THE SPEECH

The Israeli-based international news and current affairs television channel i24NEWS gave an early appraisal of Prime Minister Yair Lapid’s address at the United Nations General Assembly, last week. “It’s no coincidence that Yair Lapid, one of Israel's most calculated politicians in recent years, chose to ‘whip up a storm’ over his UNGA address, more than 24 hours before he delivered it. “Wrote Ariel Schmidberg, the channel’s news editor.

“During election campaigning, Israeli politicians make every effort to avoid controversial topics liable to alienate potential voters.

 Apparently, Yair Lapid broke that golden rule.

Nevertheless, from the 1990s until 2016, every Israeli prime minister who spoke at the UN mentioned the "two-state solution." 

Benjamin Netanyahu also paid lip service to the same formula. 

But since 2016, the political (and international) reality has changed, and the issue has been abandoned. 

Lapid has supported a two-state solution for decades, dating back to his pre-political career, when he was a newspaper columnist.

The big difference between Netanyahu and Lapid is that when Netanyahu talked about two states for two peoples at the UN, Israelis didn’t take him seriously. They accepted it as a diplomatic ploy, part of the UN ritual, nothing more. On the other hand, Lapid enjoys greater credibility, therefore from an electoral viewpoint reinstating the two-state solution is hazardous, to say the least.

Incidentally, while he was in New York Prime Minister Lapid did not meet with President Biden.

If former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu had gone to the annual UNGA event without meeting the US president, it would have been seen as a crisis in Israeli-American ties.

It was part of Netanyahu's showmanship to believe that his trips to the US must be accompanied by a meeting with the US president. Indeed, during his last UNGA trip in 2020, he met with former US president Donald Trump.

For Lapid, such a meeting or even a photograph was not on the agenda. It was one of a number of examples of how Lapid chooses statesmanship over showmanship.

In fact, Netanyahu's dramatic flair was absent from the moment Lapid's limousine pulled up to the El Al plane that would take him to New York.

When traveling abroad, Netanyahu would walk slowly up to the cameras and issue statements to the media. Lapid prior to departing for New York sent his quotes to the media by WhatsApp. He skipped right over the limelight moment and simply boarded the plane.

Similarly, when Lapid delivered his first ever UNGA speech at an opening session, the drama was in the words, not the presentation. There were no placards or gimmicks. He didn't disclose classified information (the absconded Iranian nuclear files).

The critics were quick to find fault with his speech. 

“For years, Netanyahu managed to sideline the Palestinian issue from the global agenda,” said a Likud party spokesperson. “Lapid brought Abu Mazen [Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas] back to centre-stage in less than a year.”  Further to that, a statement issued by the Likud party accused Lapid of “wanting to establish a Palestinian state on the border of Kfar Saba, Netanya, and Ben-Gurion Airport, and give over territory in our homeland to our enemies.”

Just the same, Lapid has said he would demand a resumption of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. His party's 2013 platform called for an outline of "two states for two peoples", while maintaining the large Israeli settlement blocs, a united Jerusalem, and ensuring Israel's security.] In January 2013, just days before the election, Lapid said he would not join a cabinet that stalled peace talks with the Palestinian Authority, and added that a single country for both Israelis and Palestinians without a peace agreement would endanger Israel's Jewish character. He said, "We're not looking for a happy marriage with the Palestinians, but for a divorce agreement we can live with." As part of a future peace agreement, Lapid said Palestinians would have to recognise that the large West Bank settlement blocs of Ariel, Gush Etzion, and Ma'aleh Adumim would remain within the State of Israel. According to Lapid, only granting Palestinians their own state could end the conflict, and Jews and Arabs should live apart in two states, while Jerusalem should remain undivided under Israeli rule. He says that he is guided by a principle of "maximum Jews on maximum land with maximum security and with minimum Palestinians."

Of the diplomatic stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Lapid said, "Most of the fault lies with the Palestinians, and I am not sure that they as a people are ready to make peace with us." He has also dismissed the possibility of a comprehensive peace deal with the Palestinians as unrealistic.

In June 2015, after the March 2015 elections, Lapid visited the United States, and after an hour-long interview, American journalist Jeffrey Goldberg wrote, "Lapid is a leader of the great mass of disillusioned centrists in Israeli politics. He could conceivably be prime minister one day, assuming Benjamin Netanyahu, in whose previous cabinet he served, ever stops being prime minister. Now functioning as a kind of shadow foreign minister, Lapid argues that Israel must seize the diplomatic initiative with the Palestinians if it is to continue existing as a Jewish-majority democracy, and he is proposing a regional summit somewhat along the lines of the earlier Arab Peace Initiative. Lapid is not a left-winger—he has a particular sort of contempt (perhaps disregard would be more accurate) for the Israeli left, born of the belief that leftists do not recognise the nature of the region in which they live. But he is also for territorial compromise as a political and moral necessity, and he sees Netanyahu leading Israel inexorably toward the abyss."

In September 2015, Lapid laid out his diplomatic vision in a major speech at Bar Ilan University in which he said, "Israel's strategic goal needs to be a regional agreement that will lead to full and normal relations with the Arab world and the creation of a demilitarised independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. That's where Israel needs to head. Separation from the Palestinians with strict security measures will save the Jewish character of the state."

 

Lapid supports recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. He noted in 2017 that with Iran attempting to establish a foothold in Syria, Israel cannot be expected to relinquish the Golan Heights.

According to many estimates, the election will be decided by swing voters who are to be found firmly in the centre-right of the political map.

Some observers believe Lapid will try to entice reluctant voters in the Greater Tel Aviv area, especially in neighbourhoods noted for their low voter turnout. 

International news media outlets allotted Lapid’s UNGA address no more than a passing mention. After all, the attention of world leaders is not focused on Israel, it’s focused on two central issues: the war in Ukraine and the violation of human rights in Iran.

Lapid's language was also the strongest in support of Palestinian statehood since Ehud Olmert was prime minister.

It's a move that will likely raise his standing in the international community and help Israel push back against the apartheid campaign which claims that it only wants a Jewish state from the River to the Sea. Most political analysts applauded the prime minister’s UNGA speech, but doubted if Israelis will remember it when they go to the polls on the 1^st of November.

  So far there is little or no indication that Yair Lapid is attempting to cobble together a coalition government. Even the likelihood of including the United Arab List (Ra’am) led by Mansour Abbas hasn’t been considered. He prefers to leave the political wheeling and dealing till after the elections.

 

Ahead of Yom Kippur, I wish you well over the fast.

 

 

Beni,                                                   29^th of September, 2022.

 

 

 URGINEA MARITIMA

 

Sea Squills, (Urginea maritima) harbingers of the changing season, are in full bloom right now.

According to local folk tradition, when the Sea Squills grow to a height of more than 150 cm we can bank on a rainy winter.

 

Foresight, an innate ability to predict events, is a rare gift in this part of the world.

Rules of thumb, synoptic weather maps and even ancient omens are of no help predicting the outcome of the forthcoming Knesset elections scheduled to take place on the 1^st of November.

I try to avoid writing about Israeli politics. Mainly because I find it hard to proffer a neutral, unbiased opinion.

Of course, I could quote our news media political analysts, but then their forecasts are mostly speculative. I might as well resort to reading tarot cards or examining goat entrails.

On the other hand, The Israel Democracy Institute’s Centre for Public Opinion and Policy Research provides a non-partisan analysis without predicting the outcome of the November elections.

One of the Institute’s research scholars Dr. Or Anabi. claims that Jewish Israeli voters are moving to the right. Well, any taxi driver, barber or fruit and vegetable vendor would probably tell you that free of charge.

Dr. Anabi posits,” There’s a strong correlation between voters who describe themselves as left-wing oriented and their votes for parties categorised on the left. The same applies to Israelis who place themselves in the ideological centre. By contrast, following the voting patterns of Israelis who claim they support right-wing parties is more complicated. Many of them support parties outside the traditionally-defined right-wing bloc.”

Time-out to explain that Netanyahu and his devotees call all parties not aligned with his right-wing bloc, “Lefties”. A definition that is clearly intended to be derogatory. It’s all part of the Likud party’s smear campaign.

Back to Or Anabi’s survey-

“Meretz voters—almost all define themselves as left-wing, but among people who vote for Labour, many define themselves as centrists. In Yesh Atid (Yair Lapid), most will say they’re in the centre, but some define themselves as left or right, in both directions.

The division into three political camps is based on the positions of Jewish Israeli voters only. Arab Israeli voters are not categorised according to right, centre, and left affiliation. They are a separate group, with their own aspirations and internal tensions. For example, Ra’am is a conservative party and many of its positions are like those of the Jewish religious parties. On the other hand, its voters believe in liberalism and want to integrate into Israeli society.” ….

“In the first round of elections in 2019, with the founding of the Blue White party, identification with the centre reached an all-time high of 33%. But from then on, the centre has been drifting to the right and the rhetoric is now focused on who is the ‘authentic right.’ The rise of the centre did not produce a significant decline in the right, but benefited chiefly from the decline of the left.

If we look at the broader picture painted by the polls, we see that the division into political camps is not only a reflection of people’s positions on various topical issues, but is also related to deep traits of identity and belonging. People who define themselves as leftists are overwhelmingly secular (83%) and Ashkenazi (61%), with a relatively large segment earning an above-average income (40%). They tend to vote mainly for Meretz, Labour, and Yesh Atid.

On the other side, those who define themselves as right-wing come from diverse groups with regard to religious observance: about a quarter are secular, a quarter are ‘traditionists,’ a third are traditional and religious, and 15% are ultra-Orthodox. The proportion of Mizrahim (45%) in this camp exceeds that of Ashkenazim (32%). Many (39%) have a below-average income. About a third of them voted for the Likud in the last election, with the rest split among the other parties on the right. The centre falls between these two camps with regard to its voters’ demographics, but resembles the left more than it does the right.”

 So far there is no indication that the next round of elections for our legislative assembly will be decisive. In November Israelis will be going to the polls for the fifth time in three years.

Knowing that the political situation in Lebanon is far worse than our political stalemate doesn’t console Israeli voters

Lebanon has the most religiously diverse society in the Middle East, comprising 18 recognised religious sects. The primary religions are Islam (Sunni, Shia, and a small number of Alawites and Ismailis) and Christianity (the Maronite Church, the Greek Orthodox Church, the Melkite Greek Catholic Church, various protestant denominations, the Armenian Apostolic Church). The Druze community amounts to about 5% of the country’s population. The country also has a large refugee population (1.5 million out of approximately 6 million in 2017). The refugees, mostly Syrian or Palestinian, are predominantly Sunni but also include Christians and Shia.

Lebanon differs from other Middle East countries where Muslims are the overwhelming majority, in that it has  a diverse mix of Muslims and Christians that make up a large proportion of the country's population. Christians were once a majority in Lebanon and are still a majority in the diaspora of the nearly 14 million Lebanese people living outside of Lebanon. The president of the country is traditionally a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shia Muslim.

If you haven’t read last week’s post “Pumping Gas” I suggest you read it first, otherwise the following extract from an article written by Simon Henderson (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy) might be incomprehensible. Here’s the link: http://benisisraelinewsletter.blogspot.com/

 

“Israel’s Karish Gas Field: Diplomatic Opportunity or Casus Belli?   

The timing of the Karish project seems to be a key matter for the U.S. and Israeli leaders. This is partly due to the uncertainty of what will emerge from Israel’s November 1 parliamentary election; any progress on offshore issues before then could be seen as an achievement for caretaker prime minister Yair Lapid. Another mystery is whether Iran will give its Hezbollah proxy the go-ahead to permit a Lebanese deal at a time of broad regional uncertainty. For now, the various hopeful signals surrounding a potential breakthrough suggest that Washington is quietly urging restraint on Karish in order to give the rest of the diplomatic process time to play out over the next month or so.

The Biden administration has defined resolving the maritime boundary dispute as a ‘key priority’ that will promote regional stability. Yet while an agreement on this frontier may remove one source of conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, it is unlikely to alleviate their spiking tensions along the Blue Line, the land boundary that runs from the coast to the Syrian border. Moreover, any service contracts and revenue stemming from an EEZ agreement could result in funds leaking to Hezbollah—in fact, such diversions seem inevitable unless international authorities insist on sufficient oversight and a Lebanese sovereign wealth fund, which might encourage the transparent collection and disbursement of related revenue.

The Biden administration is also apparently keen on brokering a maritime deal soon because it may influence the outcome of Israel’s election. Prime Minister Lapid is currently running neck and neck with former leader Binyamin Netanyahu, and the White House would prefer a Lapid victory in order to further its goals of improving relations with the Palestinians and maintaining the status quo in the West Bank. Whatever the final terms of a maritime agreement with Lebanon, reaching a deal would burnish Lapid’s foreign policy credentials and potentially help him at the polls.

In addition to maritime talks, the United States has spent more than a year in drawn-out negotiations to broker a Jordanian-inspired deal for supplying Lebanon with more energy. Under its terms, electricity generated in Jordan from Israeli gas—along with certain amounts of Israeli gas itself—would be transported over Syrian territory to Lebanon.

Much of the plan’s controversy stems from the fact that Syria’s Assad regime would reportedly receive 8 percent of any electricity and gas transiting its territory as a form of in-kind payment—this despite its continued status as a target of sanctions via the U.S. Caesar Act, the European Union, and the Arab League. Northern Lebanon has just one electricity generation station that is both adjacent to the Arab Gas Pipeline and capable of using gas as a feedstock, so Syria is the only party in a position to generate the amount of electricity Beirut currently needs. The Assad regime is also eager for this arrangement because its own generation stations often sit idle due to lack of feedstock.

Israeli sources describe the plan as an energy extension of their country’s “good neighbours” policy toward the Syrian people during the civil war next door. In other words, Jerusalem has sought to show that it wishes Syrian citizens well even though their country remains dominated by Iranian and other proxy forces.”

Now that’s mind-boggling!

I’ll conclude by wishing you and your family- Shana Tova.

 

Beni,                                       22^nd of September,   2022.

 

 PUMPING GAS

King Charles has spent decades campaigning, cajoling, and convening meetings to drive action on environmental issues.

But that was when he was Prince of Wales, now he is subject to different rules - the monarch is obliged to remain politically neutral.

But his friends and advisers say he will not cool on the issue of global warming.

I had no intention of writing about the “Land of Hope and Glory” and its new King, but I got sidetracked by a news item I read on climate change.

Just the same, it serves as a preamble to the topic of Lebanon’s natural gas dilemma

At this juncture, I’ll add a brief comment regarding natural gas. It is a relatively clean burning fossil fuel Burning natural gas for energy results in fewer emissions of nearly all types of air pollutants and carbon dioxide (CO₂) than burning coal or petroleum products to produce an equal amount of energy.

Now back to our neighbours in the land of the cedars

The arrival of an Israeli floating gas production unit in the maritime zone adjacent to the coasts of Israel and Lebanon recently has radically changed the “rules of the game.”.

In abeyance for more than a decade, the dispute between Israel and Lebanon over the two countries’ maritime borders resurfaced on June 5.

Israel and Lebanon have never drawn their borders. The Karish gas field where Israel is exploring is located in a disputed area of 860 km2 in the middle of the Eastern Mediterranean where huge gas reserves have been found in recent years.

The Lebanese government invited the US envoy Amos Hochstein – appointed by President Joe Biden to mediate between the two countries – asking him to help restart talks with Israel over the issue.

Any exploration, drilling, or extraction work Israel carries out in the disputed areas would constitute a “provocation and act of aggression”, said a joint statement by Lebanese President Michel Aoun and outgoing Prime Minister Najib Mikati.

However, the Israeli government sees the Karish gas field as part of its exclusive economic zone and therefore believes that it’s not relevant to its maritime dispute.

Originally in dispute was the maritime area between the southern boundary of the Lebanese claim (known as “line 23”), which it formally asserted under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the boundary Israel sought to draw to the north (known as “line 1”). In 2012, U.S. mediator Frederic Hof proposed a compromise that would have split up the area at a ratio of 55 percent for Lebanon and 45 percent for Israel. But – without offering clear reasons – the Lebanese government failed to approve the proposal and the negotiations lapsed. When indirect talks resumed in late 2020, the Lebanese delegation presented new legal and hydrographical studies to support an expanded claim (bounded by what is known as “line 29”) encompassing an additional 1,430 sq km south of line 23; it did not, however, formalise the expanded claim by amending its prior UNCLOS filing, which remains pegged to line 23.

Lebanon’s subsequent insistence on staking its claim based on line 29 has brought previously undisputed gas reserves into play, stoking further tension between the two countries. Under Lebanon’s original line 23 claim, the Karish field – the one from which Israel is preparing to extract gas, lies far to the south in Israeli waters. By contrast, the new Lebanese claim would put the northern half of Karish in Lebanese maritime territory. Predictably, Israel has rejected the new Lebanese position, and the parties have struggled unsuccessfully to resolve their differences.

 

The Karish field’s development is expected to add around 1.41 trillion cubic feet of gas to Israel’s proven reserves. The expected quantity of gas available at Karish falls well below the estimated size of the Leviathan and Tamar fields, which Israel is already exploiting, suggesting that Karish is not integral to Israeli energy security at present. Nevertheless, Israel’s firm stance regarding this matter has put an end to Lebanon’s foot-dragging.

An analysis conducted by INSS (The Institute for National Security Studies), quoted a particularly belligerent speech made by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on June 9 attacking Israel and claiming that he had the ability to prevent gas production from the Karish field. “He described such gas production as Israeli aggression and theft of Lebanon’s economic resources. Nasrallah is therefore exploiting the current crisis in order to reinforce the organisation’s familiar narrative, that it uses its weapons on behalf of Lebanon’s national interests.

At this stage, efforts are focused on the formation of a new government. However, based on past experience, it is unlikely that Lebanese citizens will see the mission completed in the near future. More than a month after the elections there is still no sign of agreement over the composition of the government or the identity of the Sunni prime minister (as required by the Lebanese constitution). It is possible that the task will not even be finished by October when the parliament is due to elect a new president.

However, even if a government is formed in the coming months, the two main relevant scenarios do not promise a functioning government that could rescue Lebanon from its dire economic straits. A government of broad consensus as promoted by Hezbollah and its allies would be as paralysed as its predecessors and would be unable to promote the reforms necessary for any improvement in the situation. In the other scenario, any government formed without Hezbollah, a very unlikely scenario, would find its actions thwarted by Hezbollah through political moves, and perhaps even through the use of military force within Lebanon, or by heating up the border with Israel.

The fact that Hezbollah in recent years has been largely engaged in internal matters has helped restrain its military activity against Israel. However, in view of Nasrallah’s harsh rhetoric around the issue of pumping gas from the Karish field and his threats that his organisation can prevent Israel from acting unilaterally in a gas field that he considers disputed, Israel must prepare for the possibility of escalation following attempts to implement the threats. This will be especially likely if there is greater internal pressure on Hezbollah.”   

In an earlier publication issued by INSS in 2019, the authors included the whole Eastern Mediterranean in their analysis,” A number of seemingly unconnected developments over the past year have created the possibility of a new dynamic concerning the economic potential in natural gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Accelerated activity in the matter may also contribute to a positive change in the geopolitical situation in the region.” Since then, the situation in Europe following Russia’s incursion in Ukraine has changed. In retrospect, the INSS survey of 2019 appears even more relevant today. “The third development has to do with the issue of transporting the gas to the European market. When Lebanon reaches the commercial production stage, the question of transportation of quantities of natural gas produced in the Eastern Mediterranean to the most significant nearby customer - Europe - will come into sharper focus. The alternative of laying a pipeline toward Cyprus and from there to Greece may prove to be difficult to implement for political reasons (Turkish opposition), technical reasons (difficulties in laying the pipeline on a problematic seabed), and thus also for financial reasons (costs higher than the current estimate of $6 billion). The less expensive alternative of laying a pipeline to Turkey and connecting it to the existing transportation systems to Europe is more problematic politically, not only from Israel's standpoint. It requires passage through Lebanese and Syrian EEZs, and reliance on the current regime in Turkey that in recent years has been wont to make strategic reversals and certainly does not encourage long term investment that requires trust between potential investors.

Against this background, other alternatives emerge. One is transporting the gas from the Israeli fields to facilities on the northern Egyptian coast. These facilities liquefy the gas and load it into tankers, carrying the gas to ports where the reverse process is performed — offloading, gasification, and pumping the gas into a pipeline. The companies that operate the Leviathan field planned to begin transporting gas to Egypt in late 2019.  It was anticipated that Egypt would be both a consumer of Israeli gas and a transit point for liquefied natural gas. Since then, a change in the route has occurred. The Israeli energy ministry has approved the start of gas flows to Egypt via Jordan.

At present, Israeli gas from its offshore Leviathan and Tamar fields is delivered to Egypt via Israel's own transmission system before flowing to Egypt via the now-reversed offshore East Mediterranean Gas, or EMG, pipeline.

However, with Egyptian demand for Israeli gas set to grow, the ministry approved the use of the Jordan route which will take gas to Aqaba and then onto Egypt.

This alternative is very important, both because it is the only one that provides an immediate gas export response that ensures the ability of producing companies to continue developing the other fields where they have concessions, and because it enables the state to increase its tax and royalty revenue from the sale of the gas. Beyond the economic aspect, cooperation between Israel and Egypt is a strategic asset for both countries. Despite the advantages, this alternative is not without technical and political problems. The technical problem is the limited capacity of both the pipeline to Egypt and the Egyptian liquefaction facilities. The Israeli-American consortium will have to compete with the natural gas produced in Egypt, some of which is intended for export. From a political standpoint as well, economic dependence on a single transport mechanism may under various circumstances prove to be problematic.

For that reason, the willingness of the consortium (and in effect that of the Israeli government as well) to examine the alternative of liquefying the natural gas and shipping it to Europe from floating installations – Floating LNG – that will be positioned in Israel's EEZ is understandable. In July 2019, the Israeli-American consortium signed agreements with two companies that deal with the establishment of such floating installations. One is GOLAR, which is registered in the US, and the second is EXMAR of Belgium. The cost of an installation depends on its distance from the coast, the quantity to be liquefied, and the ability to store the liquefied gas until it is loaded onto tankers. In all cases, the cost of the floating LNG installation exceeds $1 billion. A combination of land-based installations in Egypt and a floating installation in Israel’s economic waters will provide flexibility in transport and early and more rapid exploitation of quantities of natural gas, which the companies are permitted to export according to the framework adopted by the Israeli government, and which may increase if new reserves are discovered.

Settling the issue of the land and maritime boundary between Israel and Lebanon and an agreement for the joint exploitation of cross-border gas fields may enable the future utilisation of a floating LNG facility by producing companies in Lebanon and Cyprus, thereby saving them huge investments in separate infrastructure. This will also increase the interest of the involved countries in maintaining regional stability.

Almost all of this convoluted narrative is derived from open-source information. My experience with pumping gas (petrol) is at our local filling station.

Have a good weekend.

 

Beni,                                                               15^th of September, 2022. 

 

THE UPPER HAND

Avi Issacharoff, Arab affairs journalist and author, posted an appraisal of the current outbreak of terrorist activity in the West Bank (Judea & Samaria) for the Ynetnews outlet, recently. Issacharoff appears less on our TV channels and more in the printed and digital media. He is perhaps better known as co-author of the Israeli television series Fauda.

“Last Thursday, some 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in Israel began a hunger strike because they have no official body to negotiate with in the Israel Prison Service. The strike is not limited in time, and next week, an additional 1,000 prisoners are set to join the strike.” Issacharoff said.      I doubt if many Israelis lost much sleep when they heard about the impending strike. After all, we aren’t talking about innocent white-frocked choir boys, but dyed-in-the-wool terrorists.  The strike is not really about representation, prison conditions or other grievances, but a vague hope that it “will bring about a real awakening that would ignite the Palestinian street.”  Issacharoff was quoting the head of the Commission of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs, Fatah member Qadri Abu Bakr.

A spokesman for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas also issued a statement, warning Israel against violating the rights of Palestinian detainees. In other words, the Palestinian Authority will not attempt to interfere or stop the strikes.

“This appears to be a newly-emerging problem that Israeli security officials will have to deal with - not the strike itself, but the weakness of the PA. The Palestinian Security Services struggle to operate in various areas of the West Bank - especially in the northern parts.”  Issacharoff noted, adding that they are rapidly becoming home ground for armed militias working to attack Israelis.

“At first, it was the Jenin area and the refugee camp in the city, but the focus quickly turned to Nablus and then to the surrounding villages.

On Wednesday last week, Israeli security forces conducted an operation in Silwad, north-east of Ramallah, and managed to nab a squad of Palestinian militants who carried out a shooting attack on Israeli targets a few weeks ago. The fact that the squad was arrested near Ramallah means they were able to operate unrestrained in the Palestinian Authority’s backyard.” Said Issacharoff.

Other commentators emphasised that no place is out of bounds when Israeli forces pursue terrorist groups, even in the PA’s backyard.   

Putting the current upsurge in clashes in statistical perspective Issacharoff said “More than 60 shooting incidents occurred in the West Bank in the first part of August, and 60 shooting attacks were carried out against Israeli security forces during arrest raids in the area in recent months. These numbers are higher than in all of 2021 combined.

In addition, another 220 shooting incidents were thwarted by the IDF and Shin Bet.” A definite increase compared with incidents that occurred in recent years.

“The growing involvement of Islamic Jihad members in the shooting attacks, as well as Fatah operatives who are now collaborating with them, raises suspicions that we are witnessing a development that is a lot more than a spontaneous reaction. Hamas certainly won't object to this move. It contributes greatly to incessant attempts of persuading Palestinians in the West Bank to carry out attacks against Israel.

In the early years of the Second Intifada, Hezbollah invested quite a lot of funds in an attempt to incite the West Bank by supporting Fatah and Tanzim operatives in the Nablus area. A similar development is quite possible now”

The Palestinian terrorists that Israeli security forces have encountered in recent clashes in the West Bank are a new generation.

 “They are eager to engage in combat, refuse to surrender easily, and equally important - thirsty for publicity and are well-versed in social media platforms.

However, these new-age terrorists don't seem to have any distinct organisational affiliation. They see their local Palestinian identity as more important than being affiliated with a particular terror group.

Social media are convenient communication venues for disseminating information and activities. The downside of these platforms is that they are easily detected.

In recent months Israeli security forces have seized large quantities of firearms and munitions during raids in the West Bank. Disrupting the weapons supply line is a formidable task. For some time now weapons have been smuggled across the river from Jordan. The long-neglected security fence is easily breached by weapons smugglers. Evidently, Iran supplies the weapons for the purpose of undermining Israel’s security. Repairing and upgrading the security barrier is now a top priority requirement.

At this juncture, it’s important to clarify that Israel definitely has the upper hand. Its elite combat units deployed in confrontations with Palestinian terrorists are better trained, equipped with better weapons, and provided with excellent military intelligence.

Israel is trying to curb a different Iranian supply line on yet another front.

Confronting Iranian incursions in Syria has reached a new stage. In the past IDF attacks on Iranian proxies, weapons stores, convoys en route to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syrian airports were reported by both Syrian and foreign newsmedia outlets but rarely confirmed by official Israeli spokespersons.

A-Sharq Al-Awsat, a Saudi-owned daily published in London, claims that Israel has intensified strikes on Syrian airports to disrupt Tehran's increasing use of aerial supply lines to deliver arms to allies in Syria and Lebanon including Hezbollah.

“Tehran has adopted air transport as a more reliable means of ferrying military equipment to its forces and proxies in Syria, following disruptions to ground transfers.

Israel has long seen Iran's deepening entrenchment in Syria as a national security threat and is widening the scope of its strikes to hit at this new transport method,”.

On Wednesday night last week, Israeli aerial attacks damaged Aleppo airport just before the arrival of a plane from Iran, preventing it from landing.

Israel also carried out a strike on Damascus airport, damaging equipment, the second such attack on the airport since June when Israeli air strikes on the runway knocked it out of service for two weeks.

In the past, Israel attacked weapons storage installations and adjacent facilities after Iranian cargo planes had unloaded the weapons they were carrying. Lately, Iran has switched to sending its weapons shipments via Iranian commercial airliners hoping to fool Israeli military intelligence.

This ruse has also been foiled.

In another report A-Sharq Al-Awsat cited Syrian officials as saying Russian officers called on their Iranian counterparts at the Hama Military Airport in central Syria, to vacate a number of sites in the country.

The report said the three Russian officers demanded they evacuate the Iranian military headquarters in the western Hama province, which is situated next to the Syrian army’s Regiment 49 base. The base is used to store missiles for the S-200 air defence system, as well as other Russian-made military equipment, the report said.

Another site the Russian officers demanded the Iranians evacuate was a base south of Tartus, the report said. In July, Syria accused Israel of targeting a site in the town, in a rare morning airstrike.

The report said the calls came as Russia was seeking to maintain stability in Syria, and to deprive Israel of targets to bomb in areas Russia regards as being strategically important. An airstrike attributed to Israel last month hit several Iranian sites close to Russia’s main naval base in Tartus.

In its struggle to defend itself Israel is often taken to task. A case in point is the never-ending Shireen Abu Akleh case.

Biden administration officials have asked Israel to review the IDF’s rules of engagement for operations in Judea and Samaria. Specifically, to publish the conclusions of its report into the killing of Palestinian-American Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh on May 11.

American and Israeli officials claim that the requests were made in a recent call between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Israeli Defence Minister Benny Gantz.

Blinken made the request after meeting Abu Akleh’s family members in Washington, and after the release of America’s own investigation into Abu Akleh’s death.  As you no doubt recall, Abu Akleh was killed in crossfire between IDF soldiers and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists in Jenin.

Rules of engagement are guidelines used by the military to determine when the use of live fire is justified during operations.

Evidently, the Biden administration felt compelled to do something in response to Abu Akleh’s death after the Palestinians and their proponents succeeded in turning her into a cause célèbre (despite the fact that she is but one among thousands of journalists killed on assignment in recent decades).

A seemingly unassertive “request” for the IDF to review its rules of engagement was probably deemed the mildest form of rebuke, while not really accusing the IDF of intentionally killing Abu Akleh.

Even so, Gantz reminded Blinken that war is messy, and collateral damage, including harm to civilians who intentionally come dangerously close to armed clashes, is not uncommon.

The United States military is certainly no stranger to this phenomenon, with its second invasion of Iraq deemed one of the most deadly conflicts ever for war reporters. Taken together, all of this further bolsters the perception that Israel is held to a double or higher standard than every other nation, including the United States.

Prime Minister Yair Lapid reiterated the defence minister’s remarks on Wednesday when he addressed a graduation ceremony for maritime officers. “No one will dictate our rules of engagement when we are fighting for our lives,”

The prime minister spoke just one day after State Department Deputy Spokesperson Vedant Patel said that the Biden administration wanted Israel to review its rules of engagement.

Summing up, and mindful of the Jewish people’s long history of suffering, expulsions, pogroms, and genocide, I’m glad to be alive at a time when Israel definitely has the upper hand.

 

Have a good weekend.

 

Beni                                                       8^th of September, 2022.