I’ll hazard a guess and wager that most Israelis this week have been preoccupied with the weather. We are experiencing an almost unprecedented heat wave, which our meteorologists promise will end on Friday. They also forecast that temperatures will soar again on Tuesday or Wednesday next week. The Israel Electric Corporation is struggling to apportion its meagre reserves without resorting to power cuts.

The broadened coalition government ended this week when Kadima chose to leave the government and return to the opposition benches.  The party’s ten week coalition partnership yielded no gains and further undermined its hold on the centre ground of the Israeli political arena..

Kadima’s  coalition venture began and ended  with a futile effort to replace the defunct  Tal Law with alternative legislation designed to bring about  a more equal sharing of the defence burden.  Once again the prime minister vacillated, alternatively supporting and opposing  the proposed legislation empowering the government to draft Haredi men for military service as well as  to an alternative  national service scheme. However, when the two Haredi parties in the coalition government  threatened to resign he withdrew his support for the draft proposal .

After the terrorist attack on Israeli tourists in Bulgaria our anti-terrorist  intelligence agency spokesmen  have been busy explaining why they didn’t advise Israelis not to visit Bulgaria. The Black Sea resort where the Israeli tourists were murdered differed little from other travel destinations in the Mediterranean, Europe and further afield. Perhaps the lax airport security at Burgas should have alerted Mossad analysts, but it didn’t.

Furthermore, there are limits to an active Israeli security presence in foreign countries. I’m sure corrective measure are being made and now that the identity of the suicide bomber is known it is already clear who sent him.

He wasn’t a lone operative, at least ten people provided all he needed to reach his target and carry out his terror attack.

Both Iran and Hezbollah were quick to deny any involvement in the attack. Iran went so far as to condemn the attack. However, these denials are part and parcel of the cover up methods they employed after other terrorist attacks.

Israel has accused both Hezbollah and its patron Iran for carrying out the attack

Three years ago Defence Viewpoints a UK Defence Forum published an assessment on the first anniversary of the assassination of Imad Mughniyah, one of Hezbollah's top military commanders. The authors wrote, “Because of Hezbollah's history of conducting retaliatory attacks after the assassination of its leaders, and the frequent and very vocal calls for retribution for the Mughniyah assassination, many observers (including Stratfor) have been waiting for Hezbollah to exact its revenge. “ Explaining why Hezbollah had not avenged Mughniyah’s death Fred Burton and Scott Stewart said, “In keeping with Hezbollah's history, if an attack is launched, we anticipate that it will have to be fairly spectacular, given the fact that Mughniyah was very important to Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsors - although the attack must not be so spectacular as to cause a full-on Israeli attack in Lebanon. Hezbollah can weather a few airstrikes, but it does not want to provoke an extended conflict. “…”Given Hezbollah's proclivity toward using a hidden hand, we suspect the attack will be conducted by a stealthy and ambiguous cell or cells that will likely have no direct connection to the organisation. For example, in July 1994, the group used Palestinian operatives to conduct attacks against the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish nongovernmental organization office in London. Also, as we have seen in prior attacks, if a hardened target such as an Israeli embassy or VIP is not vulnerable, a secondary soft target might be selected. The July 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association in Buenos Aires is a prime example of this type of attack. It should serve as a warning to Jewish community centers and other non-Israeli government targets everywhere that even non-Israeli Jewish targets are considered fair game. “

The Burgas suicide bomber certainly didn’t arouse suspicion and it seems he probably would have passed standard profile screenings. It still remains to be determined why the Iranians/Hezbollah terrorists would bother targeting Israeli tourists.

They certainly aren’t the retribution they seek for Mughniyah’s assassination.

In fact they clearly indicated after the attack that the Burgas bombing certainly wasn’t the vengeance they sought.

Nasrallah has Syria on his mind. If Assad falls the weapons supply line to Hezbollah might be severed. Iran too is concerned. After Assad there is no guarantee that its proxies, Syria and Hezbollah will be able or willing to project Iranian Shiite influence in the region.

In the meantime observers, analysts and our intelligence communities are convinced that Assad’s days are numbered.

Israel has increased its military presence along the northern border.

On Thursday Defence Minister Ehud Barak toured the Golan Heights. While he spoke with reporters close to the border a battle between Syrian government forces and rebel fighters was raging  a mere 300 metres away.

Many people  are concerned about what will happen after Assad. However the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) has pointed out some of the dangers we face now. “Recent reports of dozens of Kuwaiti jihadists traveling to fight in the Syrian conflict further highlight the stronger foothold radical Islamic groups are gaining in Syria. Since January 2012, Syria has been transformed into a major battleground of the jihad world, with a number of foreign and Syrian jihadist groups surfacing to participate in the conflict. This development not only poses a serious threat to the present Syrian government or any government that may follow, but also threatens the armed opposition in Syria, headed by the Free Syrian Army (FSA).”

The authors of the INSS article noted that at least ten different foreign and Syrian groups with varying ideologies are waging a militant jihad in Syria. In spite of these differences, a useful distinction becomes apparent when comparing each group’s mode of operation, which can be categorized as one of three types: In the first category there are “support” groups that predominantly assist the flow of arms and fighters into Syria. The second category is made up of “guerilla” groups that carry out small scale but regular attacks on security forces, and in the third type  there are “terror” groups that carry out high profile bombings outside the usual fighting areas.

Michael Eisenstadt director of the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute .related to Syria’s stocks of chemical and biological weapons  in a recent issue of  Policy Watch. “Growing violence in Syria has raised concerns that the Assad regime might use its massive stockpile of chemical weapons (CW) against the opposition, or that anti-regime insurgents, al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, or other states might divert some of these arms for their own use.”

After surveying the very complex situation in Syria Eisenstadt concludes,

“Given these complexities, the preferred method of dealing with the problem of Syrian CW is to use  deterrence, assistance, containment, and elimination.

Deterrence. Washington must convince the Assad regime that the use of CW is a game-changer that could prompt international military action. It should also spread the word among regime security forces that those complicit in the use of CW will be sought out and punished, while those who refuse orders to use CW will be assisted if they choose to escape the country, or shielded from retribution should the regime fall.”

The Economist argued that Assad may be able to hang on for months. Alternatively, the paper said, “The assassination of two of Assad’s top aids   may tip the regime into a swift decline. Either way, now is the time to start preparing for the day when Syria is at last rid of him.

Syria after Assad will be a danger to its own people and its neighbours. Sectarian bloodletting is one risk, loose chemical weapons another, tides of refugees a third. Syria could become the focus of rivalry between Iran, Turkey and the Arab world. Violence could suck in Israel or spill over into Lebanon.

The world cannot eliminate these dangers, but it can mitigate them. Money and planning are essential to help found a new government. Regional diplomacy, with Turkey and the Arab League to the fore, will be needed to steady nerves. Peace-keepers and monitors may have a part. This calls above all for presidential diplomacy from America. In election season Barack Obama’s thoughts may be elsewhere; but this dangerous place needs some attention.”

So far we are spectators and I hope we remain looking on without getting involved.

Have a good weekend.

Beni                            19^th of July, 2012.