Sinwar

 

Yahya Sinwar and Ismael  Haniyeh in better days 

Sifting through the numerous news reports on the Israel-Gaza war and its ramifications on our region and beyond it, is difficult, to say the least. Nevertheless, I found some foreign news media analyses particularly interesting.

 A piece in The Guardian posited that when Hamas leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, launched his devastating assault on Israel on 7 October, the militant group’s exiled leadership, like the rest of the world, was apparently caught unawares.

“From plush penthouses in Beirut, Doha and Istanbul, they watched the carnage that killed 1,200 Israelis unfold, as well as Israel’s retaliatory campaign on the Gaza Strip.

In the early days of the war, while Sinwar’s cadre was calling on Arab peoples across the Middle East to join the fight against Israel, the Doha-based chair of Hamas’s political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, appeared to focus on damage control. Talks mediated by Egypt, Qatar and the US resulted in a ceasefire and hostage and prisoner swaps at the end of November that lasted seven days before collapsing.

Now, it seems that those roles have reversed. According to reports, it is Sinwar and his men, exhausted from the fighting, who want to reach a temporary truce deal, and Haniyeh’s office that is demanding more concessions and holding out for a complete Israeli withdrawal.”

At this juncture I’ll add a brief comment: - Maybe Sinwar is on the run. However, he appears to be obstinately holding out for a better deal.

“On Tuesday night, cautious optimism for a deal returned, after fears that negotiations on a second truce were once again falling apart.

Qatar’s prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, and the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, said in a media conference in the Qatari capital, which formed part of Blinken’s latest whistle-stop diplomatic tour of the region, that Hamas had finally responded to the outlines of the deal.

“Hamas has comments, but in general the reply is positive,” the officials said, adding that the details have been forwarded to Israel.

It’s no secret that there is no love lost between Hamas’s leaders in Gaza and those outside. Such splits in opinion are not uncommon among militant organisations that are geographically scattered, but conflicting messages from the group in recent weeks regarding the talks have added to a sense that internal obstructions may have played a large role in holding up a deal.

The reported proposal on the table involves an initial six-week-long cessation of hostilities and phased release of the estimated 130 Israelis still held hostage in Gaza in exchange for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Foreign mediators hope that a permanent ceasefire can be negotiated during the pause.

A major sticking point appears to be how many and which Palestinians will be released, with the Wall Street Journal reporting that Hamas’s political wing is asking for almost 3,000 prisoners in exchange for just 36 Israeli civilians.

Unlike the November deal in which 110 Israelis were freed in return for 240 Palestinians, who were mostly women and children held for minor offences or in administrative detention, the new list is also believed to include hardened militants imprisoned for major crimes, such as planning or carrying out terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians.

Israeli officials have demanded that all hostages – alive and dead – are released in this exchange, and have refused to consider bringing the war to a complete close.”

In an op-ed written for Slate Magazine author-journalist Fred M. Kaplan said, “Secretary of State Antony Blinken has begun his fifth round of shuttle diplomacy in the region since Oct. 7, this time hoping to firm up two big projects. First is an Israel–Hamas cease-fire, combined with an exchange of hostages and prisoners, negotiated by U.S., Egyptian, and Qatari diplomats. Second is a broader, possibly transformative arrangement by which Saudi Arabia would “normalise” relations with Israel in exchange for formal security guarantees, more arms sales, and even the supply of (supposedly peaceful) nuclear technology from the United States.

There’s only one problem with these diplomatic breakthroughs: Israel and Hamas—the parties that have to stop fighting—haven’t signed on. Hamas’ leaders say that any cease-fire arrangement has to be permanent and that they will free the remaining 100 or so Israeli hostages only if Israel withdraws all of its troops from Gaza and frees thousands of Palestinian prisoners. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed to keep fighting until all his objectives are met, including the elimination of Hamas as political ruler of Gaza and as a military force that can threaten Israel. There is also disagreement over the ratio of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners to be freed. Finally, the negotiating parties haven’t yet settled the question of who governs, rebuilds, and provides security in and around Gaza.

In the end, Israel and Hamas may have to be budged off their most stubborn points of resistance by their biggest allies—Hamas by Qatar, Israel by the United States. Qatar holds a uniquely bizarre position, as a friend to both the U.S. and Hamas. President Biden has declared Qatar to be a “major non-NATO ally,” and it is host to the largest U.S. air base in the region. At the same time, Qatar is the major supplier of economic aid to Hamas-run enterprises in Gaza, and some Hamas leaders have lavish houses on Qatari real estate.

The U.S., of course, is Israel’s largest military supplier. Biden has compelled Netanyahu to take certain moderating steps in the war—opening a humanitarian corridor, allowing a weeklong trade of hostages for prisoners. But he has had limited influence in getting Israel to scale back its attacks in Gaza or reduce civilian casualties—and no sway whatever in getting Netanyahu to take steps toward a two-state solution to the long-festering Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Biden could do more. He and his aides are reportedly mulling the option of simply declaring the existence of a Palestinian state, perhaps through a U.N. resolution. Many other world leaders have discussed this possibility, but U.S. presidents have rejected the notion, saying recognition must be the final step in such a process. For the U.S. to threaten passage of such a measure—perhaps on condition that the state’s territory (whatever its delineations) be demilitarised and that its leaders (whoever they are) recognise Israel’s right to exist—could exert tremendous leverage on Israel to get negotiations rolling.

Along these lines, in recent days, there has been a very intriguing twist in possible moves toward Saudi–Israeli relations.

The Saudi royal family and the other Sunni Arab leaders have never materially cared much about the Palestinians’ fate, choosing to support them only rhetorically. And in recent years, the Sunnis have come to see Israel as a possible ally, both for trade and to shore up the alliance against their common foe, the Shiite mullahs and proxies of Iran. In pursuit of relations with Israel, the Sunnis were pushing the Palestinians steadily aside; a Saudi deal would have pushed their cause off the table entirely. The Oct. 7 attack put the cause back front and centre. The Saudi and Egyptian populations are more radical than their leaders. The leaders had to voice sympathy for Hamas and suspend open dealings with Israel, especially after Israel’s bombing began. A few weeks ago, Saudi leaders said they were still interested in normalising relations with Israel, but only if Israel took concrete and “irreversible” steps toward facilitating a Palestinian state.

“It may be that the leadership in Doha, because they were not really involved in the planning of 7 October, are trying to reassert dominance and prove that they are the ones who are really in charge,” said Dr H.A Hellyer, a senior associate fellow in international security studies at the Royal United Services Institute who is also a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“It is also possible that their positions are not so far apart and the talks are derailing for some other reason. These are very sensitive negotiations, and it doesn’t take much for someone to throw in a wrench (spanner) if they want to strut about for some personal motivation we don’t know about.”

It also suits the preferred Israeli narrative that Hamas’s top leaders are divided, Hellyer added. “The Israeli government can turn around and say: there’s no political will on the other side, so we can keep prosecuting the war,” he said.

According to al-Aqsa, the Hamas-affiliated television channel, the group is deliberating with “all the representatives from the different factions and organisations in the Palestinian sphere” to promote Palestinian national interests, the first of which is “stopping the [Israeli] aggression, rehabilitating the Gaza Strip, and releasing the prisoners”.

The reported proposal on the table involves an initial six-week-long cessation of hostilities and phased release of the estimated 130 Israelis still held hostage in Gaza in exchange for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Foreign mediators hope that a permanent ceasefire can be negotiated during the pause.

A major sticking point appears to be how many and which Palestinians will be released, with the Wall Street Journal reporting that Hamas’s political wing is asking for almost 3,000 prisoners in exchange for just 36 Israeli civilians.

Unlike the November deal in which 110 Israelis were freed in return for 240 Palestinians, who were mostly women and children held for minor offences or in administrative detention, the new list is also believed to include hardened militants imprisoned for major crimes, such as planning or carrying out terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians.

Israeli officials have demanded that all hostages – alive and dead – are released in this exchange, and have refused to consider bringing the war to a complete close.

The trick is that all of these elements must be achieved almost simultaneously—a cease-fire, an exchange of hostages for prisoners, a toning-down (at very least) of rocket fire from Iranian proxies, and at least baby steps toward a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This last bit—the one that so many often-well-meaning diplomats have tried to achieve over the decades—would also have to involve an agreement on how to repair the damage in Gaza, how to secure the Gazan borders (with Israel to the north and with Egypt to the south), and how to replace the aging, ailing leadership of the Palestinian Authority.

If Biden and the others can pull this off, it will be a triumph for the ages. If they can’t, it will be, at best, a return to normalcy—which, for the Middle East, means occasional eruptions of horrendous violence—and, at worst, a widening, deepening, and prolonged version of the savage war and constant danger flashing on all fronts today.

The BBC quoted comments made by a ‘senior Israeli representative’ speaking to Israel's Channel 13.  The unnamed official said, “Some of Hamas’ demands could not be met, but Israeli authorities were debating whether to reject the proposal outright or request alternative conditions.

“While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insists the goal is ‘total victory’, Israeli officials acknowledge that is still a long way off and some insist it is not even achievable militarily.

Earlier, a senior Hamas official told the BBC that it had ‘presented a positive vision’ to the Israel-backed proposal but had asked for some amendments relating to the rebuilding of Gaza and the return of its residents to their homes.”

The US, one of the main brokers in these indirect Israel-Hamas talks, still sees negotiations as the ‘best path forward’ and is pressing hard along with its Arab partners.

Their goal is to achieve a sustained humanitarian pause, which could lead to a ceasefire and provide breathing space to focus on a more ambitious plan for the ‘day after’ the end of the war.

Secretary of State Blinken called it an ‘incredibly powerful path’ which would pave the way to the rebuilding of Gaza, a reformed Palestinian Authority and eventually a Palestinian state, as well as a normalisation of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

The US and its Arab allies worry about the growing risks of a wider regional conflagration. And many international organisations are loudly warning of the deepening humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in the Gaza enclave.

I simply can’t conclude on such a despondent note. At least the weather has been good! The winter rains hold promise of good yields for Israeli and Palestinian farmers alike. Both the total precipitation and its distribution have been better than we expected.

 

Have a good weekend.

 

Beni,

8^th of February, 2024.