the vessels could erupt into violence.” The report also said he did not sufficiently coordinate or document high-level government discussions on how to handle the flotilla.  The State Comptroller reports and recommends, he is not empowered to enforce his recommendations. Judge Lindenstrauss knows that in many instances unless he makes full use of the news media the recommendations in his reports won’t be implemented.
In addition to the State Comptroller’s office, approximately seventy boards of inquiry, investigating committees and other fact finding bodies have  examined various “shortcomings” during times of war and peace, over the past 64 years. There has been very little “corrective action” as a result of these investigations.
This week too the Comptroller presented another report, the results of his investigation of the devastating Mt. Carmel forest fire that claimed 44 lives in 2010. In this case public outrage prompted corrective action and Israel’s fire-fighting force is gradually improving.  .
Minister of Interior Eli Yishai and Minister of Finance Yuval Steinitz were singled out by the comptroller for direct ministerial responsibility for the inability to deal with the Mt. Carmel blaze. The prime minister was criticized for not intervening to correct his ministers’ shortcomings.
Yuval and Steinitz refuted the criticism and denied ministerial responsibility for  the sorry state of the fire fighting force. In other countries the disclosure of similar failings would require accountability, even the resignation of the minister mentioned in a report. Both ministers received bad media reviews, but they surely know that by next week both reports will be forgotten.
The Minister of the Interior made headlines this week with an expensive repatriation scheme for illegal African infiltrators he is promoting. The first flight to South Sudan left Israel early this week. The passengers accepted Minister Yishai’s voluntary repatriation offer and received in addition to the  free flight home $1300 each. The same day twice as many infiltrators crossed into Israel. Yishai has promised to return all the African infiltrators within three years.
Many people say we will be stuck with 60,000 unskilled African job seekers.
Most of the illegal “immigrants” are from Eritrea and North Sudan and only a relatively small number come from South Sudan. Neither Eritrea nor North Sudan are in a position to repatriate their exiles. A claim that another African country  can be persuaded ( paid) to  accept them is nonsense.
Some of African infiltrators are employed by contractors  constructing the security fence cordoning off the  Sinai Peninsular from Israel. This week a previously unknown terrorist group claiming affiliation to Al-Qaida, cut through the old border fence and ambushed contractors on their way to a section of the new fence under construction. They killed one of the contractors, an Israeli Arab from Haifa.
The incident occurred immediately following the Islamic Brotherhood's victory in Egypt’s presidential elections. The proximity of the two events is a coincidence, yet they are not unrelated.
Arab affairs analyst Ron Ben-Yishai tends to emphasise the Bedouin connection, citing the economic aspect.  He claims that the attack was initiated by Bedouin smugglers in the northern Sinai who want to impair the construction of the new security fence. The new barrier is higher and more robust than its predecessor. Furthermore it will be equipped with state-of- the - art surveillance accessories that are bound to make life difficult for Bedouin smugglers
The Sinai  Bedouins and their collaborators among the Israeli Bedouins in the Negev have an urgent interest in furthering violent border clashes. Their goal is to delay the fence construction as much as possible.
The rapid erecting of the new barrier is reducing the "porosity" of the old fence. In the past Bedouin smugglers had little difficulty crossing the border with  African job seekers, trafficking drugs and transporting weapons for terrorists. Now they are about to lose a very lucrative source of income. Ben-Yishai estimates that the northern Sinai Bedouins have been raking in   hundreds of thousands and possibly millions of dollars from their trans-Sinai “trade route.”   They know they can't prevent the construction of the fence, nevertheless, they are doing everything they can to delay its completion, thereby profiting a little more before the fence finally cuts their economic lifeline.  ..  
The terror and deterrence method they are using against Israel is similar to the tactics they employed  several months ago against Egyptian troops and security agents who attempted to block the smuggling routes to Israel. The Bedouins are not short of weapons; they possess huge arsenals of heavy machine-guns, RPG rockets and launchers of all types, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, as well as advanced Grad rockets and perhaps longer range rockets..
Most of these weapons arrived from Libya. The Bedouins are gaining experience in using them and are being trained by Palestinian terrorists from Gaza and members of the Global Jihad.

The Bedouins are well acquainted with the rules of the game. They know that under the terms of Israel-Egyptian peace treaty  the IDF  cannot  pursue them across the border into Sinai.
For Egypt, Sinai has for the most part been an almost extraterritorial province.
The Bedouins have always  been hard to control. They were quick to learn that  Gaza and the Negev presented more lucrative opportunities than their traditional grazing economy.
However the Bedouin involvement in the terrorist attacks possesses an ideological-religious aspect too. Some of them have been influenced by Islamic fundamentalist groups. At present the exact makeup of the terrorist groups is not clear. Part  Palestinian break-away groups from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and part Bedouin fundamentalists and opportunists. They might be a loose coalition of some or all of them.

Ron Ben-Yishai says the Bedouins want to coerce the IDF to boost its security operations, including armed escorts, thorough searches for roadside bombs, and an earlier curfew for workers in the area. All of the above will surely slow the pace of construction, the extra hours will accumulate into nights, and these nights will translate into dollars

Once the whole length of border fence from the Gaza border to Eilat is completed the Bedouins will try to overcome this setback. They will soon discover that the fence and its surveillance teams are smarter than they are. For now, they are mounting a last stand. No doubt the IDF is preparing for the contingency of more frequent attacks and the likelihood that Palestinian/Bedouin terrorist groups will be tempted to use the anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles in their arsenals.
As has been the case in the past, attacks on Israel from Sinai, this week’s attack had repercussions in Gaza. Overnight the whole Gaza Strip periphery, a belt of kibbutz and moshav communities and small towns was targeted by terrorist teams in Gaza firing mortar shells and Qassam rockets. Fierce IDF reprisals caused Hamas to ask Egypt to broker a return to the ostensible ceasefire understanding.
The Egyptians don’t have the inclination or ability to intercede at the moment.
Just the same it seems Hamas and its affiliates have returned to the back-burner mode.

Next week my wife and I will be holidaying in the Black Forest and Alsace-Lorraine, so I won’t be able to write to you.


Have a good weekend.


Beni                            21st of June, 2012.



Friday 15 June 2012

The view from Tel Saki


The Friday trip to the Golan Heights was definitely not one of those run-of-the-mill sightseeing tours. Our tour guide Aviram Barkai, a veteran of the Yom Kippur war had carefully chosen the vantage points in his itinerary. Each one was a chapter in his book "Stemming the breach," the untold story of the heroic stand made by the  188th armoured brigade, blocking the advance of the Syrian army in  the battles waged  on the Golan Heights in October 1973.
We stood by the bunker at Tel Saki where  in 1973 a hopelessly outnumbered and out- gunned group of parachutists and armoured corps crews fought desperately, almost to the point of annihilation, determined to halt the Syrian advance. Not far below us a lone Syrian flag was flying at a border post.
It occurred to me that while we were reliving old battles, new battles were raging not far from where we stood. We are better able to understand what is happening in Syria, than most casual observers outside our region. Still, for most of us Syria is a place we hear about on news bulletins, but in the daily routine it seems to be more distant than a fading star.   Having said that, I hasten to add that we are not insensitive to the atrocities committed by Syrians against Syrians.
One of the best descriptions of what is happening in Syria was published in Foreign Policy Magazine. The author,  Aaron David, Miller assured us that “Everything was going according to plan,” then hastened to add “It just depends on whose plan you are talking about.”    “The key actors -- America, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the Arabs -- know precisely what they're about (or at least what they want to avoid) and are acting quite willfully to attend to their own interests.”  
“In short, we have a coalition not of the willing but of the disabled, the unwilling, and the opposed. And each has a clear agenda. The tragedy for Syria is that it's just not a common agenda.”
While we were walking back to our bus below Tel Saki I looked back towards the Syrian border, past the flag as far as the horizon. There was nothing in that landscape that could indicate what was really happening in Syria. I’m sure a host of foreign intelligence agencies equipped with the best spy-ware money can buy are trying to see a lot more than I could at Tel Saki.
Spy-satellites, drones and the old fashioned on the ground informer add body to sparse information leaked out from Syria. In Israel journalists, analysts and Middle East researchers whose special sphere of interest is Syria, all of them fluent in Arabic, rely on other sources as well. They have cultivated “associates” inside Syria who they contact frequently for the purpose of gleaning reliable  information. They describe a divided opposition force that has failed so far to unite under a common flag.
Bashar al-Assad’s power basis, a legacy from his father, is held together by fear. Assad is an Alawi and he relies on the support of the minority Alawi community. The Alawis make up 12 percent of Syria’s population, many of them fear persecution or worse at the hands of Sunni Muslim majority if the regime falls. This also explains why key units of the Syrian army have not deserted. About 80% of the well-equipped, well-trained 4th armoured division are Alawis. For them, the struggle to crush the opposition is potentially an existential one. So far there is no sign that Assad’s regime is about to collapse.
Aaron David, Miller explains why  Obama  is reluctant to intervene in Syria. “Sure, the president is outraged by Assad's brutality, and yes he'd like to do more. But bad options and electoral politics provide little incentive or leeway for heroics on Syria. The president is more focused on the perpetuation of the House of Obama than on the fall of the House of Assad. And rightly so. Americans are tired of costly military interventions, and the election is going to turn not on foreign policy but on the economy. And the Republicans can't find a way to make political hay from an Obama foreign policy that on balance has been smart and competent.
The only issues Americans care about abroad these days are terrorism and high gas prices. The president may pay for the latter but has been very tough on the former. Foreign policy will not help him in November, but a costly stumble abroad could hurt him. And the Syrian crisis offers plenty of opportunities for that. If the president acts, it will be cautiously and in the company of others. “
 Journalist Nicholas D. Kristof is less sympathetic to the president’s hesitancy .In  a piece he called “Dithering while people die,” posted in the  Pittsburgh Post-Gazette . Kristof wrote  on assignment in the Nuba Mountains, Sudan
“When a government devours its own people, as in Syria or Sudan, there are never easy solutions. That helps explain President Barack Obama's dithering, for there are more problems in international relations than solutions, and well-meaning interventions can make a crisis worse.    Yet the president is taking prudence to the point of paralysis. I'm generally an admirer of Mr. Obama's foreign policy but his policies toward both Syria and Sudan increasingly seem lame, ineffective and contrary to U.S. interests and values”. ….. “Likewise, in Syria, the United States has not only refused to arm the opposition but has, I believe, discouraged other countries from doing so. Yes, there's an underlying logic: The Syrian opposition includes extreme elements, and the violence is embedded in a regional sectarian conflict. Nonetheless, the failure to arm the opposition allows the conflict to drag on and the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, to massacre more people. The upshot is that the violence spills over into Lebanon, and sectarian poisons make Syria less and less governable.”
Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. examined Turkey’s relations  with the U.S  with regard to the Syrian dilemma. “Will Turkey Force Obama's Hand on Syria?” he asks. “Ankara and Washington both abhor the Syrian regime's brutal crackdown on demonstrators. But according to some reports, Ankara is hosting the Syrian opposition and possibly even helping arm it.
In contrast, Obama's cautious policy on Syria appears to be driven by a desire to avoid three things: the political unknown after Bashar al-Assad, war in an election year, and a new military campaign in a Muslim country.
Erdogan might find it increasingly difficult to tolerate Obama's "wait-and-see" strategy. For the Turks, slaughter in Syria is not an overseas affair, but rather a tragedy close to home that they cannot ignore.
Turkey's border with Syria spans 510 miles, crisscrossing ethnic groups and families. Some Turks have loved ones in Syria who are in harm's way. These constituents demand that Erdogan do his utmost to stop the al-Assad regime from perpetrating its crimes.”
A few months ago Erdogan used war-like rhetoric, threatening Assad’s regime. Turkey has a strong army, nevertheless, it wouldn’t attack Syria alone.   An alliance with Arab states and active US support  would better  serve its purpose. Cagaptay mentions an additional reason to overthrow Assad
“There is one more reason why Ankara cannot live with the al-Assad regime, even if Washington can. Recent news reports suggest the Syrian regime is allowing the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a Kurdish terrorist group that targets Turkey, to operate inside Syrian territory.
Turkey views the PKK as an existential threat, and it considers anyone who hosts the group to be an enemy. So even if Washington were to reach a modus vivendi with Damascus, it is hard for Ankara to ever become friends with al-Assad.
The longer Washington delays action against al-Assad, the more nervous Ankara will become about the PKK's growing strength inside Syria. Eventually, Erdogan will ask Obama to help him oust al-Assad and prevent the PKK from becoming a fighting machine next door. This divergence will test the limits of the Obama-Erdogan relationship.
For the time being, Erdogan might accept U.S. inaction, knowing that Obama's re-election chances depend on his ability to keep America out of an overseas conflict. But what happens after the U.S. elections in November?
Regardless of the winner, Erdogan will demand help from Washington to end the Syrian regime's patronage of the PKK. This is because Erdogan, like Obama, has election fever. The Turkish leader wants to become the country's first popularly elected president in polls to be held in 2013 or 2014. (Until a recent constitutional amendment, Turkish presidents were elected by the country's parliament.)
Should al-Assad continue to reign despite Erdogan's outspoken support for regime change, this will tarnish the Turkish leader's image as the tough guy who gets things done, the very image that has earned him respect and helped him win three successive elections since 2002.
He would also be weakened with the PKK thriving in Syria and using its territory as a springboard to launch attacks against Turkey. Then he would most certainly ask Obama to prove whether he is truly the friend that the Turkish leader thinks he is.”
The view from Tel Saki across the calm arid landscape was deceptive.
Just the same at the present time  we prefer  to maintain our observer status.


Beni                                        15th of June, 2012.





Thursday 7 June 2012

Scottish stones

The Ulpana Neighbourhood

In this country everything is viewed in fine resolution. We love to zoom in with our “Google Earth” eyes to find something to argue about. The Ulpana neighbourhood is a case in point. In full zoom the crux of the problem is the legality of five houses in the Ulpana neighbourhood of Beit El, a settlement situated just north of Jerusalem in a district universally known as the West Bank. Anywhere else in the world property disputes are rarely of interest to anyone other than the parties concerned. However, here there is a lot more at stake. The implementation of a court ruling regarding the five Ulpana buildings will probably set a precedent for similar cases. Currently about 1200 families live at Beit El. This week the Ulpana neighbourhood controversy threatened to topple the government. Admittedly, so far Prime Minister Netanyahu has managed the crisis with skill and aplomb. However, the problem is far from being resolved, or as the Americans say "It ain't over till the fat lady sings."    In both Israel and the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) we like to be on “terra firma.” Regarding Beit El and its environs we are told that here the patriarch Jacob slept and dreamt of angels descending  and  ascending a ladder. He called the place Beit El.  The modern settlement started in 1977 when a number of Jewish families moved into an IDF base built at the site. Twenty years later Beit El was awarded local council status and two years later construction work was started on an extension to the settlement , known as the Ulpana neighbourhood. A stop-work order was issued by an Israeli court as early as September of that year, but construction has continued, notwithstanding a demolition order issued by the Supreme Court of Israel in 2008  after an appeal was lodged by Palestinians from the village of Dura al-Qar.
At this juncture I want to add a few words about the Supreme Court. The area of its jurisdiction is all of Israel and the Israeli occupied territories. A ruling of the Supreme Court is binding upon every court, other than the Supreme Court itself.. The Supreme Court can sit as an appellate court and a court of first instance. The Court has ruled on numerous issues relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the rights of Arab citizens of Israel, and on discrimination between Jewish groups in Israel. It is unique in that its rulings can intervene in IDF military operations. Israel's Supreme Court is internationally known as the bulwark of civil and human rights in the country's democracy. On numerous occasions it has used its muscle to scale back the initiatives of our legislature, the Knesset  and its executive branches. But it has taken decades for the court to gather this power and stature.                The main reason for this gradual build-up of stature is the absence of a constitution. In the country's seminal legal document, the May 1948 Declaration of Independence, Israel's founders called for the drafting of a constitution within six months. But in the ensuing chaos of the country's struggle to fend off invading Arab armies, the deadline passed.                 Later, lawmakers bitterly disputed the nature of a potential constitution. Secular representatives wanted the document to reflect the legal values of Western liberal democracies, while religious lawmakers insisted that the Torah and halakhic (Jewish legal) tradition should serve as the basis for the legal system of the Jewish state. Failing to reach a consensus, the lawmakers decided the constitution would be constructed gradually, in a piecemeal fashion. They did this through establishing a special type of legislation known as "Basic Laws." This type of legislation takes precedence over everyday laws, and these laws can only be changed by a special majority. It was envisioned that the Basic Laws would eventually acquire the force of a constitution, but for the time being, they would have a quasi-constitutional force: stronger than regular laws but weaker than a formalised constitution.
Back to  Jacob dreaming on the hilltop, his head snugly resting on a “stone.”           According to a popular legend that stone rolled a considerable distance. It’s reputed to be the same Stone of Scone that was tucked under the royal throne of England for almost 700 years.  Another legend claims the prophet Jeremiah brought the stone to Ireland. The Bible doesn’t say where or how Jeremiah died, it simply recalls him moving to Egypt. Perhaps he fancied a glass of Guinness. Much later during the Viking raids on Ireland, the legend recounts, Irish priests moved it to safety in Scotland. In 1296 Edward I of England invaded Scotland absconded with the Stone of Scone and brought it to Westminster. Yet another legend claims the Abbot of Scone switched stones and gave Edward a fake lump of Scottish rock. More recently geologists examined the stone under the chair in Westminster and pronounced that it was red standstone quarried somewhere near Scone.
In 1996 the worthless replica was returned to the Scots who had been harbouring a grudge for 700 years. They are still peeved, why I don’t know.
If you believe the legend they are still holding the original  Kosher stone Jeremiah brought to Ireland and the cheap Scottish replica.  
 Another legend-like story concerns a contemporary of King Edward, namely Robert Bruce, king of Scotland, who was both ally and foe of Edward. Before he died Bruce asked his friend James Douglas to bury his heart in the Holy Land. Douglas was killed in battle in Spain and the heart was brought back to Scotland. It seems that’s exactly what happened.
Legend aside the Ulpana neighbourhood is still with us.
The last Supreme Court ruling  ordered the state to demolish  the  five Ulpana buildings by the 1st of July.  At present Netanyahu wants move the buildings to another site. Ulpana’s five contested buildings — home to some 30 families, and built on what the state accepts is privately owned Palestinian land — would be transplanted several hundred metres away. However, in the event that the houses would have to be demolished rather than transplanted, 10 more would be built in Judea and Samaria, pending the approval of Attorney General Yehuda Weinstein
The prime minister proposes sawing them at the base and rail-tracking them to the new site. Some time ago the old Sharona community built by the German Templar settlers in the late nineteenth century was moved fifty metres in the heart of Tel Aviv. The prime minister’s proposal is far more complicated and costly. It’s a lose-lose situation. The prime minister is loath to defy the court order, he doesn’t want to anger the settlers and he hopes the US will understand his predicament.  He has ruled out demolishing the buildings. He briefly considered walling them up but appears to have rejected that idea. So now he has settled for sledging them to another place. To appease the angry settlers who tried through their Knesset representatives to introduce retroactive legislation  on Wednesday to legalise the building on the Ulpana land and offer compensation to the Palestinian landowners. By a majority vote the Knesset rejected the proposal. If it had approved the bill the Supreme Court would have invalidated it at a later date.
By way of  compensation Netanyahu said he would construct thirty new buildings in Beit El for the five buildings that would have to be vacated. Later he increased the number to 850 housing units to be erected in different settlements in Judea and Samaria. As expected the State Department responded immediately criticising the proposal.
While all this has been going on an old idea has been given a fresh airing  by a small group led by Ami Ayalon, a former member of the Knesset for the Labour Party. He was previously head of the Shin Bet (Shabak or GSS), Israel's secret service, and commander-in-chief of the Navy.  Ayalon’s proposal calls for a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank in places with no Jewish  settlements and then  negotiating  with the Palestinians regarding the final status borders.
Earlier this week Defence Minister Ehud Barak said the West Bank settlements of Ofra and Beit El would be annexed to Israel under a final-status agreement, a remark that raised the ire of the Palestinians.
This marks a change in Barak's position from the 2000 Camp David talks, when he was prime minister. Back then, he offered the Palestinians most of the West Bank and parts of East Jerusalem.
In the past both Presidents Clinton and George W.Bush  recognised “facts on the ground.” namely the need to include the large settlement blocs in Israel and “swap” land to compensate the Palestinians. So far no progress has been made to  “flesh out” this idea. Ayalon hopes his withdrawal proposal will provide the catalyst to set the process in motion.
Have a good weekend

Beni                                                    7th of June, 2012.