Hummus

What did we have this week? We celebrated Shavuot and we tried to bury some long forgotten bones.

Well the Byzantine bones that concerned us so much have finally been laid to rest. At one stage the fate of the ancient burial site uncovered during preliminary work on the foundations of a new bomb-proof emergency room for the Barzilai hospital in Ashkelon almost caused a government crisis. Initially the prime minister took the path of least resistance and sided with a proposal to relocate the new ER to a less convenient and more expensive site. Finally armed with the rabbinical rulings of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and the current Sephardi Chief Rabbi, Netanyahu had the confidence to rule in favour of the original plan. Columnist Nahum Barnea backed Prime Minister Netanyahu's change of heart. "The majority of the Israeli public would not have been able to comprehend a government that favours dead pagans over live patients.” An enraged Haredi group was quick to respond but unable to muster more than a few score demonstrators to “storm" the ER construction site. A few protestors who managed to breach the fence around the site were arrested and the excavation work continued without interference.

At this juncture I think it's pertinent to clarify a few details. Archaeologists dated the artefacts and bones in the graves to the Byzantine period.

The deceased were probably pagans, maybe Christians but definitely not Jews. The demonstrators who tried to stop excavation work belong to an extreme ultra-Orthodox group, a marginal small but noisy faction that is certainly not representative of the greater religious sector of the population.

Demonstrators in Jerusalem caused damage to public property and according to one report a group of Haredim gathered by the gates of Prime Minister Netanyahu's official residence in order to curse him. The same source estimated that the curse was one rung down from the potent Pulsa Dinura ceremony.

A well known political correspondent claims, "you have not made it in Israeli politics until you've been cursed by the Pulsa DiNura."

Early in the 20th century, agitated Haredi Jews in Jerusalem were accused by the media of having recited the curse against Hebraist Eliezer Ben Yehuda. There have been unsubstantiated media reports of the curse being recited against archaeologists and authors. Prior to the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, there were rumours that the curse had been recited against him by right-wing extremists.

In July 2005, an undisclosed news media source reported that opponents of the Gaza pullout plan recited the Pulsa diNura in the old cemetery of Rosh Pina, asking the "Angel of Death" to kill Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Six months later Sharon suffered two strokes and is currently in a coma.

What can I say – "Plenty powerful medicine!"

Unless you happen to live in Ashkelon and the area served by the Barzilai hospital the ER episode albeit annoying is a lesser existential threat.

Whatever happens in Lebanon, Syria and Iran concerns us mainly because this axis presents a potential existential threat to Israel.

In the past inroads made by Russia (then the USSR) in our region were often accompanied by generous armaments deals, ostensibly for defence purposes but in effect they presented a direct threat to Israel.

Zvi Magen believes Russia is trying to restore its influence in the Middle East. He expressed this opinion in a thought provoking analysis of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to Syria. Magen’s article appeared in a recent issue of “Insight” published by the Institute for National Security Studies, an Israeli think-tank.

Zvi Magen is well schooled in military intelligence and has served as ambassador for Israel to both the Ukraine and Russia.

I suppose I could have made do with the title to his piece in” Insight. ” After all any casual observer noting the visits made in recent months by Syrian government ministers and officials to Moscow as well as the reciprocal visits made by their Russian counterparts to Damascus, could easily have come to the same conclusion. However Zvi Magen presents a highly qualified analysis of these visits.

President Assad has visited Russia three times in the past five years, therefore this first reciprocal visit by President Medvedev is especially significant

Visits of this kind are always described as “fruitful and productive” and indeed they do produce memoranda, agreements and treaties. However, their implementation depends largely on the prevailing mood in the Kremlin.

Let’s gloss over the long list of trade and commerce agreements signed during the visit, the promises made to supply Syria with scientific information, to further infrastructure projects and advance technological cooperation and tourism.

Of particular interest was Medvedev’s meeting with Hamas leader Khaled Mashal (whom he met in Moscow three months earlier). Mashal is blacklisted by many countries as a terrorist so the only justification for meeting him again was because Medvedev raised the issue of releasing Gilad Shalit.

At one time, in the 1970s and 1980s Syria was the USSR’s main ally in the Middle East. Assad senior cooled Syria’s relations with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union because of “its betrayal of the Arab cause.” Relations were restored a few years later in an effort to form an anti-Western front in the Middle East with Russia’s active participation, and subsequently the political, economic, and security ties between the countries have grown closer. Good reason for this is Syria’s current international isolation and threats both perceived and real from various rivals and enemies. Therefore Syria sees Russia as an important partner. For its part, Russia has expressed sweeping support for Syria and rejected any criticism regarding its nuclear programme, activities in Lebanon, arming of Hezbollah, support for terrorist organisations, including Hamas, and cooperation with Iran.

Regarding security, the two nations began a new era with Assad’s first visit to Moscow, when then-President Vladimir Putin cancelled 73 percent ($9.8 billion) of Syria's debt to Russia for armaments supplied before the breakup of the USSR, in return for new weapons deals. Russia supplies Syria with Mig-29 fighter planes and aerial defence systems of an older generation. Although understandings regarding the supply of more advanced models, such as the Mig-E-31 jet, the S-300 surface-to-air missile, and the Askandar-2 surface-to-surface missile were reached, these weapons have not been supplied yet because of regional military balance considerations. Russia’s policy regarding the delay in supplying the new weapons is not likely to change soon. In addition, the Russian navy uses the Tartous port facilities, and Russia is even financing the port’s renovation. On the nuclear question, Medvedev declared his support for a nuclear-free Middle East. Syria, however, is eager to receive a civilian nuclear reactor.

According to US news media sources the Obama administration is looking for ways to build up "moderate elements" within Hezbollah and to diminish the influence of hard-liners. To this end John Brennan, assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism, met with government leaders during a recent visit to Lebanon. Maybe this is an attempt to defuse the tension along the Lebanese and Syrian borders with Israel.

Columnist Alex Fishman weighed up the possible outcome of a future confrontation with Hezbollah. In two articles he wrote for Haaretz Fishman outlined how he thinks the IDF will prepare for a Hezbollah offensive.
“The IDF will go into next Lebanon war with more firepower and upgraded capabilities.” Claims Fishman.
“The Scud missiles which Hezbollah reportedly received from Syria are meant for a specific objective. Should it indeed turn out that the missiles smuggled in are of the Scud D type, this is apparently a threat on Israel's nuclear reactor in Dimona.

As far as is known, Hezbollah does not have plans to take over areas in Galilee. It may have the ability to raid a community, purely for the symbolic and dramatic effect of such an attack. Its strategy will focus on sustained rocket and missile attacks deep into Israel. For that reason, most of its fortifications aim to protect and feed its strategic arm.

This protection is based on approximately 160 military compounds established in southern Lebanon, in villages and in their vicinity, including the Christian enclaves. For that reason, when the IDF held drills it referred to the communities as military compounds in every way. When it happens the army will head into the next war in Lebanon with a tried and practiced operational plan “

Hezbollah has learnt the lessons drawn from the Second Lebanon War. It has studied “Operation Cast Lead” in Gaza and realises that the next round will be different. The operation in the south in 2008-9 demonstrated to an even greater extent than in 2006 the grave results of the IDF's so-called "Dahiya Doctrine" – Nasrallah realises that today the IDF is a better trained, better equipped and a far more formidable military machine.

For this reason, Hezbollah (as well as Hamas) is rapidly digging in, building fortifications underground – bunkers, headquarters, control centres, and connecting tunnels from one sector to another.

Relating to Hezbollah’s capabilities Fishman says, “In order to direct coordinated fire at the same target, one needs a much more advanced command and control system than the system Hezbollah has. Here, in fact, lies its vulnerability. On the one hand, it's hard to cope with a terror group that conducts itself like an army. On the other hand, Hezbollah is already suffering from all the problems that plague an institutionalised military organisation; problems which small and clandestine guerilla cells are not afflicted with.

In the Second Lebanon War, the Air Force destroyed Hezbollah's long-range missiles within 35 minutes. Meanwhile, 50% of the rockets fired from mass produced short and mid range rocket launchers were destroyed before they were used, while the rest were destroyed immediately after the first attack. We can assume that the Israeli Air Force's and ground forces' abilities in terms of accurate weaponry and hitting such targets have improved considerably since then.”.

“Hezbollah's goal,” says Fishman, “is to maintain a standing army of at least 40,000 men, Today it has less than half of that, and the increase it aspires for requires compromise on manpower quality. Moreover, advanced weapons systems require strict maintenance and high technological capabilities. A requirement Hezbollah doesn’t possess at the present time.

In the next war, UNIFIL will not be in south Lebanon. Its members will leave when the war breaks out, even if they're not saying this right now. UNIFIL does not have the mandate to interfere in the fighting, and it certainly has an interest in saving its own skin.

On another front, the 15,000 troops of the Lebanese Army deployed south of the Litani River do not constitute a target for the IDF at this time. However, this army is expected to put up a fight once a war breaks out. Based on this logic, the IDF will be addressing this army as a hostile force. In other words, any clash that includes IDF ground movement in Lebanon will have to push aside and neutralize these 15,000 troops as quickly as possible.

Nasrallah is apparently unconvinced that his organisation has reached the optimal point to embark on war. He possesses endless amounts of rockets, but not many accurate and long-range missiles. We can assume that once he accumulates a sufficient arsenal, the countdown will begin. “

This opinion based on the inevitability of a confrontation with Hezbollah ignores the deterrence factor. It assumes that Hezbollah’s very raison d'être is to destroy Israel and because of its fanatical dedication to this goal it can’t be deterred. Nevertheless, observers who don’t subscribe to the “inevitability scenario” claim that Israel’s overwhelming military superiority and its preparedness to meet the contingency of a Hezbollah offensive is suffice to deter Nasrallah from taking a rash and ill-considered action.

On one front the Lebanese have already won the war. Disregarding the Lebanese Miss America crowned recently I’ll move on to the much publicised hummus war.

We reacted with a measure of resignation and humour to the news that Lebanon one-upped us for the world record for the largest plate of hummus.

In the latest round of the hummus war between Israel and Lebanon , a team of Lebanese chefs prepared a serving of hummus that weighed in at 23,130 kilograms (59,992 pounds), setting a Guinness World Record .

That broke the record set in January by a restaurant in the Israeli Arab town of Abu Gosh, outdoing an older Lebanese record..

As one observer commented aptly, "It's better to battle over hummus than over human lives.”

Have a good weekend

Beni 20th of May, 2010.