SINAI

David Schenker, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy posted an op-ed in one of its publications recently.

Under the heading “Egypt’s Remilitarized Sinai Is a Future Powder Keg” Schenker complained that Egypt and Israel are undermining their peace treaty. He advised both countries to walk back the changes they had made.

Recounting how the changes had come about he said, “In early May, the Islamic State-Sinai Province killed 11 Egyptian soldiers and damaged a natural gas pipeline. Far from demonstrating the Islamic State’s power in the strategic peninsula, the attack was the first major incident in almost a year, a far cry from the full-blown jihadi insurgency that had gripped Sinai only a few years ago. The Egyptian military finally appears to be making progress in rolling back the group. Not only have there been fewer attacks, but Cairo’s funnelling of economic development funds to the peninsula has also generated some goodwill among the long-restive population. In March 2021, a coalition of Bedouin tribesmen, armed civilians, and Egyptian military killed the region’s Islamic State leader.

Egypt’s apparent success has been, in part, a result of Cairo’s shift away from a heavy-handed military approach replete with collateral destruction and civilian casualties to a nimbler counterinsurgency strategy with a heavy emphasis on checkpoints and curfews. Israeli tactical air support has also played an important, if less publicized, role. Egyptian-Israeli cooperation contributed in another even more important way: by mutually agreeing to substantial violations of their 1978 peace treaty—or, more precisely, the treaty’s security annex limiting Sinai’s militarization. Not only has Egypt allowed Israel to operate over Egyptian territory, but Israel also allowed Cairo to flood Sinai with troops and heavy equipment substantially in excess of the treaty’s limits.

While these deployments have been indispensable to Egypt’s campaign against the Islamic State, they have also changed—perhaps irrevocably—the status quo for Sinai, where an international peacekeeping force still watches over what is stipulated in the peace treaty to be a largely demilitarized buffer zone. Although the current militarization of Sinai comes at a time of excellent Egyptian-Israeli relations, history suggests that this could quickly change. After all, it has been barely a decade since the Egyptian revolution brought an openly Islamist, anti-Israeli president to power. For nearly 45 years, the treaty’s limits on military deployment in Sinai buttressed the peace. If not reversed, Egyptian violations could threaten the core provisions of the agreement and, over time, compromise the integrity of the treaty.”

As far as I know, Israeli politicians, journalists, military affairs analysts, and security experts aren’t in the least concerned about these so-called violations.

If I’m not mistaken the U.S. State Department hasn’t questioned the wisdom of these infringements.  

I think David Schenker’s concern stems from his past role as head of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in the State Department during the George W. Bush administration.

 The worst-case scenario cited by Schenker hasn’t been overlooked by Israel. In the event of it happening, Israel is strong enough to bring about a return to the limitations set out in the annex to the 1973 peace treaty.

I want to add a personal note to this topic. Just before David Schenker posted his op-ed our daughter Irit went to Sinai for a few days. Her vacation was quiet, undisturbed by any jihadi insurgency. She stayed at a private beach holiday facility near Dhahab on the Gulf of Aqaba. No Wi-Fi, just sea, sand and the coral reef. Communication was difficult, even WhatsApp didn’t function completely. We had to make do with texting. Anyway, we will hear all about it

when she visits us next week.

 

Have a good weekend.

 

Beni,                                                               9^th of June, 2022.