Disclaimer: Most of the topics included in my posts are quoted from open-source intelligence (OSINT). Occasionally I add a personal comment.
The Guardian dedicated an editorial to a feasible endgame for the Gaza conflict, complaining that Binyamin Netanyahu does not have an endgame.
By the way, the IDF prefers to call the Gaza operation by the Hebrew nom de guerre ‘timron’ which translates as ‘manoeuvre.’
“What happens to Gaza the day after the war ends?” asked Patrick Wintour diplomatic editor for The Guardian.
“When US Secretary Of State Antony Blinken arrived in the Middle East on his most recent visit, one of his aims was to clarify what happens to Gaza after the war, but some of Blinken’s ideas have met with opposition from Israel and Arab states.
Jordan’s foreign minister, Ayman Safadi, said on Saturday at a press conference alongside Blinken: “What happens next? How can we even entertain what will happen in Gaza when we do not know what kind of Gaza will be left when this war is over? Are we going to be talking about a wasteland? Are we going to be talking about a whole population reduced to refugees? Simply, we do not know – we do not have all the variables to even start thinking about that.”
Netanyahu discussed potential "tactical pauses" in a phone call with US President Joe Biden on Monday. However, in a statement that was issued following their conversation there was no mention of a ceasefire.
While key Israeli ally, the United States is seeking a humanitarian "pause" in the fighting, several countries and UN agencies have repeatedly called for a ceasefire.
"There will be no ceasefire -- general ceasefire -- in Gaza, without the release of our hostages," Netanyahu said.
"As far as tactical, little pauses -- an hour here, an hour there -- we've had them before. I suppose we'll check the circumstances in order to enable goods -- humanitarian goods -- to come in or our hostages, individual hostages, to leave," he added.
A very pragmatic opinion was put forward by Jacob Nagel, Lieutenant General (res.) and professor at the faculty of Aeronautics and Aerospace Engineering at the Technion in Haifa and head of the Centre for Security Science and Technology (CSST) Texas. He argues that Israel cannot risk relinquishing security control of Gaza. “No matter which entity will take responsibility for Gaza’s civil affairs, Israel will be the full security authority. “The entire Gaza Strip, especially Gaza City, will be demilitarised and will not contain tunnels, weapons or the ability to produce weapons.
All goods that enter Gaza will be completely monitored by Israel, and Israeli security forces will be able to enter Gaza anytime, anywhere, to ensure the removal of any potential threat to Israel.” I think Jacob Nagel’s opinion is widely endorsed by both rank and file Israelis and leaders alike.
The need to be ever watchful was stressed by Howard LaFranchi in his report for the Christian Science Monitor on October 23.
“Hamas is not a carpetbagger extremist group, but a deeply implanted governing organisation espousing a brand of Palestinian nationalism that won’t be extinguished with regime change in Gaza.”
Then suddenly, out of nowhere, there ‘came a blast from the past.’ Former Fatah strongman Mohammed Dahlan gave an interview to The Economist from the comfort of his chosen exile in Abu Dhabi. He suggested that after the war a two-year transitional technocratic government should be created for Gaza and the West Bank jointly. After that, elections with all Palestinian political factions standing, including Hamas, should take place for a parliamentary system of government, without a President. This Palestinian state should be internationally recognised.
Dahlan remains a powerful figure in Gaza, where he formerly ran security for PA President Mahmoud Abbas and has since brokered deals to bring money and fuel into the Strip.
However, he dismisses the suggestion that he would agree to be installed by Israel to rule the enclave. His reputation was damaged in the Karni scandal of 1997 when it was revealed that Dahlan was diverting 40% of the taxes levied at the Karni border crossing (an estimated one million Shekels a month) to his personal bank account.
Jon B Alterman also posed the question - “What Comes After War in Gaza.”
Alterman is senior vice president, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and the director of the Middle East Programme at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Earlier in his career, he was a member of the policy planning staff at the U.S. Department of State, a special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and a foreign policy adviser to Senator Daniel P. Moynihan.
“War contains many uncertainties, but there are some things about the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas that seem in little doubt. One is that Israel will deal Hamas a decisive blow. It will kill thousands of Hamas fighters, destroy the organisation’s infrastructure, and neutralise much of its weapons stocks.
Another is that Israel will refuse a return to the status quo ante, as it has done in the four other times since 2007 that it has struck out against Hamas in Gaza. Israeli security officials had often called it ‘mowing the grass,’ the unpleasant task that inevitably needs to be done periodically. That strategy has failed.
Yet the things that will determine who ultimately wins this war are entirely uncertain. What politics will emerge in Gaza after the fighting stops and the rubble is cleared? Who will be in control, and who will support them? Will Gazans seek a pathway forward living in peace and increased prosperity, or will the voices of alienation and despair grow even louder and usher in a new cycle of violence?
Not surprisingly, Israelis are not discussing these longer-term questions much yet. Israelis are still reeling from the shocking losses of October 7 and the unfolding hostage crisis. They are united in their need to act firmly, to reassert Israel’s deterrent power, and to avenge the hundreds of acts of cold-blooded murder.
Increasingly, they are also critical of their leadership. They accuse politicians and the military alike of missing the signs of an impending attack and of being distracted from the country’s real security issues. The time for accountability will come. In the meantime, Israelis will need their leadership to make an excruciating decision: when to stop fighting, and on what terms.
This challenge is not unique to Israel. All military operations reach levels of diminishing returns. They start off with robust target sets and frequent advances. Over time, it costs more and more to get less and less incremental benefit.
The impending Israeli assault on Gaza will produce a stream of disturbing images that will capitalise on increasingly lax content moderation by some social media platforms. What Hamas cannot win on the battlefield it will seek to win through information operations. Israeli leaders know they will come under profound international pressure to stop fighting and start negotiating, and that pressure is likely to become overwhelming within a month of beginning ground operations.” Well, this week a month after the ‘manoeuvre’ began we still haven’t come to the end of our tether.
Virtually all of the Arab states are hostile to Hamas, whose roots are in the Muslim Brotherhood. Regional governments see the Brotherhood as a threat, and they see Hamas’ Iranian patrons as a major threat, too. They are fundamentally strategically aligned with Israel and the U.S.
There are potential roles for Gulf Arab States, which can both help fund Gaza’s recovery and help give Arab legitimacy to what comes after.
Further to that, Alterman said, “But ultimately, a better outcome in Gaza requires Gazans to rise to the opportunity of a different kind of leadership. Hamas’ vicious attack on October 7 will prove to be a pyrrhic victory. It has strengthened Israeli resolve to destroy the organisation and its capabilities. The destruction of Gaza will be comprehensive, and it needs to provoke some soul-searching among Palestinians.
There also needs to be an Israeli recognition that there is both the possibility and the necessity for a different kind of relationship with Gaza in particular and Palestinian aspirations more generally. This will be hard for an Israeli public that has grown comfortable with the idea that the Palestinian problem is not only too hard to solve, but also a problem that doesn’t need to be solved, a problem behind walls.”
My own conclusion is that as long as Palestinian leaders insist on including their ‘excess baggage’ in the deal, there will be no deal. By ‘excess baggage’ I refer to the multi-generation Palestinian refugees keys-in-hand demanding to return home.
Have good weekend,
Beni,
9th of November, 2023.
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